Strengthening the institutional structure of urban development land market in Malaysia by Omar, Ismail et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strengthening the Structure  
of Development Land Market in Kampong Baru, Kuala Lumpur –  
Transaction Cost of Institutional Economics  
Analysis Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate Professor Dr Ismail Omar 
Dr Hajjah Asiah Othman 
Djurjani Wardata 
Prijono Nugroho Djojomartono 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
To: 
Research Management Center, UTM 
Colleagues at UTM 
All respondents, KLCH, professionals and MAS Board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There will be no development without land being available in the market. Although 
land is available in the market for development, without landowners’ willingness to 
participate or transfer their land to land developers under development arrangement, 
there will be no development takes place too. This is known as land supply 
constraints that restrict the flow of land supply onto the land market for development 
purposes. In other word, land supply constraints disturb the effectiveness of the land 
market. As a result, the underutilized area may become derelict and needs 
regeneration as part of urban renewal programs. The study begins with discussion on 
institutional economics analysis and transaction costs approach. In particular, review 
on literature concentrates on the elements of land supply constraints with the 
purpose to feed the empirical analysis in the case study areas. In doing so, the study 
on the institutional structure of the land supply in the market may disclose ways to 
improve the land supply constraints for land development.  Empirically, the study 
seeks to investigate sources of land supply constraints in the case study area of MAS 
Kampong Baru, Kuala Lumpur. Data were gathered using interviews with 
landowners of undeveloped and developed sites to examine why they had paid effort 
to develop or simply abandoned their lands undeveloped. Analysis had been 
undertaken by qualitative techniques on respondents using coding, either direct or 
indirect quotations. Landowners respondent were taken randomly to represent 
predetermined zones within the case study areas. Property professional respondents 
were taken purposively for interviews. Data analysed were presented in the forms of 
charts, histograms, diagrams and illustrations to ease discussion. One of the main 
findings is that landowners were unwilling to undertake redevelopment due to land 
supply constraints as revealed by transaction cost embedded within their status of 
landownership, attitudes, physical, planning, valuation and market constraints. In the 
end, the findings enable various interested parties to realize their roles and 
responsibilities in their future direction to redevelop Kampong Baru in Kuala 
Lumpur. One of the ways is to undertake joint effort in applying land readjustment 
technique to redevelop Kampong Baru.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
Tiada pembangunan tanpa tanah tersedia di pasaran. Sekalipun tanah tersedia di 
pasaran, tanpa kerelaan tuan tanah untuk melibatkan diri melalui urusan peruntukan 
dan kos kewangan yang sesuai, pembangunan tidak akan berlaku juga. Keadaan ini 
dinamai sebagai halangan penawaran tanah yang menyekat aliran bekalan tanah di 
pasaran untuk dimajukan. Akhirnya, tanah akan terhalang daripada dimajukan. 
Kawasan yang mempunyai tanah terbiar sebegini akan menjadi kawasan mundur 
yang perlu dimajukan di bawah program pembangunan dan pembaharuan semula 
bandar. Kajian ini bermula dengan kupasan mengenai teori analisis ekonomi institusi 
dengan menjurus kepada peranan kos transaksi. Secara khusus, kajian literatur 
menumpu kepada halangan penawaran tanah untuk maksud pembangunan semula 
yang akan digunakan semasa kajian lapangan di kawasan kajian. Perbincangan 
mengenai halangan pembangunan tanah dalam konteks kos transaksi menurut 
pendekatan analisis ekonomi institusi akan menghurai masalah keengganan tuan 
tanah memajukan tanah mereka di kawasan kajian yang boleh digunakan untuk 
mengatasi masalah berkenaan. Jadi, kawasan kajian yang dipilih adalah Kawasan 
MAS di Kampong Baru, Kuala Lumpur. Data-data dikumpulkan melalui temu bual 
dengan tuan tanah yang telah memajukan tanah mereka dan juga yang masih belum 
memajukannya. Analisis data dijalankan melalui kaedah kualitatif secara 
pengekodan langsung mahupun tidak langsung. Responden tuan tanah dip[ilih 
secara rawak dan responden profesional pula dipilih secara purposif. Data-data 
dipersembahkan melalui carta, histogram, jadual dan juga ilustrasi bagi 
memudahkan pembentangan. Salah satu dapatan utama daripada kajian ini adalah 
tuan tanah terhalang daripada memajukan tanah-tanah mereka disebabkan halangan 
penawaran tanah yang terangkum sebagai kos transaksi yang termasuklah masalah 
kepemilikan, sikap mereka, perancangan, fizikal, penilaian dan pasaran dan 
sebagainya. Dapatan telah menjadikan tuan tanah dan pihak terbabit sedar tentang 
tanggung jawab mereka untuk memajukan tanah di kawasan kajian. Salah satu cara 
untuk memajukan tanah MAS di Kampong Baru adalah melalui pendekatan 
pelarasan semula tanah yang melibatkan semua pihak berkepentingan. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1       Introduction 
 
Land supply in the market determines the success of land development. The 
urban land markets play a critical role in shaping urban development outcomes 
(Serra and David Dowall, 2004).  The lacking of land in the market, compare to the 
demand for it, is known as land supply constraints (Adams, 1994). 
 
There are various factors causing land supply constraints.  Among others are 
government role in the form of planning (Popetan in Hui, 2004), complex 
regulations (Dowall, 2003), the quality of titling registration and tenure security 
(Dowall, 2003), passive land owner (Adams, 1994), multiple ownership of urban 
land (Adams et al., 2000a),  macro economic variables as well as physical condition 
of the lands (Knaap  and Terry Moore, 2000).  Therefore, land supply constraint is a 
complex phenomenon whereby the flow of land into the market is restricted and 
hence, limits agents interactions in the market, As a result, the price of land tends to 
increase due to higher demand compared to the level of land available in the 
market. As such, to understand the nature of land supply constraint, the analysis 
should address the knowledge about the characteristics of the land market process 
including the behavior of the agents involved in it (Keogh and D Arcy ,1998). 
 
 In the field of land and property markets, only few studies focused primarily 
on the institutional market processes which may lead to supply constraint. Previous 
studies considered market as the output of interaction between seller and buyer and 
no external factors influencing it (Needham and Arno Segeren, 2005). Another 
study focused on the direct impact of the problems in the creation of land supply 
problems (Hui, 2004; Peng, 1994; Tse, 1998).  Less attention is given to the role of 
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rules and agents influencing the land market particularly with regards to indigenous 
lands. Ismail (1999) argued that institutional economics analysis has the 
explanatory power to characterize the role of rules and agents’ interaction in the 
land market processes. 
 
This study aims at understanding the land supply constraint of indigenous 
lands in Kampong Baru, Kuala Lumpur.  The study uses institutional economics 
analysis to explain the way in which formal and informal rules or institutions that  
influence the decision made by actors in defining, maintaining,  utilizing and 
transferring the rights for exchange in the market (Benham  and Lee Benham, 
1998).  
 
1.2       Problem Statements 
 
Why do indigenous land rights in Kuala Lumpur are still largely 
undeveloped? Although location is right, the price is high and the demand is good, 
but unfortunately the lands are just laid under-utilized. There are difficulties to 
bring the lands into the market due to the land supply problems.  Indigenous lands 
in its very nature have specific characteristics in term of history and rules governing 
them, relationship between landowners and the lands and their environments.  
Therefore the main problem addressed in this research is how the institutional 
economics approach can be used to understand the land supply constraint 
phenomenon in the case study area, particularly the role of institutions in 
influencing agents’ attitudes to bring the land into the market. 
 
In assessing land market processes, some issues will be addressed. The first 
issue is agents’ attitude.  Agents’ actions in the land market are always framed by 
the existing organization and institutions which is commonly known as the structure 
(Healey and Barrett in  Adams et al, 1998). This market structure acts as the 
mediating device which provides rules that enable and constrain the various forms 
of agent actions (Adams et al, 1998). Secondly, which landowners are actively or 
passively involved in the land market of the MAS areas and why they made such 
decisions.  The landowners are a part of the structure of the urban land market 
especially with the indigenous lands (Evans, 2004).  Last, which institutions and 
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market attributes that produce special formal and informal institutions which 
subsequently hinder the transaction of indigenous land from landowners to land 
developers in the market.  
 
 
1.3       Significance of Study 
 
From practical point of view, the result of this study, particularly the 
structure of land market, can be used as a source of future reference which is 
relevance in answering some questions being asked by various parties. This result 
hopefully can also provide clear understanding about the degree of involvement of 
any parties in the land market and the role of which parties should be strengthened. 
For the government it is hoped that this approach provides input to direct the future 
of the MAS areas, particularly related to the land supply constraints so that the 
phenomenon of underutilized lands can be improved.  In so doing, using research 
analysis and research findings, government can evaluate the current institutions 
particularly those which provide constraints and cause transaction cost to the supply 
of land and in the long run can establish the most encouraging regulations that 
support land market for land development.  Landowners who currently still become 
the most important actors in the land market can take strategic actions to maximize 
their ownership without having to discourage the environmental development.  
Similarly, organizations or parties may also get benefit from the newly alternative 
approach to actively participate in the land market in the study area considering 
future direction proposed in this research. 
 
 
1.4       Scope of Study 
 
The field of study of this research is land economy with special reference to 
the structure of indigenous land market in Kampong Baru Kuala Lumpur. The focus 
of  the research is the causes of land supply constraints of indigenous lands. 
 
Research discussing about land supply commonly used market price to 
examine either the factors causing land supply or the effects of land supply on the 
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other market (Peng, 1994; Tse 1998; Lai and Wang, 1999; Hui and Ho, 2002; Hui, 
2004; Evans, 2004). Since this approach more focused on the output/price 
consideration, the complex phenomenon of the land supply such as actors’ attitude 
and the role of institutions can’t be explained completely (Ismail, 1999). Han and 
Yong Wang (2003) tried to include institutions factors in the study of property 
market in Hongkong.  However, it didn’t focus on the problem of land supply.  
While a study about land supply constraint of indigenous lands has been done by 
Ismail (1999).  He used institutional analysis, particularly the role of formal and 
informal rules, to understand the land supply constraints of indigenous lands for 
land development.  This study is, however, an extension to elaborate the role of 
actors within indigenous land rights in the land market which influence the supply 
of lands. 
 
The strands of institutional economics analysis used in this study are the 
way in which property right and actors’ behaviour affect land transfers.  The reason 
is that formal and informal rules influence the decision made by actors in defining, 
maintaining,  utilizing and transferring the rights (Benham  and Lee Benham, 1998).  
Therefore the study will focus on the way, the reason agents participate in the land 
market and the way existing rules provide either incentive or constraint that cause 
limitation in the structure of indigenous land market.   
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Institutional economics analysis concerns with the human behaviour and 
institutions which constrain the interactions among agents.  The interaction between 
agents and institutions will determine the structure of the activity and also the 
institutional changes.  In the case of land and property market, beside the factors 
discussed above, the restriction in interests is a factor that hinders the transferability 
of lands in the land market.  There are a number of agents involved in the land 
transfer process including government, land owners, developers, investors and 
financial facilitators or investors.  Therefore this research will identify the role of 
each agents and the decision made by agents either to bring or not to bring the land 
to the markets. 
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The first step in this research is to develop theoretical framework about the 
role of institutions that affects actors’ attitude and subsequently create the problem 
of land supply in the land market.  This framework is developed based on the 
previous researches and literatures.  It is then used as the guidance to develop 
empirical analysis.  
 
Since this research will analyze the processes within the complex 
interrelationships among agents, therefore qualitative research method will be used 
preferably to approach the problems (Deddy, 2001).  In addition, qualitative method 
also has the advantage of being open to the possibility of detecting important issues 
that might not have been predicted before (Kim, 2002).  The last reason is based on 
the assumption that social phenomenon is very complex, and to make that 
framework to encompass all variables is not a trivial work. 
 
Empirical works then will be conducted to assess the frameworks that have 
been developed.  In doing so, two types of data namely primary data and secondary 
data will be collected.  For the primary data, open-ended questionnaires are used as 
an instrument to collect empirical data.  The questionnaires were distributed to the 
landowners in the case study area.  Purposive sampling technique is used to select 
the respondents.  In this case the selection is on the current condition of the lots 
such as the developed-undeveloped lots and lots which have been transferred.  
Whilst the interview will be directed to the land and property professional such as 
valuers and estate agents/land broker and also other related land and property 
market agents such as planners, land administrators, developers.  The secondary 
data could be collected from various sources such as libraries, related governments 
agencies such as Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur, MAS Board, Kuala Lumpur 
City Hall Valuation and Property Services Department, including maps covering the 
study area, land and property data, formal rules and macro economics data.  
 
Data on the land and property market,  prior to analysis stage,  will be 
converted into more interpretable presentation such as graphic and structured tables 
using software package such as SPSS or Excel. To analyze the data collected by 
questionnaires and in-depth interview, data coding technique will be used.  In this 
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technique, the first stage is to identify the phenomena, the condition causing the 
phenomena, the condition affecting the phenomena, strategy to overcome the 
phenomena as well as the result of this strategy.  Based on various types of 
processed-data, descriptive analysis can be drawn to answer the research objectives.  
Finally, conclusion and recommendation will be drawn based on the research 
findings and research analysis by using deductive analytics technique particularly to 
assess whether the framework that have been developed can be proved by the 
empirical data found in the case study area.  
 
 
 Empirical Works 
 
The main objective of empirical works is to collect data supporting the study 
such as property market, the formal rules, the land attributes, the interaction among 
agents which govern the land market structure and transaction cost particularly land 
supply constraints in the case study area. Subsequently this data will be used to 
asses the developed theoretical framework. Qualitative research approach will be 
used in this research based on the subject character.  Figure 1.1 shows the diagram 
of research methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
  Preparation and Literature 
     Review 
 
 
 
 
 
            Data Collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Data analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
   Finding, Conclusions and 
        Recommendations 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Research Methodology 
 
 
To know the boundary knowledge of the topic 
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collection 
Types : maps, formal 
and informal rules, 
statistical data on land 
property market 
To convert the data into more readable presentation 
To construct the causal-effect of the phenomena 
Descriptive analysis 
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Therefore, the following are the stages of the research: 
 
a. Preparation and literature review 
The objective of this stage is to offer a comprehensive knowledge about the 
subject of this research and also the boundary knowledge of this subject.  
Subsequently, the theorization will be used as a framework for the research 
methodology and empirical conduct. 
 
b. Development of research design 
Based on the literature review, research designed can be developed by 
considering characteristic of the subject-research, time and researcher 
capability.  In this step the research areas, agents and agencies are also 
determined.  Kampong Baru is an indigenous land area located within the 
central business district of Kuala Lumpur is selected as the study area.  In 1897 
it was established as Malay Agricultural Settlement by the Selangor State 
Government but there are lots of underutilized lands ever since.  
 
c. Data collection 
Two types of data will be collected namely primary data and secondary data. 
Questionnaires and in-depth interview to the agents and agencies involved in 
governing land and property market will be used as tools to collect primary 
data.  Among others agents to be interviewed are land owners and land and 
property market professional such as valuers and planners.  Sample data are 
determined by implementing selective random sampling technique.  While 
secondary data can come from other resources such as library, agency offices 
and individual agent.   
 
d. Data processing and data analysis 
Qualitative analysis to the observed data will be done by using the feasible and 
appropriate tool such as SPSS software package or Excel.  Using those 
software, the trends, the structure of each group of data can be identified easily.  
Descriptive analysis is selected to explain the phenomenon.   
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e. Conclusion and recommendations 
Conclusion and recommendation will be drawn based on the research analysis 
and findings.  Deductive analytics technique will be used to draw the conclusion 
and also to propose recommendation particularly to deal with the land supply 
constraints and the way to overcome them. 
 
 
 
Expected Results 
 
The expected result of this study is that the institutional economics analysis 
has significant power to understand the attributes of the supply constraint in the 
study case area so that any single factor influencing the supply of lands including 
rules can be identified. In the end, the source of land supply constraints can be 
improved and the underutilized lands would be able to be redeveloped at last. 
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2.0 THE STRUCTURE OF LAND MARKET AND 
THE LAND SUPPLY CONSTRAINT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 As a consequence of the economic growth, the need for additional space 
for human activities is unavoidably increasing.  The required spaces may be 
fulfilled by seeking newly raw lands or by intensifying the existing lands.  To 
achieve the above objectives, the land development process may involve the 
acquisition of raw lands, detailed physical planning, improvement of soil, 
construction of the infrastructure, implementation of public areas, parceling, and 
building site disposal (Levainen K.I. and Willem Korthals Altes, 2002).  It means 
that the availability of lands becomes the ultimate factor determining the 
successful of urban development.  However, Dowall (1995) stated that, for 
developing country, the problem of land development is not a shortage of 
developable lands, but the ineffective mechanism to assure the supply of lands for 
urban development.  It is due to the fact that land plays a very complex role in the 
society.  Land is not only a factor of development but also the product of 
commercial good and location. To a certain extent, land often portrays as an 
identity that is directly connected to a certain plot or area, the importance of which 
is extremely hard to determine in monetary terms (Platteau, 2000). The same is 
true for the function of land ownership as a source of power (Bardhan and Udry, 
1999). 
 
   Therefore, understanding the urban land market within the context of the 
urban development process is vital in explaining phenomenon of the land 
development and built environment.  This is due to the important of urban land 
markets which plays a critical role in shaping the outcome of urban development 
(Serra and David Dowall, 2004). 
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2.2   The Structure of Land and Property Market 
 
Structure can be defined as a mediating device which provides the rules 
that characterize the social system, thereby enabling or constraining the various 
forms of agency actions, the performance of which modifies and reconstitutes the 
structure over time and space (Adams et al, 1998).  In institutional economics 
theory, structure consists of the organization of economic and political activity 
and of prevailing values that frame individual decision making (Healey and 
Barrett in Adams et al, 1998).  Organization according to the definition provided 
by North (1996) is “ a group of individuals bound by some common purpose to 
achieve objectives”, further more “Organizations are created with purposive intent 
in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the existing set of 
constraints”.  Therefore, urban land market structure consist of organizations 
involved in the market that their activities and interactions are enabled or 
constrained by rules provided by the structure.  
 
Market can be defined as a group of buyers and sellers linked together by 
trade in the sale or purchase of particular commodity or service (Grinols,1994); as 
an arrangement by which buyers and sellers area brought together to fix a price at 
which goods can be exchanged (Harvey and Ernie Jowsey, 2004) and as a group 
buyers and sellers involved in the production and consumption of a single 
commodity come together to undertake transaction (Adams, 1994 a).  Therefore, 
property market can be defined as setting (rather than a place) in which property 
transaction are affected by buyers and sellers and their representatives at some 
agreed forms of settlement under the working institutions. As such, institutional 
economics analysis tries to enhance the notion of market through giving the 
markets characteristics of their own (Swedberg, 1994).  Thus, markets cannot be 
understood without regarding where and why costs accrue in their use and without 
looking at the underlying institutional framework (Hurrelman, 2003 ).   
 
Urban land market is only one facet of the whole land development 
processes and the property markets.  Ball (1998) mentioned that in the property 
market there are four interlinked markets namely user market, financial asset, 
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development market as well as urban land market which affect each others. User 
market is related to the stock of the property that may be owned directly by the 
user themselves, as owner occupiers, or rented from a property company. A stock 
of property also can be considered as financial assets to those owning it. 
Consequently, the behaviour of the market is driven by the opportunity cost of the 
capital invested in property. In the development market, property building takes 
place when demand of property increase so that the stock of the property need to 
be expanded.  The user and development market finally dictate the urban land 
market and determine urban land demand (Ball, 1998). Thus land is used 
exclusively for producing some other product (Dowall, 1995).  The demand for 
land is therefore derived from the demand for the product or service produced on 
the land. 
 
Sometimes land market is formal and informal (Harvey and Ernie Jowsey, 
2004).  The former is characterized by more open dissemination of information 
through such as newspapers or internet, and also commonly the process of transfer 
is mediated by estate agents.  Another example of formal market is auction held 
by government.  Whilst the latter, information is distributed to the more limited 
targets such as families or relatives, and very often brokers serve as middleman 
between the sellers and the buyers (Muchunga, 2001) 
 
According to OECD (1992), there are factors influencing the demand of 
land property market.  Firstly, the general economics factors such as economic 
development, interest level and expected profits.  Rate of interest, for example, 
influences the total spending on both consumption and investment.  When interest 
rate rise, the amount of property investment will fall, and vice versa ( Ball et al, 
1998).  The gross national product (GNP) is one of economic development 
indicators that denote the total spending. The rise of GNP represents in increased 
spending overall of all resident of a country (Harvey and Ernie Jowsey, 2004).  
 
The second factor is taxation policies.  Taxation policies influence the 
capability of individual household to allocate the wage for purchasing land and 
property since increase tax will reduce the net income of the household.  In other 
words, taxes will draw money out of the circular expenditure flow (Ball et al, 
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1998).   Capital transfer tax, for example, is among various taxes affecting 
landowners’ decision to hold their assets (Goodchild and Munton, 1985) 
 
The third factor is housing policies which usually in the form of 
government financial supports particularly addressed to the low income 
households.   There are various ways government may provide financial support 
to the households that affect  the demand of land such as provide loan for the 
purchase of land and location subsidy. The former subsidy will directly increase 
the capability to access the land market; the latter encourage the buyers to occupy 
those lands close to the public facilities which have been developed by 
government such as infrastructures (OECD, 1992).  
 
Finally, non-economic policies measures such as limitation on built up 
density is the fourth factor. Limitation of built up density in a certain area directly 
affects the developer to construct buildings, however indirect impacts to the 
demand of land emerge since the future opportunities can be gain from lands 
decreased because of density limitation (OECD, 1992).  
 
While from supply side, the most critical factors which influence the 
property stock is the availability of readily build-able lands (OECD, 1992), 
although it still not provide guarantee that the property development can be 
performed.  It is due to the need of planning approval from local authority as 
planning control before the development start.  It means that the supply of lands 
for urban development is not only determined by topography, distribution of 
infrastructure, the willingness of land owners to sell parcels, but also controlled by 
master plan and zoning policies, and (Dowall, 1993; Dowall et al, 2004).  
 
In term of the manner in which land may enter into the readily build-able 
lands stage, two possible ways can be identified, through market activities or 
through compulsory purchase taken by government. The letter is performed when 
the former manner failed to be carried out.  The land property market structure 
which indicates the factors involved and their relationship is shown in Figure 2.1 
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Figure 2.1 Land Property Market Structure 
(Source : Zhu Jieming  and Ismail, 2005) 
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Unlike other markets, where supply and demand determine the dynamics of 
market operation, land markets are not driven by perfectly competitive forces.  Land 
is not homogeneous; each parcel is unique, having a bundle characteristic that hardly 
unbundled such as a particular set of location, physical, and neighbourhood 
characteristics.  Actors in the land market are diverse and have divergent objectives,  
expectations, and strategies.  In some cases, only a few buyers and sellers may 
participate in particular land markets (Evans, 1994), and an individual land seller or 
buyer can greatly influence market outcomes (Dowall, 1995). This is the reason why 
perfect land market is almost never materialized (Evans, 1994). 
 
Borrowing the concept of bounded rationality, Keogh and D’Arcy (1998) 
proposed a concept, which considers physical and legal entity of the property and 
property market process, called ‘bounded efficiency’.  To assess bounded 
efficiency, the institution environment within which property market operates and 
the institutional mechanism become the gauge of market efficiency.  Therefore, 
institutional economics analysis which considered market as an institution produced 
by interaction of various agents also offers ways to analyze property (Keogh and 
D’Arcy, 1998, and Ismail 1999). 
 
Since processes cannot be separated from actors involved, considerations 
about the actors participating in the land market is the primary step addressed.  In 
the land development processes, there are important actors involved namely 
landowners, developers, investors as well as government. Whilst, in the land 
market, the key actors which determine the activity of the market are landowners, 
developers (private) and government (Ball et al, 1998; Fisher, 2005; OECD, 1992). 
Therefore the next sub chapter will discuss the role of each actor in the land market 
subsequently. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Government’s Role   
 
Discussion about the role of government in economic development, 
commonly can be found in the political economy literatures. Two common views 
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about the government’s function are well known as “delivery-service” and “social 
transformation” model.  The first focuses on a range of services which government 
should deliver goods such as in the form of “law and order”, social security and 
market regulation; the second looks at the role of the government in the 
transformation from one stage of societies into an other stage (for example from pre-
industrial societies into industrial capitalist) (Khan, 2002). For the two models, it 
seems that the first model provides facilities to explain about the government’s role 
in the land market.  
 
As a “delivery-service” body, in the macro level government provides 
institutions including law and order, stable property rights, key public goods and 
welfare redistributions.  The role of laws and regulations established by government 
is nothing but to increase the efficiency of resources distribution through identifying 
and controlling the related phenomenon in the distribution processes (Ogus, 2001).  
Beside as institutions producer, government is also the only body in society which 
can legitimately enforce institutions, collect taxes, redistribute income and wealth, 
represent and enforce social cohesion or resolve conflicts, in all cases using force if 
necessary (Khan, 2002).  
 
Discussion about property market particularly land market, property right 
system has crucial function as the basis to govern the relationship between people 
and lands. Thus, a stable and well-defined system of property rights are a 
precondition for efficient exchange (North, 1996).  Better titling and registration as 
well as more comprehensive land information system are among government 
policies related to the land ownership which affect significant impact to the land 
exchange (Dowall, 1993). Well-defined system of property rights exactly gives 
certainty for people in using the land to improve the production. In addition, such 
condition encourages the buyer or seller to perform transaction (Dam, 2006) 
 
 In the case that private market unable to achieve market efficiency, two 
approaches government may respond to the phenomenon. Firstly, Van Pennington 
in Buitelaar (2002) argued that it should be left to the market since in the market 
there are varieties of preference interest that only can be coordinated by the 
market itself through a process of mutual adjustment.  His second argument is 
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called self-interested government which derived from public choice theory.  The 
third and last argument is derived from new institutional economics and comes 
down to the assertion that private parties will be able to internalize externalities 
through the transaction of private property rights.  However, such ideal market is 
almost never materialized. Therefore, secondly, the involvement of the 
government to minimize the efficiency losses by arranging the institutional 
environment is needed (Rodenburg and Vreeker, 2002). 
 
 There are two manners government may involve to minimize market 
imperfection namely indirect involvement by providing regulations (Rodenburg 
and Vreeker, 2002) and direct involvement through direct participation in the 
market (Rivkin, 1983).  Property taxation, public ownership and land use 
regulation are among regulations that usually government use to overcome market 
imperfection.  The philosophy of using property taxation regulation is to set up a 
tax system such that it will stimulate the working of market.  For example tax 
vacant land which has been implemented in Taiwan and Chili, and also higher tax 
rates implemented in Jakarta which is used to encourage development and land 
market (Shoup, 1983). 
 
 Whilst in the public ownership approach, the main government’s focus is to 
interfere the land market by bringing the land into public ownership either 
permanently or temporary (Shoup, 1983). This approach has been successfully 
implemented in some countries such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Thailand (Shoup, 
1983, Dale et al, 2002).  The last approach is to influence the land market 
imperfection by using land use regulation.  Although land use regulation may 
provide constraint to the supply of land in term of rigidness, such as by limiting 
building density or the uses allowed in certain areas, it also stimulates the market by 
giving certainty for government and actors involved particularly about the future use 
of the lands (Buitelaar, 2004). 
 
The second way government may involve in the land market is by direct 
participation.  In this approach, government directly involve in the market or 
development by providing the investment or financial support.  Land acquisition is 
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an example that government directly involve to bring land into the market for 
development purpose (Rivkin, 1983). 
 
Besides elimination of market imperfection, Dowal (1993) also explained 
that government involvement in the land market through removing externalities so 
that the social costs of land market outcomes correspond more closely to private 
costs.  Market will not be able to cover all social cost that private should measure.  
For example market values involved do not contain a full estimate of certain type 
of buildings and land uses which possess “public goods” characteristics (OECD, 
1992). 
 
 The next role of government involvement in the land market is to 
redistribute society’s scarce resources so that disadvantaged groups can share in 
society’s output (Dowall, 1993).  Agrarian reform is an example of government 
policy to redistribute the land resource to the disadvantage group of people. In the 
urban area, although it is not directly addressed to the land market, government 
subsidy for low income households to access housing market at the end will 
influence the land markets performance.  
 
Related to the indigenous lands, government usually uses protective and 
right- based approach to manage the lands. The former focuses on the protection of 
indigenous land from outside and market force.  While the latter insists that 
indigenous peoples have special rights to land and resources (Plant and Hvalkov, 
2001). Green (1987) gives examples where government policy affects the supply of 
land.  In Kenya, in order to protect the member of family to be landless and 
destitute, the government policy run by District Land Control Boards do not permit 
any transaction which will leave the families in those situation.  This typical policy 
also happened in Zimbabwe where individual only has the rights to own the land, 
not the right to buy and to sell the land. 
 
For the laws provided by government, in the certain extent some costs some 
time should be paid such as the lack of information and multiple goals (OECD, 
1992).  The first factor emerges when the government faces the same problem as the 
buyer and supplier encounter that is the informational difficulties. Two types of the 
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most difficult part of informational difficulties are identifying social preferences and 
measuring the costs and benefits arising from urban land market policy.  The second 
factor come out in the form of conflicts among governmental policy objectives, 
since it is well known that government commonly has more than one policies and 
goals.  
 
 
 
2.2.2 Landowner’s Role  
 
No land development will take place until the land is in the hands of a 
person or body willing and able to carry it out.  It means that how owners behave 
affects the supply of development land. In addition the landowners’ characteristic 
in the development process is important and somewhat unpredictable. The role of 
the landowners in the development process centre on his decision to sell their land 
and the way they go about this (Goodchild and Richard Munton, 1985).  
 
The relationship between landowners and lands is governed through the 
property right system as denoted by the landownership. According to property 
rights theory, resources including lands can be defined as bundles of property 
rights, and therefore can be disaggregated and then recombined according to 
necessary usage (Kim and Mahoney, 2006).  For any particular piece of land these 
right may be divided between any number of holders and can be attributed to an 
individual or shared among different individual (Goodchild and Richard Munton, 
1985; Picot et.al, 1997).  The most important of these rights confers upon the 
holder is the right to occupy, to use and to transfer the lands (Guerin, 2003; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1977). 
 
In the case of indigenous lands, there is special relationship between lands 
and landowners since land is a direct manifestation of their personal, social and 
spiritual relationships, and provides them with powerful yet subtle answers to their 
need for integrity and identity (Sheehan, 2002). In addition, at several places not 
all rights on the lands are possessed by the landowner, for example Indian people 
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in Canada are restricted to transfer only between band members (Mathew, 
2004). 
 
Two types of ownerships are commonly recognized namely individual 
ownership and group ownership.  Ellickson (1993) argued that land owned by 
individual is relatively low-transaction-cost in term of internalizing externalities. 
It is due to the easier to monitor the boundaries, easier to self-control than a 
group-owned or multi-person. Furthermore consensus between just a few 
individual is easier than between a whole group. The reason is that for the latter 
case, every owner with different behavior has to be involved. 
 
  There are also arguments that group ownership has a number of 
superiorities (Buitellar, 2002). Among others are: (1) for some purpose, group 
ownership may be more efficient that several individual landowners co-operate, in 
order to achieve economies scale (2)  the occurrence of large events such as 
environmental disaster (3) the spreading of the risk.   
 
In identifying the roles of landowners in managing their lands, Adams  
(1994) and Adams and May (1991) were able to classify actives and passive 
landowners.  Active landowners are those who develop their own land, enter into 
joint venture development or make their land available for others to develop. 
 
It means that active landowners bring the lands into the development process 
through two manners either direct supply or indirect supply.  Direct supply of lands 
means that the landowners are trying to occupy the lands and to maximize the 
potentiality of the lands through development process.  In this case the landowners 
don’t want to release the lands because of economic or social factors consideration 
such to inherit or further bequeath the lands.  The second way happened when the 
landowners either they no longer want to keep or have to release the lands, so that 
they will bring the land onto the land market.  Active behaviour may be motivated 
by political concerns, or the prospect of financial reward, or the desire by land-users 
such as manufacturing companies to meet their own land needs (Adams et al, 1994). 
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The second characteristic of landowners is passive landowners.  Passive 
landowners take no particular steps to market or develop their land, even though 
they may intend to do so in the distant future. Some owners are willing to sell, but 
only on restricted terms and conditions.  Various reasons may cause passive owners 
such as low cost to keep vacant land, use the land as loan collateral and uncertainty 
about the future (Adams et al, 1994). 
 
Landowners’ behavior that causes land supply constraint among others are 
landowner’s expectations such as valuation constraints, marketing strategies as 
well as passive landownership (Adams, 1994). Valuation constraints are available 
whenever buyers and sellers cannot agree the price so that no transaction 
performed.  The second constraints emerge particularly because the landowners 
delay the lands to enter the market in order to fulfill the wider objectives of 
ownership interest.  For example potential industrial land can be sold for offices, 
housings or retailing, to get higher price.  The last constraints come from passive 
landowners indicated by their reluctant to participate in the land development 
processes.   
 
Adams et al (1997) mention that many spectrums of land ownership may 
constrain the supply of lands. Two main classifications of landownership that 
cause constraint namely (1) related to ownership and (2) related to selling-
eagerness. Unclear ownership, divided ownership and fragmented ownership are 
belong to the first group. The second group encompass land owners’ characteristic 
such as willing and unwilling to sell as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Spectrum of ownership constraints in the development process 
A Ownership 
unknown or unclear
A.1 Title deeds incomplete or missing 
  A.2 Ownership in dispute 
B Ownership rights 
divided 
B.1  Land held in trust 
  B.2  Land subject to leases or licences 
  B.3  Land subject to mortgages or other legal charges 
  B.4 Land subject to restrictive covenants 
  B.5 Land subject to easements 
  B.6 Land subject to options or conditional contracts 
C Ownership 
assembly required 
for development 
C.1 Ransom strips 
  C.2 Multiple ownership 
D Owner willing to 
sell but not on 
terms acceptable to 
potential purchasers 
D.1 Restrictive terms or conditions of sale 
  D.2 Unrealistic expectations of price 
E Owner unwilling to 
sell  
E.1 Retention for continued current use for: 
* Occupation 
* Investment 
* Making available to others on non-profit basis 
  E.2 Retention for control or protection 
  E.3 Retention for subsequent own development 
  E.4 Retention for subsequent sale 
* Indecision  (terms of sale unresolved) 
* Postponement  (delayed sale advantageous) 
* Uncertainty  (unsure of present value or potential) 
* Speculation  (hoping for future rise in value or 
potential) 
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  E.5 Retention for no specified purpose: inertia 
 
Adam et. al., (1997) 
 
Green (1987) provides an example that the way landowners consider the 
lands will also influence the supply of lands, for example what happen in Kenya. 
The landowners are reluctant to sell the lands because land is perceived as crucial 
asset for the present and/or future subsistence of the family and lands are secure 
form of holding wealth and a good hedge against inflation. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Private’s Role  
 
The most important actors in the private sectors are those who undertake 
speculative development, those who invest in it and their professional advisers 
(Adams ,1994).  The first two sectors currently are not strictly able to be separated 
since in the real situation some development may well be undertaken by financial 
institution and reversely investment provided by mature development companies.  
However both have the main role in the land development process that is to 
provide additional or changing of attributes of the land so that the value and 
benefit of the land significantly increase.  Since the focus of discussion is land 
market and developer is among key factors in the land market, the next discussion 
will more address to the first actors, developer. 
 
The role of developer in the land development process is to make building 
available in anticipation of the demand of the market for profit-oriented purposes 
(Harvey and Jawsey, 2004). So that developer can be considered as an 
entrepreneur who provides the organization and capital to perform its role.  It is a 
body to achieve common objectives using opportunities provided by the existing 
institutions (North, 1996) 
 
According to various market explained by Ball (1998), developers 
activities have directly effects to the development market in the form of the 
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number of property building can be supplied into the market. In another words, 
developer behaviour in making decision toward a certain situation influence 
development market which in the long run influence the land market. Kenny in 
Mohamed (2006) found that bounded rationality of developer can be observed in 
the decision made by them which commonly use recent choices as benchmark to 
evaluate alternative. In addition a minimum profit criterion is used to select 
locations.  
 
Gillen and Fisher (2002) observed that rapidly reduced supply of 
undeveloped lands have directed to the redevelopment of previously urban city. It 
then produces uncertainty of remediation cost, difficulties in site assembly, market 
demand and planning obligation requirements which cause hesitation on the part 
of developer. They also investigated the residence developer in land price 
determination. They found that land prices tend to be driven by over-optimism on 
the part of developer.  Developer incite price by overzealous bidding and 
procurement behaviour.   
 
Related to the land use planning, Adams (1994) mentioned developer’s 
conflict to the existing rules provided by local authority, such as city planning, 
emerges whenever defined zoning area do not match to the trend and potential of 
the area based on the economical point of view.  It is well known that some time 
the existing city planning was not developed based on complete information 
related to the area.  As a result, short-term conflict may unavoidably affect the 
supply of the land in the property market, and long-term conflict cause land 
supply constraint to the land development process. 
 
Lai and Wang (1999) studied about the developer strategies when 
encounter land supply problem particularly to fulfill the housing demand in Hong 
Kong area. They found that to face with government decision on land supply, 
developer make decision on their land banks independent to the government 
decision on land supply. Developers will increase (or decrease) the level of their 
land banks as long as it is considered to be a profit maximizing decision. As a 
result government land supply has little effect on housing supply. 
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2.3   Land Supply Constraint 
 
Land supply constraints can be identified by the unavailability of the lands 
in the land and property market, although physically the lands are available 
(Adams, 1994).  The following sub chapter will elaborate factors causing the 
supply of lands and analysis of land supply constraint subsequently. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Factors causing land supply  
 
There are various factors affecting land supply constraints.  First, 
government role in the form of planning systems is an ultimate factor influence 
land supply in the land market.  Land use planning, for example, has functions to 
allocate a certain amount of lands for particular development, to control the 
location of development and to justify the types of development in different areas 
(Popetan in Hui, 2002).  It means that the total amount of lands to be developed 
has been restricted by the planning, so the dynamic of the land market can’t be 
adjusted easily.   
 
Related to the planning systems which often hinder the supply of land is 
regulatory complexity.  It is due to the complex regulations cause cumbersome 
and lengthy processes to get planning permission (Dowall, 2003).  Therefore the 
supply of land for development becomes relatively slow, in fact to meet dynamics 
change in demand is somewhat difficult.  Second, the quality of titling registration 
and tenure security are also considered as additional factors affecting land supply.  
Good registration and tenure records produce clear title, high tenure security and 
subsequently avoid the long delays in registration (Dowall.,2003).  Thus it 
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quickens the availability of the lands in the land market. Social factor is the third 
one which influences the supply of lands. 
  
Social factor is the third one which influences the supply of lands. Passive 
land owner those who take no particulars steps to develop land is the major  issue 
affecting land development process.  Some land owners are willing to participate 
but only on the restricted terms and conditions, such as by offering leasehold not 
freehold.  In addition, because of expecting higher price or uncertainty in the 
future land price, the land owners are still keeping the lands (Adams, 1994).  
Multiple ownership of urban land, as the outcome of the second and the third 
factor, is also recognized as constraint of the land supply through some difficulty 
to rapidly acquire the ownership rights ( Adams et al., 2000a).   
 
Macro economic factors and its stabilization, as external factors, such as in 
the form of interest rate is also an aspect influence the land supply.  High interest 
rates may cause the amount of capital circulates in the land and property market 
decrease.  Given that, the total amount of capital spent to buy lands is also 
decreased and thus it disturbs the supply of lands.    Finally, physical condition of 
the lands becomes a burden of the land supply since the lands have no possibility 
to be developed.  The land is considered not build able if it is located in a 
floodplain, sloped more than certain amount, as well as subject to natural hazard 
such as mud slide and earthquakes (Knaap and  Moore, 2000).  
 
At the urban periphery, planning constraints appear the more prevalent.  In 
inner urban areas, the land supply constraints generally come from combination of 
four factors namely critical physical, ownership, valuation constraints as well as 
planning constraint (Adams, 1994).  Derelict areas, contaminated areas and lack of 
infrastructure commonly are caused by the first constraint.  The second constraint 
comes from the land owners who reluctant to respond to market mechanism, who 
keep the lands because they want better price in the future as well as who keep the 
lands because of emotional factors toward the lands.  In Kenya, land owners still 
reluctance to sale their lands because of several considerations.  Among others are 
(1) land is perceived as a crucial asset for the present and/or future subsistence of 
the family (2) it is a secure form of holding wealth and a good hedge against 
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inflation (Green, 1987).  For the low income households, the willingness to put the 
lands in the market area is also affected by the degree of uncertainty of their future 
after they release the lands (Howe in Adams, 1994).  
 
The third constraints emerge because of the land value disputes.  In this 
case landowner and buyer/developer have different estimation prices of the land.  
Commonly the land owner price is higher than proposed land developer/buyer 
price. Sometimes the third constraints are as the effects of the second constraints.  
The last constraint emerges because local authorities provide not-comprehensive 
planning, so that it creates uncertainty for the developers and landowners.  
 
In indigenous land, restriction of transfer land to protect the remaining 
land in certain tribe ownership have raised the cost of changing the use or user of 
land and may reduce  the profitability of any investment attached on the land.  In 
addition the restrictions also cause a smaller market, lower value as well as limited 
uses  as collateral.  The difficulty of locating owners and the cost of establishing 
trusts strictly affected the ability of owners to develop land and subsequently 
hindering economic development and finally produce land supply constraint 
(Guerin, 2003).  Green (1987) gives examples where government policy causes 
the supply of land.  In Kenya, in order to protect the member of family to be 
landless and destitute, the government policy run by District Land Control Boards 
do not permit any transaction which will leave the families in those situation.  
This typical policy also happened in Zimbabwe where individual only has the 
rights to own the land, not the right to buy and to sell the land.  It means every 
transaction should be approved by the traditional village council (the sabuku). 
 
The inability to sell the land gradually cause the fragmentation of title 
among successor such as what happen to Native American land tenure (Anderson 
and Lueck in Guerin, 2003).  Multiple ownership in turn increases the costs of 
obtaining agreement among landowners, reduce the willingness of individual 
owners to put effort into development.  Although the benefit of the uses of the 
land quite valuable, multiple ownership discourage uses since it is more difficult 
to monitor the inputs and outputs by owners (Guerin , 2003). 
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Land supply constraint provides direct impacts in the land and property 
market in term of increasing land price which subsequently cause the amount of 
readable lands for development. On one hand, land supply constraints will be a 
burden of the development process and finally prevent the maximization of 
economics value of the lands.  On the other hand, land supply constraints, apart 
from factors affecting them, cause underutilized lands and in a certain extent 
produce deterioration of surrounding properties leading to an overall decline in 
neighborhood property values (Ambrose, 2005). 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Analysis of land supply constraints 
 
In the urban development literatures, land supply discussion commonly 
can be found in land property market seminal and in the land development field.  
Therefore the following discussion will review the previous discussion about the 
land supply from both views. 
 
View number of publications addressed specifically the urban land supply 
phenomenon can be found in the literatures. Some of researchers such as Hui 
(2004), Peng (1994) and Tse (1998) more focus on the effects of the restriction of 
land supply to other market.  Hui (2004) makes use the housing market data 
related to the land supply and lease condition in Hongkong.   The results show that 
land supply through action and tender statistically significant correlation with 
housing price.  Meanwile, Peng (1994) in his publication in Journal of Housing 
research elaborates the effects of sudden scarcity of land to the housing price in 
Hongkong in between 1965-1990.  By using modified stock-flow model he comes 
up with the result that supply restriction in Hongkong have caused higher housing 
price but not lower housing output.  However Tse (1998) argues that the impact of 
the supply of new land by the Hongkong government is not as important as they 
maintain in accounting for the volatile house price in Hongkong.   
 
All publications discussed above commonly address to the effects of land 
supply restriction. Non of them specifically focuses on the discussion about the 
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process which cause the land supply problem. Also analysis commonly assume 
that market analyzed the market based on the assumption that market is the output 
of interaction between seller and buyer and no external factors influence it 
(Needham and Arno Segeren, 2005).  This assumption of course failed to 
understand the complexity of land market specifically land supply constraints 
because in the real world there are various factors influence it. 
 
In the field of land developments, a number of models have been proposed 
to explain the development processes (Adams, 1986).  The first approach is called 
equilibrium models or some time called positivism approach (Ismail, 1999).  This 
models was established basically from neoclassical economics concept.  This 
concept focuses on the interaction between supply and demand such to reach an 
equilibrium stage.  Problem of supply emerges whenever factors such as 
monopoly or human speculation influence the flow of supply and demand in the 
market and subsequently disturb the equilibrium stage.  However this model is 
failed to explain the roles of actors’ preferences in performing interaction in the 
market process. 
 
The second model is called empiricism and sequent model. This approach 
breaks down the development process into events and activities.  The linear event-
sequence model (Ratcliffe in Ismail, 1999) is the first model including in the 
empiricism approach.  This model divides the development process into 4 
sequential events namely evaluation, preparation, implementation and disposal.  
However, it fails to explain the role of important key actors and their interests in a 
comprehensive way (Healey, 1991; Ismail, 1999).  To improve the performance of 
the model, the development pipe-line model was introduced by Barrett et. al. 
(1978). The improved model considers 3 sequential stages in the development 
namely the pressure and prospect stage, the feasibility stage as well as the 
implementation stage. Unfortunately the last model is also unable to address the 
complexities of the land development process in an explicit manner. 
 
The humanism approaches concentrate on each key agent’s personality, 
motives and characteristics which may disturb the flow of land supply for 
development (Goodchild and Munton, 1985; Ismail, 1999).  It provides facilities 
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to asses the implication of imperfect decisions which may lead to the 
abandonment of the project at any stage.  However, it doesn’t provide adequate 
explanation about the effects of actors’ interest, roles and strategies that can 
influence other actors’ decision in the land development (Ismail, 1999). 
 
The fourth model in the land development analysis is structural 
approaches. It is basically developed based on Marxism theory within urban 
political economy (Ismail, 1999).  This approach assumes that built environment 
is considered as the result of the struggle of different groups within wider social, 
political and economic framework. Thus this model provides a more coherent and 
comprehensive explanation of market interactions.  Since little insight is given to 
the particular part of the land developments such as the role of actors’ behavior to 
the wider social, political and economical framework, this model is inadequate in 
examining the complex process of land development particularly land supply 
constraint. 
 
Based on the previous discussions, Ismail (1999) argued that institutional 
economic analysis has power to understand the land supply constraint in the land 
development.  Institutional economics models provide facilities to deeply 
understand about the linkage between formal and informal rules or institutions 
through the exercise of agency relations by agents in the land development 
process (North, 1996; van der Krabben, 1995).  In this relationship, the formal and 
informal rules may become constraints which influence actors’ decisions and the 
way they interact and, hence, restrict the supply of land for development.   
 
To support the argument mentioned above, Ismail (1999) have tried to 
implement institutional economics analysis to study land supply constraints in 
Kuala Lumpur. His study focuses on the role of formal and informal rules in 
affecting landowners’ attitude to participate in the development process.  
However, less attention is given to the role of transaction cost in influencing 
landowners’ decision to participate in the land development and particularly land 
market. As Hurrellman (2003) mentioned, transaction cost plays important roles 
since it has relationship with institutions and actors’ decision to participate in the 
land market and land development.  
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Adams et al (1994) argued that the best way to understand about land 
markets and development processes is to examine the processes of land supply, 
land exchange and land development including the interaction among them.  In 
doing so, consideration about the institutions and cost will enrich the 
understanding of the supply phenomenon. It is due to the actors’ decision to bring 
the lands into the land market and land development process is also influenced by 
transaction cost. In addition, indigenous lands have more complex attributes 
attached on them that are not easily separated from actors’ decision.  
 
 
 
2.4     Conclusion 
 
This chapter has viewed the role of land market within the land 
development processes. Basically, land market is one facet of the development 
process and also one type of market in the whole property market. In the land and 
property market there are various factors that determine demand and supply as 
well as various actors influenced the working of the market.   
 
Three main actors in the land market process have been discussed. The 
main role of the government is to provide regulations that raise the efficiency of 
the distribution of resources including lands. The main role of land owners is to 
assure that land is in the liquid stage to be carried out in the market and 
development process.   While, the private organizations particularly developers 
take opportunity provided by the regulation to perform transaction and 
development.  All actors interact in the frame of market structure.  
 
Various approaches have been discussed to understand the supply of lands, 
although most of them commonly focus on the effects caused by this lack of 
lands. In fact, view of them directly gives more attention to the causes of the land 
supply particularly indigenous lands which have unique characteristics in its 
nature. To understand the cause and effect of the supply of lands means that we 
have to examine the processes including actors’ attitude which influence the 
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process.  To do that, it seems that institutional economics, particularly transaction 
cost and property rights will enrich and give power in understanding the 
phenomena of the supply constraints of indigenous lands. 
 
 
 
3.0 THE URBAN LAND MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Institutional economics analysis is an analysis currently attracts people, 
particularly economists, because its ability to provide rich facilities to understand 
the interactions of people not only with resources but also rules within their 
activities.  This institutional analysis emerges because of the failures of the 
conventional approach (neoclassical) to models the real world since in economic 
activities human behavior is dynamic and perfect condition is something rarely 
encountered.  Institutional economics analysis tried to expand the conventional 
approach by incorporating social factors such as individual’s preferences, 
technological possibility and constraints which influence people actions in the 
economy analysis (Hodgson, 1988) as indicated in the Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Boundaries of institutional analysis 
Source: Hodgson (1988) and van der Krabben (1995) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that institution economics analysis tries to open the self 
sufficiency assumption by regarding social factors as part of the economic system. 
  
This economics analysis actually has been proposed by a number of 
institutionalist leaders such as Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell, John R. 
Commons and Clarence Ayres in the beginning of 19’s centuries (Ruterford, 1999).  
However at that time it was not so popular since it provided less scientific precision 
in analyzing the ideological, social, political and economical changes, as compared 
to neoclassical approaches which introduced the market mechanism (Mair and 
Miller, 1992).  Some economists offered a more flexible concept of new 
institutionalism during 1990s (see, for example, Hodgson, 1993, 1998; North, 
1996) with reference to the importance of institutional frameworks and the 
changing nature of collective agents’ behavior. 
 
There are a number of definitions about institutions. North (1996) defines 
institution as constraints on behavior imposed by “the rules of the game” in society: 
“Institutions include any form of constraint that human being devise to shape 
human interaction”.  Institutions are durable systems of established and embedded 
social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2004).  Institution is a set of 
socially prescribed patterns of correlated behavior (Bush, 2003).  The common 
notion can be extracted from these definitions is that institution is a structure which 
directs, constrains and provides incentive to the people in performing activities. 
 
In term of operational environment, Williamson in Parto (2003) 
distinguishes between institutional micro and macroeconomics. In the 
macroeconomics it deals with the institutional environment while in the micro scale 
deals with the institutions of governance. According to North (1996) the 
institutional environment can be in the form of formal rules or informal rules.  
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Institutional governance deals with the coordination in transferring good or right 
through market, quasi-market or hierarchical modes. 
 
Formal and informal rules are institutions which drive and constrain the 
people to perform the human activities.  Formal rules, particularly, and informal 
rules are developed based on the bargaining between agents to reduce the 
uncertainty (North, 1996).  Formal rules are usually in form of written document 
such as political (and judicial) rules, economic rules as well as contract. Whilst, 
according North (1996) informal rules (some times called culture) is as part of 
heritage and transformed from one generation to the next via teaching and 
imitation, a knowledge, values,  and other factors that influence habit.  Formal and 
informal rules all together provide structures to agents in performing mutual 
interaction with other agents with in a frame of human activities including market 
(Nedham and Segeren, 2005). 
 
Related to the market, as the basic concept in the mainstream economy 
analysis to allocate resources, institutional economics analysis enhances the notion 
of market which is unclearly mentioned by neoclassical approach through giving 
the markets characteristics of their own (Swedberg, 1994).  Rules as exogenous or 
no rules in the interaction of supplier and demander (Thrall, 1987; Evans 1985) is 
improved by considering where and why costs accrue in their use and looking at 
the underlying institutional framework (Hurrelman, 2003 ).  Analysis which focuss 
on the market outcome (Hodgson, 1998; van der Kraben, 1995) is then 
complemented with the manners interaction among agents involved taken place 
(Nedham and Arno Segeren, 2005). In other words, the market outcome such as 
what is traded, by whom, in what volume, at what price, the rules must be 
investigated, and also how people react to them (Nedham and Arno Segeren, 2005). 
As a mean to coordinate human interaction, market has two embedded attributes, a 
set of rules with which market parties should perform and the information about the 
nature of property right, the quality of the goods or services (van der Kraben, 
1995). Therefore, Hodgson cited by van der Krabben (1995, p. 75) defines the 
market as “a set of social institutions in which a large number of commodity 
exchanges of a specific type regularly take place, and to some extent are facilitated 
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and structured by those institutions. Markets, in a short, are organized and 
institutionalized exchange”. 
 
As a social institution, the market is not considered as a single uniform 
entity, but as an aggregate market which each particular market seen as having 
routines and procedures (Adam et.al., 2005). This routines and procedures is 
distinctive depend on the existing culture and other institutions.  
  
In term of theoretical conceptualization and development institutions, it 
could be classified into three mainstreams (Eggerstsson, 1990, Rutherford, 1994, 
Ismail, 1999, IEBM, 2002) namely old institutionalism, new institutionalism and 
neo-institutionalism. The following discussion will elaborate these mainstreams 
subsequently, particularly related to the notion of market in each of them. 
 
a. Old institutionalism 
Old institutional economics rejects the neo classical proposition of the idea of 
‘rational economic man’, to be replaced by the idea of institutionalized agent, 
driven in the main by habit and routine.  Common made major contribution to 
the theory of institutions.  In addition, old institutions also stresses both on the 
processes of economic evolution and technological transformation. Toward 
market, old institutionalism is doubtful of the ability of market processes to be 
self-corrective, that it leads to the possibility of government intervention in the 
public interest (Rutherford, 1994). 
 
b. New Institutionalism 
The fundamental difference between new and old institutions is that the way its 
assumption of the abstract individual.  Individual are pictured abstractly as 
given, with given preferences and purposes.  To explain the exchange of 
individual  behavior, then new institutions promote the emergence, existence 
and performance of social institution in where interaction among 
individual/agent within ‘bounded rationality’ agent’s decision is performed.  
Following Coases’s famous insight, Williamson argues the existence of firm in 
economic coordination with reference to the transaction cost.  North (1996) 
consider the ‘rules of the game’ within the cost of transaction to govern human 
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decisions and their economic performances. New institutionalism views market 
more positively, that self-corrective in the market processes can be achieved 
straightforwardly. For new institutionalism, government intervention may 
produce misallocation of resources distribution and all legal product established 
by government such as law, property rights and regulations are costly to society 
(Rutherford, 1994). 
 
c. Neo-institutionalism 
There are also differences between neo and new institutionalism (Eggertsson, 
1990).  The former subscribes to the neoclassical notion which embraces the 
rational choices and tendency towards the equilibrium point in relation to 
transaction costs, whereas the latter is concerned more with the economic 
decisions within a bounded rationality of human agents (Hodgson, 1993, 1998; 
van der Krabben, 1995).  Neo-institutionalism follows the positive theories on 
the role of government in the market. It is due to the need of government 
intervention to set and enforce the fundamental rules that govern exchange 
(Eggertsson, 1990). 
 
For the purpose of institutional analysis particularly in understanding of 
land property market and land development, the following sections discuss about 
the property rights in lands, transactions cost as well as institutional analysis on the 
land property market. 
 
3.2 Property rights in lands 
 
According to the theory of property rights, scarcity is a necessary condition 
for property rights to emerge. Property rights exist because resources are scarce 
relative to competing claims, so that a system that specifies authorities to exercise 
rights that lead to the utilization of given resources at any given time is needed.  In 
his seminal paper on the emergence of property rights, Demsetz in Guerin (2003) 
argues that “property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of 
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization”. 
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A generalized definitions of property right is “the exclusive right of 
possessing, enjoying, and disposing a thing” or “the exclusive right to control an 
economic good” Barlowe (1986).  Things or economic goods including lands are 
objects that have a number of attributes such as a bundle of rights, the value as well 
as the assent to protect the rights.  Therefore, a bundle of property rights in lands 
consists of separate and overlapping rights to possess (manage and exclude from), 
use (access or withdraw) and dispose of (alienate, sell, bequeath) lands (Guerin, 
2003; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). 
 
Not all these rights will necessarily be specified to the same degree, or 
allocated to the same landowner (or allocated at all).  In other words these rights can 
be attributed to an individual or can be shared among different individual, can be 
combined in many different ways and broken down for a range of particular 
purposes (Picot et.al, 1997).  Which rights exist and who owns them has major 
societal and economic implications. The degree to which rights are specified and 
owned will in turn affect the incentives on rights owners for long-term management 
of the lands. The manner in which the rights are specified will also affect the 
valuation of the right (Guerin,2003).  
 
A simple example of distribution of rights to several owners can be observed 
in landlord and tenant relationships. Both are owners of the land in their own right; 
they own some right(s) that exclude any other person from exercising that specific 
right on the land. The tenant owns the right to occupy and use the land for an agreed 
period of time, whilst the landlord owns the right to receive the rent, re-let the land 
after the agreed period, or dispose of it (Antwi, 1998). In this case, some rights own 
by landlord are temporally transferred to the tenant immediately after the transaction 
is performed. 
 
Based on the concepts of excludability (who can determine who benefits 
from the resource) and rivalness (whether use is affected by the number of users), 
four terms are usually used to classify the property namely open access, common, 
private and public property (Guerin, 2003).  Open access is characterized by no one 
has the right to exclude anyone. The characteristic of common property is group 
members have the right to exclude non-members. The last two classes of property 
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rights are distinguished subsequently by generally excludable and owned by all 
(but with access and use controlled by the state). 
 
Private property right is the exclusive rights that can be owned by individual 
members.  Full private property rights provide higher incentive to the owner to 
perform more complex contractual exchange and greater specialization.  An owner 
of private property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him to act in 
particular ways. An owner expects the community to prevent others from interfering 
with his actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specifications 
of his rights (Demsetz, 1967).  Public property rights, on the contrary, are commonly 
held by members of a society or a group in such forms that no individual or groups 
of individuals can exclude other members from exercising the right (Antwi, 1998). 
An example of this public property rights is a landed property which bequeathed to 
members of a family to be owned in common.   
 
 Property rights in land are never static which are indicated by continuous 
changes following the dynamic of the social environment such as technology 
change, new market, scarcity of the resources and government intervention (Gueriin, 
2003; Antwi, 1998). Therefore once the property rights are obtained, a perpetual 
effort is needed to protect or to enforce them from others to capture one’s rights.  
One form of this perpetual protection is by formalization of this protection through 
formal institutions that maintain these rights, such as judicial systems (Lanjouw and 
Philip, 2002).   
 
Administrative reforms, another form of formalization of land rights, 
including a formal registration of land rights and full-fledged land titling procedures 
(requiring the completion of a cadastral survey) will solve all conflicts and the social 
tensions arising from land disputes (Dale, 1997; Saleh, 2004). By formalizing the 
property rights, it means those rights have been documented and protected by the 
state. In addition, the formalization of property rights in land is a necessary step to 
make as soon as land becomes scarce so that competition arises around it and agents 
are willing to transact land through markets. 
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Aforementioned, property rights determine the nature of rewards and 
sanctions (cost-rewards system) associated with such resource employment 
decisions (Antwi, 1998). To achieve such purposes, a set of rights is only valuable if 
the rights are enforced.  Thus, private rights enforced through the courts offer greater 
allocative efficiency, while public rights enforced through existing government 
structures offer greater administrative efficiency (Ellickson in Guerin, 2003). 
 
Besides the need of enforcement to gain valuable rights, restrictions, usually 
established by government, are always placed on the rights due to the potential 
harms that particular uses may impose on others. This restriction is often called as 
“attenuations of rights” ( Barzel, 1989). Of course, this manner will reduce the value 
of the lands to their owners. Land zoning, a simple example on the lands control, 
will attenuate the opportunity of the owners to use the lands beyond what have been 
mentioned on the land use planning (Buitelaar, 2003). A system consists of a set of 
rules that delineate, attenuate, enforce and sometimes take rights is called property 
(land) right system/regime (Buitelaar, 2003).  
 
One of objectives of the property right system in land is to achieve the more 
efficient use of land by distributing the land to the individual or parties who capable 
to explore the opportunities attached on the lands.  These opportunities can be 
explored through the use of any rights or combination of rights owned by the 
landowner.  In the certain extent when the landowner who own the full set of rights 
are incapable to productively manage the land, transferring part or whole rights to 
different individual would make both parties better off and restore efficiency (Greif, 
2003).   
 
To transfer rights, three models of coordination can be selected namely 
market, hierarchy and network (Buitelaar, 2003). Market model is characterized by a 
direct exchange of exclusive and individualized land rights.  In term of dependency, 
market is identified by the similar opportunities and autonomy owned by both 
parties (Peterseon, 1995). Contrary to the market model, hierarchy model is 
distinguished by the present of control over land rights by an authorized decision-
making unit to which he might or might not belong (McGuinness in Buitelaar, 
2003). In other words, one party gives up his autonomy and agrees to follow the 
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instruction of the other party (Peterseon, 1995). Whilst in the last model, horizontal 
self coordination by negotiation, agreement and trust is used to perform exchange.  
An example of this model is a family-transaction, where the purchase of land is 
restricted to family-members (Nedham and Segeren, 2005). The selection of 
coordination model basically based on the cost required to allocate resource (Coase 
in Antwi, 1998) 
 
Market is an important feature of exchange system based on private property 
rights (Eggertsson, 1990).  In a market, it is not the goods and services that are 
owned and exchanged, but the right to use these lands (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973).  
In a market, the owners of rights may voluntary exchange their rights to other parties 
based on certain considerations such as price, trust and regulation which freely 
decided by any parties.  Also, in the market, both parties can decide which part of 
the rights which will be transferred, a part of the rights or the whole bundle of rights.  
Transferring part of the rights changes the content of the bundle of rights, while 
transferring the whole of rights may unable to change the content of the rights but 
the ownership of the rights  (Buitelaar, 2003). 
 
During the negotiation process to transfer the right of lands, information 
about the attributes of lands become a crucial input for both parties to make 
decision.  Since, in reality, land rights are impossible to delineate completely in any 
exchange and usually the attributes of land are left in the public domain, complete 
information about attributes of the lands is hardly to achieve (Barzel,1991). The 
complete measurement of the attributes of the land is prohibitively expensive since 
the measurement process incurs cost. Therefore, transaction costs always emerge 
during land rights exchanges (Antwi, 1998). 
 
 The degree of transaction cost implies various tacit meanings, related to the 
distribution of the resources and related to the decision made by party which may be 
influenced. The higher the transaction cost, the less efficient of resource distribution. 
The higher the transaction cost, the lower possibility the transaction to be performed.  
Hsiung (1998), after analyzing the Coase concept of transaction cost, mentioned that 
when transaction cost is low and can be incurred, regardless how the property rights 
are assigned initially, resources utilization will be efficient ultimately. In line to this 
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statement is that when property rights can be transferred easily, resource utilization 
will be efficient.   
 
 High transaction costs may be as the result of inadequate property rights 
system or inability the market model to internalize externalities (Guerin, 2003). To 
overcome such phenomenon, the involvement government to improve the quality of 
property rights system and to substitute the transaction process through hierarchy 
model is unavoidable. Through hierarchy approach, government attenuates the 
private rights and in fact at certain extent government takes over the whole bundle of 
rights (Buitelaar, 2003). 
 
The regulation of the land market, by the attenuation of land rights, is done 
by legal instruments that are often part of the spatial planning regime. The best 
known example of attenuation of user rights is zoning. The content of land rights are 
changed, but the ownership is not. The next famous example is expropriation. In this 
case the content of the land rights (and the other rights) is not attenuated, but the  
bundle of rights are taken. The land rights are not changed, but the ownership is. 
There is also example, like (re-)zoning or the exemptions of a zoning plan, where 
the attenuation of the rights is relaxed  (Buitelaar, 2003). 
 
Related to the role of property rights in the economy activities, numerous 
studies have revealed the relationships between property rights and economic 
outcomes in the past and present. Misallocation of property rights in land during the 
feudal period contributed to its economic stagnation (North and Thomas 1973). 
Weak property rights in contemporary developing countries hinder placing assets as 
collateral, rendering capital unproductive. Capital is not transformed from savings to 
investment (De Soto 2000). 
 
For a land tenure system, the rights to land meet the standards for secure 
property, if it fulfills the following conditions (Molen, 2004): 
 
1. ownership is defined in the law as the most complete right one might have on 
a good 
2. there are clear rules for establishing, transferring and abolishing real rights   
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3. rules for inheritance are clear 
4. rights of women are fully respected 
5. banks accept ownership of land as collateral for loans 
6. rights of third parties are well defined 
7. conflicts are resolved under civil law court 
8. a fair compensation should be paid in case of compulsory sale to the 
government 
 
 
 
3.3 Land Property Market Analysis and Institutional Economics Approach 
 
To analyze the land market, institutional economics approach places the rules 
within the analysis: they are endogenous to it. All those rules create a structure 
which affects the availability of information and drive agents’ interaction within the 
land market.  It is assumed that people act in a rational way within that structure. 
The object of investigation is not only the market outcomes, but also the market 
interactions as well (Nedham and Segeren, 2005). Therefore, the framework analysis 
is constructed on the basis of three main variables in the land market: rules 
(institutions), the outcomes, and the working of market including agents’ 
attitude/interaction. 
 
Focusing on the institutions that work on the land property market, Keogh 
and D’Arcy (1998) proposed 3 level hierarchies of institutions.  Firstly, the 
property market is established and organized by political, social, economic and 
legal frameworks.  Secondly, the property market itself is considered as an 
institution with reference to property market characteristics, scope and functions.  
Finally, the property market organizations which indicate the individual actors 
involved in the market.  Through social interaction, all three levels interrelate and 
show that this market institution is dynamics, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 indicates the relationship between institution in the same level 
and between level is interactive that stimulate change in response to action and 
experience. For example the condition resulted from the first level may drive the 
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way actors thinking about property market. Reversely, the experience come from 
actors can be used to change the institutional environment (Keogh and D’Arcy 
,1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2  The institutional hierarchy of property markets 
Source : Keogh and D’Arcy (1998)  
 
Since land market is part of the whole property market, approach provided 
by Keogh and D’Arcy (1998) can be used to understand the land market process 
particularly land supply constraint after some simplification of the organization 
involved in the land market such as instead of users organization, landowner 
organization have bigger role in the land market. In doing so, the next sub chapters 
focus on institutions in the land market and, property rights and land supply 
constraints. 
 
 
3.4.1 Formal and informal rules in the land markets 
Property market organizations: 
. users 
. investors 
. developers 
. property service providers 
. financial service providers 
. professional bodies 
. governmental and non-governmental agencies
The property market as institutions: 
. market (and non-market aspects) 
. decentralized and informal 
. legal and conventional aspects of property rights 
. legal and conventional aspects of land use and development 
The institutional environment: 
. political institutions 
. social institutions 
. economic institutions 
. legal institutions 
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Formal rules governing the land market basically can be recognized as the 
rules which provide basis concept of ownership called property right system, rules 
which related to the land management such as land use planning and rules related to 
the land transaction such as procedures to make a contract (Antwi, 1998, Saleh, 
2004). Other formal rules which don’t directly influence to the land market but still 
provide impact to the works of land market is financial rules. Formal and informal 
rules all together provide structures to agents in performing mutual interaction with 
other agents with in a frame of land market activities (Nedham and Segeren, 2005). 
This structure also give incentive and constraint to the agents involved which then 
influence the agents’ decision to get involve in the land market or to perform land 
transaction. 
 
Within a land market, landowners who want to exchange their lands should 
consider the rules consisting guidelines about what size allowed to be exchanged, to 
whom the lands can be sold, in what price and where transaction can be performed. 
Indigenous lands, for example, have restrictive market and low price ( Ismail, 1999; 
Guerin, 2003). Since land is a durable good which can be used at the same time for 
many different and non-exclusive purposes, the knowledge of land attributes and 
rules related to those phenomena are important particularly to perform transaction.  
It is also happen to the buyer who usually need information about land status, the 
rights attached on lands and other land attributes as inputs to participate in the land 
market. For example in the case of multiple ownerships, additional cost should be 
prepared to negotiate with every landowner (Buitelaar, 2002).  
 
Land use planning is the most prominent land rules usually established by 
government to control land distributions that provide significant effects to the lands 
market (Chesire and Shepard, 2004). Allocation of lands for certain use will restrict 
the lands from maximum usage referring to the market interest. It means, for 
example, that land with the designation ‘housing’ cannot be supplied for industrial 
use. As a result, the certain type of land determined within a certain segment has 
different incentive compare to other segments in term of price forming (Nedham and 
Segeren, 2005). 
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There are other formal rules which affect land markets, such as regulations 
about building, about environmental effects and about traffic effects. These rules 
directly influence the development markets, but indirectly influence the demand of 
land in the land market. In addition, there are financial regulations which affect both 
the demand and the supply and, therefore, volume and price. These include fiscal 
rules, accountancy rules, inheritance rules, subsidies and levies.  
 
On the way in which land markets work, there are often found informal rules 
which also have a significant influence. A good example is trust.  Trust will reduce 
negotiation costs because when people trust each other they are more willing to 
cooperate (Poel, 2005).  Land acquisition by public authority will work smoothly as 
long as the landowners cooperate by putting the trust on the public body (Nedham and 
Segeren, 2005). Certainly, trust can reduce transaction costs (Poel, 2005). At the certain 
extent, force becomes informal rule should be taken, such as compulsory purchase due 
to the supply of land for the vital public purposes. 
 
As mentioned before, the quality of formal and informal rules dictate the 
transaction cost. A full and reliable cadastral register reduces the costs of acquiring 
information about the real owner of the land. Statistics about recent sales prices 
reduce the cost of reaching agreement on a price. A clear land-use plan reduces the 
uncertainty about the uses to which the land may be used and uncertainty about how 
neighbouring plots of land will be used. A predictable legal system gives certainty 
that the various rules will be upheld.  Furthermore, if rights in land are unclear, 
transaction costs will be high, which will discourage smaller, private buyers. At the 
extreme, no one will want to acquire land on which the rights are totally unclear, 
because of the great uncertainty (Nedham and Segeren, 2005). 
 
Formal and informal rules are not static. If an institution is no longer 
capable to accommodate the potential disruptions of the agents, the new institution 
or an institutional change is required (Chang, 2004).  According to Schneider 
(2005) there are two ways how institutions change.  First, when all actors rationally 
accept a set rule as an efficient solution to problems, it is called a rational choice 
approach.   Second, if the legacies and limitations of prior institutions affect the 
new one, this way is called as a historical approach. Institutional change is a 
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complicated process because of involving causal-effect relationship between rules, 
the kind and effectiveness of enforcement (North, 1996).  North (1996) stated that 
informal constraints change at a different rate than formal rules so far the informal 
constraints change is still not fully understood and explained clearly particularly 
the forces that shape cultural evolution.  
 
 
 
3.4.2 Property rights and constraints on land supply  
 
It is well known that property rights system provides the power to the 
people on certain parcel of lands by giving rights. Owners of rights will stimulate 
to optimize the economics return of the lands as long those rights can be 
implemented burden less. A good property rights system will encourage the owner 
to optimize the potential of the lands. Land development is one way to optimize the 
return of the lands by putting investment on the lands. When financial problem is 
encountered, owners can implementing their rights on the land to access financial 
market by transferring part of their rights on the land for the certain period of time 
through collateral system.  A good property rights system also provides incentive 
for the owners to transfer part of or the whole rights to other person through rent or 
land market. For people who don’t have rights on a certain plot of land can access 
the rights of the land from the owners through land transaction. Clear delineation of 
rights becomes a vital consideration for buyers to perform transaction. Therefore a 
good property rights system becomes an important factor which can drive the 
owners to actively participate in the land market and in the land development 
process. 
 
In the case that property rights system provides poor delineation of rights, it 
means uncertainty there, the owners unwilling to explore the potential of the land. 
Uncertainty of rights on lands will provide constraint for owners to explore the 
potential use of the lands. It is due to the high cost should be spent by landowners 
to maintain their rights from trespass. This condition also discourages the owner to 
put investment on lands because of the same reason. In addition, the problem will 
be encountered to access the financial market through collateral system. Therefore, 
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poor property rights will discourage owners to exercise their rights because of 
uncertainty condition. 
 
For the purpose of lands control, attenuation of rights is often implemented 
by government so that efficient distribution of resources can be achieved. Land use 
planning is one form of institutions which reduce the power of rights owned by 
land owners.  Flexible land use planning means that the rights taken by 
governments and the rights still owned by landowners are uncertain. Uncertainty 
situation will emerge. In the very extreme attenuation is that government takes over 
the whole set of rights owned by landowners. In this case, the rights and 
responsibility to explore the potential use of the lands already moves to the 
government hand. 
 
Uncertainty is one condition which produces transaction cost. In the certain 
extent when the uncertainty and cost are already unacceptable by the actors 
involved, the new institution should be implemented in hope to reduce uncertainty. 
This cyclic process will always happen in order to achieve an efficient solution to 
problems. 
 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the institutional economics and its capability to 
provide tools to understand the role of institutions in driving human behavior in the 
economics activities.  Institutional economics analysis possesses facility to 
understand not only the output but also the process by incorporating social rules.   
Toward market, the approach extends the definition provided by conventional 
approach  by putting the rules as endogenous factors.  Following the model concept 
provided by Keogh and D’Arcy (1998), a framework to understand the supply 
constraint of indigenous land has been developed. This framework focuses on the 
role transaction cost theory within institutional analysis particularly property rights 
system.  
4.0 A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR  
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ANALYSIS USING INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS  
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The objective of this section is to elaborate the research methodology and 
methods for analysis of the research.  It also seeks to explain ways to evaluate the 
utility of transaction cost within institutional economics analysis with reference to 
the existence and implication of rules particularly property rights in the supply of 
land for urban land market. Thus, the methodology explains the fundamental 
contextual aspects of the theoretical framework of institutional economics analysis 
for use in the case study to examine the way rules particularly property rights or 
institutions facilitates and/or constraining the supply of land in the land market. In 
addition, the method of the research consists of steps to perform empirical work to 
achieve the aim and objectives as determined in Chapter one.  This covers the steps 
taken to collect primary and secondary data and the way to select sample sites and 
actors so as to gather reliable and representative data for the case study.  It also 
elaborates the ways of analysing data and the limitations of the institutions 
methodological framework and methods for analysis in the research.  
 
 
4.2  The methodology 
 
 As mentioned in the previous sub section, the main content of thesis 
methodology is the fundamental contextual aspects of the framework for 
institutional formal and informal constraints. This framework consists of two main 
elaborations about the ways the existing rules and institutions influence actors’ 
decision which finally cause land supply constraint. However, prior to the discussion 
about the role of institutions and transaction costs, the next section provides terms 
that will be used in this research. 
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4.2.1 Terminology 
 
 In order to have similar notion about terms used in this research, the 
following sections elaborate several terms namely rules, institutions and constraint; 
land supply constraint in the land market; land right and land rights transfer and 
indigenous land rights; the transaction cost in the land market as well as agent and 
agency 
 
 
 
4.2.1.1 Rules, institutions and constraint 
 
 The common proposition that commonly used to explain the relation 
between rules and institutions is that rules establish institutions (Ismail, 1999). 
Furthermore, institutions form constraints which govern human activity (North, 
1996).  
 
 
4.2.1.2 Land supply constraint in the land market 
 
 Land supply constraints are defined as limitations and restrictions which 
distort the smooth flow of the land supply from being available in the market 
(Ismail, 1999).  Conversely, in a positive view about restriction, land supply 
constraints may provide guidelines and incentives in order to facilitate and initiate 
the land market process. 
  
In term of land market, there are numerous definitions about it. Some of 
them focus only on the resources involved (Grinol, 1994; Hervey and Ernie Jowsey, 
2004). Others try to involve rules or institutions as an internal factor in the process. 
Therefore in this research land market can be defined as an arrangement of sellers 
and buyers to exchange land rights within working institutions. In other words, the 
working institutions provide incentive and/or constraint to agent’s decision and 
action by way of the exercise of agency relations.   
4.2.1.3 Land rights, land right transfer and indigenous land rights. 
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 A bundle of property rights in lands consists of separate and overlapping 
rights to posses (manage and exclude from), use (access or withdraw) and dispose of 
(alienate, sell, bequeath) lands (Guerin, 2003; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).  This 
rights can be owned by individual, group of individual, company or state. All of this 
rights generally are managed under certain land code.  
 
 Land transfer is a bundle of activities to pass on land from one owner to the 
new owner. In this activity actually not physically transfer the land, but transfer the 
rights on the land and all attributes attached on the land. In other words, land transfer 
is pass on part of the rights or the whole rights on lands including land attributes 
from old owner to the new owner.  
 
In Malaysia prior to the 1966, basically two types of land code were 
implemented to manage the lands namely customary land code and England land 
code. In 1965, the federal government enacted National Land Code which also 
known as Act 56 of 1965. Therefore, in this research all discussion related to the 
rights over the lands are always referred to this National Land Code. 
 
  Related to the indigenous people, using the protection concepts government 
commonly implements restriction to transfer the lands to non-indigenous people. In 
addition, indigenous lands are characterized by special relationship between lands 
and landowners since land is a direct manifestation of their personal, social and 
spiritual relationship, and provides them with powerful yet subtle answers to their 
need for integrity and identity (Sheehan, 2002). In Malaysia, to manage the 
indigenous lands government established Malay Agricultural Lands and Malay 
Reservation Lands under Land Enactments (1897) and Malay Reservation 
Enactment (1913) subsequently. Both indigenous lands have similar restriction that 
is not allowed to be transferred to non-Malay. From land rights point of view this 
restriction has attenuated the rights to sell the lands to any buyers and reduce the 
market.  However from social power point of view it has improved the bargaining 
power for the Malay people to still occupy the lands as said in the enactment.   
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4.2.1.4 Agent and agency 
 
Individual who is seen as an active, knowledgeable and reasoning person 
with reference to individual action is called agent (Giddens, 1995; Ismail, 1999). A 
group of individual agents or organizations such as corporation in the land market 
are called agents. Actors or agents in the land market process define and pursue 
their interests, actions and strategies in relation to one another (Adams, 1994, 
Ismail, 1999). Agency is the entire manner of actors’ behaviour in responding to 
institutions such as the way agents’ behave in pooling together the land and making 
decisions to participate in the land market or to undertake land development 
(Adams, 1994).  
 
 
4.3  The method of empirical work of the case study 
 
 The objective of this sub-chapter is to elaborate the steps undertaken to 
identify rules, institutions that cause transaction cost, the determinants of transaction 
costs which subsequently influence agents’ decision to bring the land in the land 
market. The empirical work adopts the following methods: 
 
 
 
4.3.1.  Selected approach 
 
In the empirical works, this study takes an inductive approach which 
investigates rules affecting individual actors and individual sample sites, in 
particular, the landowners (sellers), buyers (developers), valuers, land 
administrators, and planners involved in the land market and land transaction 
initiatives on a particular sample site. In so doing, the empirical work involves an 
investigation of rules related to the land rights and land market, agents’ attitude and 
agency power relations in the land market initiatives of the sample sites. The 
research also examines the actual sample sites intensively by collecting data about 
legal and landholding criteria, physical characteristics, planning and development 
potentiality related land supply constraints.  
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The research examines the effect of land rules such as land rights, land 
policy, planning and land market regulations, and informal institutions of agents 
collective attitudes to the supply of indigenous land for the land market. Thus, the 
research focuses on formal rules, such as laws and regulations, and informal rules or 
customs, collective decisions, indigenous values and ethical behaviour within the 
context of land supply for the land market.  
 
Indigenous lands commonly are characterized by the present of written 
customary law that protect indigenous people from being landless such as ‘non-
transferable and cannot be occupied by non-indigenous people’ which influence the 
private rights and transaction cost in maintaining and transferring rights. Therefore, 
the primary and secondary data are collected for analysis so as to evaluate the 
extent to which these written and unwritten rules produce additional cost which 
subsequently affect agents’ decisions to participate in the land market. The research 
relies on secondary data to investigate the formal written rules whereas primary 
data on informal rules is gathered using interview schedules with potential key 
agents as respondents.  
 
Since the indigenous land areas were taken for investigation, interview 
schedules needed careful implementation to select potential respondents and sample 
site.  Therefore, to identify potential respondents and sample sites, besides through 
direct observation, assistance and information from previous researcher who has 
similar case study area,  from the MAS Board of Management, the Kuala Lumpur 
City Hall and JPPH had provided useful input. Discussion with valuers and planners 
were also undertaken to identify respondents and sample sites.  Moreover, MAS 
Board’s and heads of kampongs’ advices were sought to identify the reliable 
respondents and sample sites that fit with the required classification.  
 
 
 
 
4.3.2  The case study area 
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The study case area is located in Kampong Baru adjacent to the Central 
Business District of Kuala Lumpur.  Kampong Baru is one of the biggest indigenous 
lands in Kuala Lumpur. The total area of study is 101.02 hectares (excluding two 
kampongs in the whole Kampong Baru area of 112.38 hectares) which under Section 
6,  1897 Land Enactment was established as Malay Agricultural Settlement (MAS) 
with the main purpose of alienating land to landless Malay in Kuala Lumpur.  MAS 
land is not designated as Malay Reserved Land (MRL) which was introduced in 
1913 and gazetted under Malay Reservation Enactment 1913.  However, MAS and 
MRL have the same restriction that is the prohibition to alienate the lands to non-
Malays. The case study area is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Kuala Lumpur
Kampong Bharu
Case study area
 
 
Figure 4.1  Location of the case study area 
 
 
The physical condition of Kampong Baru currently is very contradictive 
compared with the vicinity area. Many obsolete buildings, narrow roads; vacant 
lands which indicate the development problem are easily found in this area. 
According to Abdul Razak (1992) about 88.0 per cent of dwellings in Kampong 
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Baru (out of the 56.0 per cent of land in this area categorised as residential) are 
considered as under-utilised and derelict and 11.0 per cent is vacant or unimproved 
residential land. In term of property transaction, from 1980 to 1996 the everage 
number of property transaction in Kampong Baru is 4 lands every year (Ismail, 
2002). Most of the transactions involved properties in good location such as Jalan 
Raja Abdullah,  Jalan Raja Alang and Jalan Raja Abdullah.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kampong Baru is selected as study case area reflects the important of this 
area in the development of Kuala Lumpur to be recognized as a “World-Class City” 
as envisioned by the KLSP2020.  This city is fast growing in term of social, political 
and economic development. In addition, Kuala Lumpur city indicates a very active 
property market transaction, particularly residential sectors, in the last ten years as 
showed by the increased transaction record from year to year (Property Market 
Report, 1996-2005).  
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The previous last two paragraphs indicate a very contradictive situation. In 
one hand the important of Kuala Lumpur area as one of main entrance for the visitor 
to come to Malaysia. In the other hand, part of the Kuala Lumpur area close to the 
central Business District called Kampong Baru is failed to anticipate the fast 
development of the area. Government and academician commonly mention that 
restriction of rights is among factors which dictate the current condition including 
the slow land market in Kampong Baru (KLSP 2020, 2004; Ismail, 1999). 
 
Since this research view the power of transaction costs theory within 
institutional analysis, the currant condition of Kampong Baru provides interesting 
case since this Kampung Baru have complete attributes such as the restriction, slow 
land market, slow development, located in central of Kuala Lumpur area. Therefore, 
by taking Kampong Baru as the case study area, the researcher implement theory of 
transaction costs and hopefully this theory have ability to explain and to relate the 
current phenomenon through analytical  explanation. 
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4.3.3  Data collection 
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 There are a number of items have been considered during undertaking the 
data such as types of data, source and the procedures to collect the data; sampling 
technique; and finally field survey. Each of them will be discussed separately in the 
following next sub-sections. 
 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Types of data, sources and their collection 
 
 Two types of data have been collected: 
a. Primary data. The primary data were collected by using interview technique 
to selected landowners who have one of the following criteria namely 
selected undeveloped lands, developed lands as well as traded lands. The 
interview is also addressed to the related agents such as planners, valuer, 
developer and MAS Boards committee. The objectives of this interview is to 
identify the institutions and variables which cause the transaction costs 
during the process to maintain the restriction, maintain the land rights as well 
as during the land transaction process in the case study area. The same 
objective is also addressed to the second groups of interviewee, although the 
little bit general question particularly related to the variables influencing the 
transaction cost. The second objectives of this interview is to identify the 
ways institution produce transaction costs, the way transaction cost affects 
actors’ decision as well as the way they reduce or overcome this problems. 
The landowners respondents were selected such that they cover all 5 
kampong although the numbers of respondents each kampong is not always 
similar depends on the respondent classification and the easiness to reach. 
Information about landowners from planners, previous researcher, MAS 
board were also considered as input to select the respondents. The primary 
data on the landowners were conducted by semi structured-interview 
schedules using open-ended and certain limited closed questions to initiate 
further discussions. The purpose of semi structured-interview is to identify 
the rules, institutions and also the variables which cause transaction cost and 
subsequently to what extent they influence landowners’ decision to supply 
lands in the land market. Particularly for the landowners who have traded 
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their lands, this interview was conducted to identify the existing rules, 
institutions and variables that produce transaction costs and to what extent 
those transaction costs influence actors in performing lands transaction. 
Open-ended questionnaires were selected in order to provide opportunity for 
the interviewee to add more detail elaboration out of the questioned given.  
 
b. The secondary data. The secondary data and information about the rules and 
variables causing transaction costs were also collected. This data and 
information include the dynamic of property market, the land transaction as 
well as the development planning initiated by land owners in the framework 
of social, political and economics framework. The information was also 
collected through personal communication to the officer in the private or 
government offices.  Property market data from 1995-2006 was collected 
from the property market report published by the Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance Malaysia, whilst the land transaction data of the case study area was 
gathered from Valuation and Property Services Department; and the last 
secondary data was collected from the Planning and Building Control 
Department of the Kuala Lumpur City Hall. 
 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Sampling technique 
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 The total number of lots in the case study is 957 lots. A group of 51 
undeveloped, developed and traded lots with the distribution of 41,9 and 1 lots 
subsequently. Among 51 lots, 47 are occupied by individual landowners, the rest are 
occupied by corporate land owners.  
 
 The objective of getting respondents from undeveloped lots is to identify the 
institutions and variable of transaction cost that influence landowners attitude 
towards land market and landowners decision to bring or not to bring the land into 
land markets. Importantly, the interview tries to identify the cost they have to spend 
to maintain the lands restriction as identified by the reluctant to transfer the lands. In 
addition, information related to the way they overcome the problem caused by 
institution and transaction cost were also considered. Whilst, from landowners who 
have developed their lands, the interview tries to find information about  their 
motivation to develop the land, the rules and institution providing incentive or 
constrain during the development processes. Data and information about institution 
and variable of transaction cost were collected from landowners who have 
experience to trade their lands.  
 
 To select the respondents, besides personal identification, some suggestion 
from planner, previous researchers and MAS Board committee and Chief of 
Kampong were also taken into accounts. The selection of respondents based on the 
Kampong distribution and also the stratification of current lots. The number of 
respondents for each Kampong are Kampong atas A 4, Kampong Atas B 3, 
Kampong Masjid 10, Kampong Pindah 4, Kampong Paya 11, Kampong Hujong 
Pasir 5 and Kampong Periok 5. The distribution of the samples is shown in the 
Appendix A. 
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4.3.3.3 Field survey 
 
 Aforementioned at the previous sub-section, semi structured interview were 
conducted with the purpose to identify the element of rules and institutions which 
cause transaction cost and subsequently influence the agents decision to bring the 
land into land market and finally into land development process.  In other word, it 
considers various constraint which produce transaction costs that restrict the flow of 
land supply to the land market and land development process. Since there are three 
environments of transaction cost that may emerge, the questionnaire covers the 
elements of transaction cost to maintain the land restrictions because of indigenous 
lands, the cost to maintain the current land rights and also the cost to perform land 
transaction that hinder the supply of lands in the land market and in the 
development.  Therefore the questionnaires consist of 4 main parts as follow: 
 
1. Part A consists of the landowners’ background. Since in nature difference 
information can be extracted from individual and corporate landowners, two 
groups questions are provided, for individual and for corporate land owners. The 
objective of part A is to identify the potential of the landowners in terms of 
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technology (knowledge) and financial factors that may influence the decision to 
initiate the land market or land development.  
 
2. Part B consists of landownership characteristics. This part provides general view 
of the land ownership that affects the transaction cost and influences the 
landowners to bring the lands into the land market. Important information in this 
part are the way land is acquired, the land use, land status as well as the purpose 
of occupying the land. 
 
3. Part C comprise of the landowners attitude toward land market and land 
development. The objective of this part is to identify the rules which may cause 
constraint or incentive to landowners to participate in the land market or land 
development. Also, identification of rules or regulations that produce transaction 
cost in all three environments becomes the second objective. For example 
question about why landowner is reluctant to sell the land is to identify the effect 
land constraint and land rights to the landowner’s decision to participate in the 
land market. Whilst question about the problem during transferring the lands 
indicates the transaction cost that emerge during the transaction process. In this 
part some questions addressing the attributes of the lands were also given such as 
physical attributes and social attributes.  
 
4. Part D consists of questions to identify the landowners’ opinion about the way 
MAS area should be developed including the possibility to implement alternative 
governance system to transfer the land whenever possible.  
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Interview to the key agents such as valuers, planners and developers has an 
objective to get a general idea about rules, institutions, variable of transaction cost 
which affects agents’ decision to participate in the land market from their expertise 
view. The questionnaire consists of three main parts. The first part comprise of the 
respondent background which indicates the expertise and experience of the 
respondents particularly related to the MAS area development. The second part 
consists of agents view about the land market in MAS area. And the final part 
consists of agents’ attitude toward the problem of MAS developments and also the 
alternative of governance system in the framework of MAS development. 
 
 To reduce the communication problem with the respondents because some of 
respondents are old people, during data collection particularly interview steps, 4 
graduated students from land administration and development department helped the 
researcher.  Before they go to the field, discussion about the objective of the 
research and also every single question were performed in order to avoid bias 
interpretations of the questionnaire. Interview to the professional were conducted by 
the author. 
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 In term of respondents’ response, the critical part of this interview is the first 
impression of the landowners to the interviewer as indicated by the warm welcome 
and lets the interviewer to get in the house.  Some landowners reject the interviewer 
to explain the purpose of the interview and are hesitate to participate. Different 
responses emerge for the landowners who have experience to buy or sell the lands. 
Since some of them already stay outside Kampong Baru, it is very difficult to have 
personal contact to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4  Data analysis 
  
Data analysis is in the form of qualitative analysis through categorization, 
coding and quotation from the semi structured interview. The purpose of 
categorization the rules is to identify elements of rules, constraint, cost that influence 
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the supply of land in the land market. From the interview to landowners and 
professional, data coding can be completed.  In so doing, the steps include 
identification of the phenomena, the condition causing the phenomena, the condition 
affecting the phenomena, strategy to overcome the phenomena as well as the result 
of this strategy.   
 
 Most of primary data collected by interview with the key agents are analyzed 
by using direct quotation. It is due to the potential of direct quotations to indicate 
social relation among and across agents. In addition, direct quotation illustrate the 
way they exercise their power when interact with other agents. 
 
 Most secondary data collected from various government, semi government 
and private organization are analyzed with references to the existing rules and 
regulations which cause constraint and subsequently costs that affect agents decision 
to initiate land market and land development in the MAS area. Research by Ismail 
(1999) on the formal and informal rules in MAS area, and also research paper on the 
problem to develop Kampong Baru are of particular complement of this research.  
 
 
4.4. Limitation of the methodology and methods 
 
From theoretical framework point of view, transferring the concept of 
transaction costs to the operational domain remains elusive (Grover and Malhotra, 
2003). It is due to a lot of efforts and resources are required to achieve ideal 
condition where transaction costs can be easily quantified in the form of certain 
amount of money. To overcome such problem, identification of determinants of 
transaction costs will be used as a research approach. In term of selected method, 
interview technique has some limitations particularly to access the respondent in the 
case study area.  The main reason is that Kampong Baru have been the national issue 
for long time and many efforts have been proposed but have no result, so that the 
residents of Kampong Baru are very sensitive particularly related development 
issues. Moreover, some of landowners are already old, so that difficulties always 
there and in fact some of them are unwilling to be interviewed. The next problem is 
the communication technique particularly language which at certain extent hinder to 
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access the respondent. To solve this problem, asking help to local people will reduce 
the chance to be rejected. Related to the landowners, particularly those who have 
traded their lots, commonly the previous landowners have moved to the new places 
outside Kampong Bharu. To reach team require a lot of efforts and time.  
 
 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
 This section discusses methodology and methods to achieve the aim and 
objectives of this research. It starts with the framework of formal and informal rules 
for analysis to evaluate the supply constraint in the land market.  In the empirical 
works, selected approach section discusses about the manner empirical works are 
taken particularly related to the way sample respondents are selected.  Some special 
terms used in this research are also elaborated in order to provide similar conception 
to go through to this thesis.  The next discussion gives rough pictures about the 
characteristics of the case study area including the reason why to select the area. 
Next, the empirical framework consists of the steps to collect the data and some 
considerations to achieve the reliable data, the technique implemented to analysis 
the collected data. Finally some difficulties and the way to overcome those 
difficulties are explained in the last section. 
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5.0 LAND MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This section discusses trends in the land and property market in the case study areas. 
 
5.1.1 The economical environment 
 
Macro economic factors of the country are among the factors influencing the 
economic development and property market. Those factors dictate the economics 
developments particularly the demand of the property market. The following 
discussions focus on the macro economics indicators including the various 
parameters that determine economics level of Malaysia such as growth national 
product, growth development product, interest rate, inflation rate, population, 
household income as well as the government policy indicated by established rules to 
drive the economic development. 
 
The Malaysian economy in the last ten years (1996 up to 2005) has grown 
significantly although world economic crisis started at 1997 and reached the 
significantly worst at 1998 has influenced the Malaysia economics. The GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) in 1996 reached RM 130,621 million and increased by 4.7 per 
cent in average annually. This strong performance was achieved after Government 
introduced an economic stimulus package such as tax cuts benefited and attractive 
new loan package. 
 
This high growth of national economics has underpinned the admirable 
performance of property market activities. In national scale, to stimulate property 
market activity government has introduced economic stimulus packages for example 
HOPE programs, relaxed FIC`rules as well as low rate by Bank Negara.  Figure 5.1 
shows the healthy growth of Malaysia economics illustrated by the trend of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP). 
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Figure 5.1: GNP and GDP 1996 - 2005 
Source: Economic Report (1996-2005) 
 
 
Figure 5.1. shows the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross 
National Product (GNP) based on the 1987 price rate which both indicators have the 
similar trend of growth. From 1996 to 2005 GDP significantly improved more than 
42 % as from RM 183.367 billion to RM 262.029 billion. Of the 10 years period, the 
negative growth was founded from 1997-1998 due to world economic crisis, though 
the next following years recorded very significant growth which is indicated by the 
economics recovery through various government regulations. However, in 2001 only 
very least increased was achieved as indicated by only 0.4 % growth. It is probably 
due to the bombing of WTC Building in New York which affected world economic 
countries including Malaysia. However, in 2002 the economic growth have had got 
recovery, in fact in 2003 it gained the significant development. 
 
 The second indicators indicating the health economics development can be 
found in the bank policy and also the circulation of the capital as indicated in the 
figure 5.2 and 5.3 
  
 76 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
R
at
e 
(%
)
Interest rate Inflation rate
 
Rajah 5.2: Interest rate and Inflation rate  
(Source: Economics report 1996-2005) 
 
  
Figure 5.2 shows that in the first two year the interest rate increased 
following the world economic situation that was slowly going down and also the 
policy of US federal government that increased interest rate. The result of increasing 
interest rate, both growth domestic product and national product was also recorded 
slight decreased as indicated by negative growth – 7.5 % and – 5.1% subsequently. 
To halt the slide of the country into recession, in 1998 government implemented 
policy such as expansionist monetary, lowering interest rates and increasing 
liquidity. As a result the economy gradually recovers, the GDP and GNP increase 
although the effect of 1997 recession still can be sensed  as indicated by the 
increased of inflation rate.  This government’s policies have become a significant 
basis for maintaining the economics growth generally and property market 
specifically since non-fluctuated interest rate, low interest rate and low inflation rate 
provide certainty for the private company to invest resources and to do business. 
 
 The next factors which determine the power of demand side in the 
particularly property market is the number of population, GNP per capita as well 
household income. In line with the steady growth of GDP and GNP, the population 
is also increased gradually as during 10 years the population raises around 23 % or 
2.3 % in average every year. While for the GNP per capita, it was fluctuated 
although still provide positive growth as shown in Figure 5.3.   
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Figure 5.3: Income per capita and population 
(Sources: Economics report 1996-2005) 
 
 
From Figure 5.4, the common trend for the household income is very encouraging. 
During 4 years (1995-1999) the numbers of household which have income lower 
than RM 1500 tend to decrease, from 54.4% to 43.8%, while the others tend to 
increase. It indicates that the affordability of the household tend to increase.  This 
positive trend of development becomes significant factors that determine the power 
of demand side in the property market. 
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of monthly household income 
(Sources: Eight Malaysia Plan 2001-2005) 
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High growth of GDP, high income per capita, low inflation rate as well as 
low level interest rate become a conducive factor to support economic activities 
upon all sectors. For the property market, bank loan to the property sector is one of 
the indicators which denote the buoyant of those sectors progress as shown in Figure 
5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: The growth of bank loan in property sector 
(Source: Property market report 1997-2005) 
 
 
 
In 1997 bank loans for property sector reached RM 132,119 million or 33.2 % from 
the total loans, and increased dramatically to RM 228,998 or 41 % from total loans 
in 2003. The total loans given to the property sectors increase from year to year and 
reach the amount of 37.8 % for the average. In term sector type, residential property 
still dominated the whole amount of loans to property sector. 
  
 The encouraging growth of Malaysia economics as indicated by the 
increased of GDP, income per capita, household income, controlled interest rate and 
one digit inflation rate has stimulated the live of property market through property 
transactions. In addition, from financial point of view, the total loans for property 
sector that increase from year to year provide encouragement to private company to 
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invest their capital in the property sector. Figure 5.6 shows the trend of property 
market in Malaysia during last 10 years. 
 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
Year
# 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
Kuala Lumpur 12,908 13,824 9,825 12,661 12,992 11,887 12,228 13,357 15,762 16,462
Selangor 55,243 55,234 36,772 46,448 50,171 51,361 46,453 47,870 53,001 55,798
Johor 47,752 49,411 27,787 35,641 35,179 34,914 35,684 37,813 48,098 40,726
Malaysia 270,548280,384186,077225,901240,086242,634231,394243,376293,212276,511
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
  Figure 5.6 :  The number of Property transaction in Malaysia  
(Source : Property Market Report, 1996-2005) 
 
Figure 5.6 shows positive trend for the property sector has been recorded during the 
last ten years although little fluctuation is also shown there. The world recession that 
started in 1997 have had significant effect to the property transaction as illustrated 
by negative growth in 1998 that is -33.6 %. However, through the various 
government regulations such as exchange rate to US Dollar strictly maintained at the 
level of RM 3,800 become very strong economics reference. In addition, 
government also encouraged private sector to actively take important roles in driving 
economics wheel in the form of various incentives such as tax incentive, improve 
delivery systems, reducing cost doing business as well as enhancing the business 
environment. Given that policy, in 1999 it has recorded significant improvement, 21 
% positive growth than the previous year. The effect world economics in 2001 also 
provide negative growth of transaction by -4.6%. However in 2003 the economic 
recovery have reached the significant result as recorded around 5.2 % improvement 
and significant growth in the next year that is 20.5 % increased. 
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 Based on the figure 5.1 to 5.6 it is easily recognized that the last ten years the 
macro economic of Malaysia tend to have positive growth. It is due to various 
government policies to handle economics crisis. In addition, this encouraging 
economics growth also stimulated the buoyant of property market activities. As a 
result, more space to accommodate economics activity is required.  
 
 
 
5.2 Overview Kuala Lumpur property market trend 
 
 
5.2.1 The economic development and property market in Kuala Lumpur (1996-
2005) 
 
 
Property market activity in Kuala Lumpur has also been influenced by global 
economics, national economics as well as regional economics. As the capital city of 
Malaysia, the property market in Kuala Lumpur continued to be resilient to show a 
buoyant market since year 1996. Figure 5.7 shows the number of transactions  for 
the principal property sectors in Kuala Lumpur 
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Figure 5.7 Number of transaction for the principal property sectors 
(Source : Property Market Report 1999-2003) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 shows that the property market in Kuala Lumpur remained active, and the 
residential sector still dominated the transactions in the property market in which 
significantly performed property market pattern. In the volume of transactions the 
residential sector contributed around 80.28% to 86.56 % in between 1996-2005. 
Next was the commercial sector accounting for 10.78% in average annually within 
10 years , followed by the industrial sector contributing 2.22 % in average. The last 
sector participated the least volume of transaction was development land, which 
shared 1.92 % of the market. The ranking of these sectors in the contribution to the 
volume of transactions has remained unchanged within 10 years.  
 
The total number of transactions for the residential property, within 10 years, 
was fluctuated. The highest number of transaction was reached in 2005, while the 
lowest number was recorded in 1998.  It is due to the effect of world recession that 
causes high interest rate and the difficulty to gain loans from the banks. However, 
since 2001 the number of transaction for residential increased steadily, in fact in the 
year of 2003 it attained 11,097 transactions. This recovery of the residential property 
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market happened because government introduced stimulus package programs among 
others stamp duty waiver package and reduction of price margin of houses for 
foreigners. The volume of residential property transactions according to type was 
dominated by condominium/apartment which registered about 34.3% to the total of 
the residential transactions. The second type was the 2-3 storey terraced contributing 
around 20.7 % to the total, followed by the flat type which shared around 14.1 %. 
According to the price range, the volume of transactions of the 
condominium/apartment type was evenly distributed. However, for the flat type the 
transactions mostly (above 90 %) occurred below than RM 200.000, which indicated 
that middle and low income people preferred to rent/to buy flat type. 
 
The commercial sector recorded relatively stable number but tended to 
increase steadily, although in 1998 it decreased significantly (recorded as 644), 
around -43 % from the previous year (1113) due to world recession. In 1999 it 
rebounded substantially from -43 % decreased in the previous year to 60 % growth. 
In term of commercial property type, the first 3 years of transactions of commercial 
sectors is dominated by storey shop house. However, from 1999 the shop unit/retail 
shop and office lot substituted the domination of storey shop house. In fact, in 2005 
the office lots transaction recorded as the highest number of transaction reached 
around 34.6% of the transaction of commercial sector. According to the district 
where the commercial property located, Kuala Lumpur Town and Mukim Kuala 
Lumpur contributed more than 50% to the total number of commercial property 
transactions. It indicates that Kuala Lumpur has grown as one of central business 
area. 
 
Among principal property sectors, the development land, although improved 
in number of transaction, contributed the least to the market activity. The recorded 
volume in 2000 indicated substantially increment by 69.1 % to 181 against 107 in 
1999.  Lands in Kuala Lumpur Town and Mukim of Kuala Lumpur were the most 
active one in the land market, which contributed 52.6 % in average to the total 
transactions of land development. It was then followed by Land in Mukim of 
Setapak/Ulu Kelang which contributed 19.9 % to the total. 
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The second parameter which can be used to discuss property market activity 
in Kuala Lumpur is the value of transactions. Figure 5.8 show the activity of 
property market in Kuala Lumpur by value of transactions. 
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Figure 5.8 Value of transactions for the principal property sectors 
(Data source: Property Market Report 1999-2003) 
 
Figure 5.8 shows that the total value of transactions since year 1996 basically 
indicated the impression progress of property market, although in 1998 due to the 
global economics situation the amount decreased  by -52 % of the previous year. 
The total value reached significant increment of 41,2 % to RM 5879.63 million in 
2004. As the number of transaction, the value of transactions for the residential still 
dominated the total value within the range of 43.7 % to 61.90 %. It was followed by 
commercial sector which contributed 23.9 % - 43.7 % of the total value, 
development land sector (8.9 % - 28.4 %) and industrial sector (2.7 % - 6.6 %).  
 
 The value of transaction for the residential sector is stuck to the progress of 
national economics of Malaysia; for example in 1998 the decreased of all economics 
indicators (GDP, high inflation rate) also affects the total value of transactions to -
41.8 % contractions. Increasing the total amount of loans by government for 
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property sector from year to year has stimulated the wheel of property market in 
Kuala Lumpur particularly residential sector.  
 
 The value of transactions for the commercial sectors from 1996 – 2005 was 
unable to provide good impression since the oscillation of the volume except in 2003 
when the value rebounded by 16.7 % to RM 1409.09 million. This pattern also 
happened to the contribution of this sector to the total value. The recorded 
contributions of this sector to the total value of transactions are in the range of 
23.9% to 43.7 %.  
   
 The development land, though contributed the least in the volume of 
transaction, substituted the position of the industrial sector in the value of 
transactions. In 1996, the development land recorded RM 1312.375 million or 28.4 
% to the total value, but had contraction by -19.1 %, -80.2 % and 23.4 % in the 
following three years because of world recession. Since 2001, the value of 
transactions for the development land increased progressively and achieved 
significant increment in 2003 and participated around 17.3 % to the total value. 
 
 The performance of the property market in Kuala Lumpur has been 
elaborated in the previous discussion. Based on the existing data of Malaysian 
economy and property market in Kuala Lumpur, it seems that in the future the 
property market in Kuala Lumpur will grow more and more buoyant. The sustained 
growth of basic economics indicator such as GDP, GNP per capita, low interest rate 
as well as low inflation rate, along with government regulations will stimulate the 
supply and demand of the property market.  
 
 
5.2.2 The property transaction in Kuala Lumpur (1996-2006) 
 
In connection with the parties involved in the transaction that is from who 
and to whom, there are 4 type groups of transaction namely individual & individual, 
developer & individual, corporate & individual as well as corporate & corporate as 
shown in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 This figure can provide rough figure about the 
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structure of property market, particularly group of buyer and seller who actively 
participate in the property market. 
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Figure 5.9 The percentage of number of transaction based on the type of 
parties involved for residence sectors 
(Sources: Property Market Report, 1997-2005) 
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Figure 5.10 The percentage of number of transaction based on the type of 
parties involved for commercial sectors 
(Sources: Property Market Report, 1997-2005) 
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 Figure 5.9 shows that for the residential sector, the transaction is dominated 
by individual & individual which recorded more than 65 % from the total 
transaction. It means that for the residential sector, individual is more active to 
perform transaction processes since home or residence is one of basic need in every 
household.  The involvement of firms or corporate in the transaction of residential 
sector is less than 25 % in average and commonly the role of firm or corporate is as 
the developer or investor. While for the commercial sector, no one type of 
transaction dominates the transaction as illustrated by Figure 5.10. The highest 
number of transaction is recorded by corporate & corporate, followed by individual 
& individual. In addition, the involvement of private or corporate is in average more 
than 70 % from the total of transaction. It is due to the nature company or corporate 
have close relationship with the availability of space to support their economics 
activities either as the space provider or as space user.  
 
 This sub-section has discussed various types of parties involved in the 
property transaction particularly residential and commercial sectors. The role of 
individual dominates the transaction for residential property sector, while for the 
commercial sectors firm or corporate take more important role in performing 
transaction. 
 
 
5.2.3 The land transaction in Kuala Lumpur Town (1996-2006) 
 
To give illustration about the price of land transaction around Kampong 
Baru, the following table provides a list of transaction in Kuala Lumpur Town that 
have been reported in the Property Market Report publication. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Land Transaction in Kuala Lumpur Town (1996-2005) 
 
Year Location Zoning Area Price per 
m2 (RM) 
1996 - Jln Tun Razak 
- Jln Bukit Bintang 
- Jln Yap Kwan Seng 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Residential 
  6.090 
  3.506 
  1.558 
 6.394 
 4.844 
 3.175 
1997 - Jln Ampang/Tun Razak 
- Jln Bukit Bintang 
- Jln Sultan Ismail 
Coommercial 
Commercial 
Commercial 
  3.821 
  1.617 
12.154 
 7.400 
5.716 
8.800 
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1998 - Jln Tuanku Abd Rahman Secondary      186 7.600 
1999 - Jln Ipoh Secondary      273 2.873 
2000 - Jln Bukit Bintang 
- Jln Kemuning 
Secondary 
Residential 
  1.763 
  1.770 
9.000 
2.070 
2001 - Jln Ampang Residential  2.087 
2002 - Jln Tiong Nam 
- Jln Ampang/Kav uthan 
Commercial 
Residential 
     135 
  3.463 
1.314 
2.032 
2003 - Jln Tiong Nam Commercial   1.528 2.799 
2004 - Jln Tiong Nam 
- Jln Bukit Bintang 
- Off jln Ampang 
- Jln Pahang 
- Kaw Jln Gurney/Jl Maktab 
- Kaw Jln Semarak 
- Jln Tun Razak off 
- Kaw Jln Ampang 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Residential 
Residential 
Residential 
Residential 
     140 
     176 
  1.450 
  2.286 
     775 
  1.449 
  1.700 
  1.951 
1.417 
5.494 
3.152 
1.793 
1.114 
1.338 
3.231 
2.049 
2005 - Jln Tiong Nam 
- Kaw Jln Dang wangi 
- Off Jln Bukit Bintang 
- Jln P Ramli 
- Jln Tun Razak/Kav Jln Yap Kam 
Seng 
- Off Jln Ampang 
- Kaw Jln Gurney/Jl Maktab 
- Kaw Jln Ampang /U thant 
- Off Jln Tun Razak/Jln Yap Kam 
seng 
- Off Jln Bukit Bintang/ Jln Tun 
Razak 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Residential 
Residential 
Residential 
Residential 
     140 
     186 
     152 
  4.615 
  1.039 
  1.428 
     775 
  1.953 
  1.219 
  1.410 
1.430 
6.635 
5.005 
7.300 
2.444 
3.552 
1.157 
2.189 
3.082 
3.121 
 
 
From Table 1, It shows that basically land transaction around Kampong Baru 
is quite active particularly the area where the need of space always growth such as 
Bukit Bintang area as one of tourist destination. While of the residential property, 
Jln Gurney is considered as an active location as indicated by several transaction 
during the period of discussion. 
 
In term of price, generally commercial area has higher value than the 
residential area. For the low price of the commercial zoning at the same area, for 
example lots at Jln Tiong Nam from in 2003, 2004, 2005 the price increase around 
20 % and 1 % subsequently. While for the high price lots for example at Jln P. 
Ramlee from 2004 to 2005 the price of lots per m2 increases around 8 %. For the 
residential area, for example Jln Gurney/Jln Maktab, the price from 2004 to 2005 
increase around 4 %; lots at off Jln Tun Razak/Jln Yap Kim Seng increases around 1 
%. 
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5.3 Land transaction in Kampong Baru (1996-2006) 
 
5.3.1 Trend on land transaction 
 
Two types of transaction according to openness of the transaction are in the 
market and internal transaction. The latter means that the transfer of rights or 
ownership through bequeathing or inheritance. This transaction is indicated by no 
real money should be given from the receiver to the giver and also generally there is 
blood relationship between old and new owners of rights. It is also belong to this 
type transfer right that is to change the name of owners from individual owner into 
firm owner, particularly happens when the old owner is also the owner or staff of the 
firm.  Transaction through market is indicated by the real money given to the old 
owner. 
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Figure 5.11 The trend of land transaction in Kampung Baru (1996-2006) 
(Source : Valuation and Property Services Department, 2006) 
 
Figures 5.1 shows that the internal transfer of rights dominate the transfer in 
Kampong Baru area which recorded around 60 % of the transfers.  This fact support 
the general notion that in relation to the lands Malay people prefer to preserve the 
lands through bequeathing to their off springs.   
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Figure 5.12. The total value of transaction from 1996-2006 
(Sources : Valuation and Property Services Department, 2006) 
 
 
In term of the total value of transaction in Kampong Baru, from 1996 to 2003 the 
value fluctuates and recorded only view growth. However in 2004 the total number 
and also the value of transaction increase significantly from RM 5,377,000 to RM 
25,554,000 or around 375 % growth. No definite reasons so far can be used to 
explain this phenomenon, however according to the macro economics data, either in 
Malaysia or in Kuala Lumpur area the property transaction in 2004 are all increase. 
It may be due to the stability of economics situation as indicated by the lowest 
inflation in 2003 which provide positive effects to the property transaction in 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 90 
 
0
5
10
15
20
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
N
um
be
r
Residential Commercial
 
 
Figure 5.13  Type of land have been transferred according to zoning area (1996-
2006) 
(Source : Valuation and Property Services Department, 2006) 
 
5.3.2 Actors in the land transaction 
 
From the recorded data about the type of transaction in term of parties 
involved, the group of actors that actively participate in the transaction processes can 
be recognized.  
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Figure 5.14 Type of transaction according to parties involved (1996-2006) 
(Source : Valuation and Property Services Department, 2007 
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Figure 5.14 shows that individual-individual still dominate the transaction in 
Kampong Baru that reach around 62 per cent in average. While individual-company 
transaction is around 23 per cent, company-company is 16 per cent, finally 
company-individual is 6 per cent. This data illustrates that the most active buyers is 
individual. This phenomenon in the frame of land developments processes which 
provide positive impression since generally individual owners have financial 
problem to develop their lands. This argument is supported by the data that during 
10 years, from the total number of land transaction in Kampong Baru only 10 lots 
that the planning proposals have been approved or around 25 per cent from the total 
transaction through market system. 
Among companies which actively performed transaction in Kampong Bharu 
during the last 10 years, Rah Property, Naza and Datuk Dagang are the three most 
active companies. During 10 years each company bought 5 lots in Kampong Baru. It 
is than followed by Pembangunan MAS Bhd that bought 3 lots. 
 
5.3.3 Interaction between seller-buyers 
 
According to the ways seller and buyers interaction, two type of market can 
be identified that is formal market and informal market. Formal market is indicated 
by the information about the lands is distributed through formal organization such as  
land agents or through formal publication such as newspaper. While informal market 
is indicated by the information is distributed from individual to individual such as 
friends, neighbors. As Mr Onn (Group executive from Naza Properties) explained 
that the information about lands can be come from individual sources or from formal 
sources such as agents and Bank.  
 
In term of relationship between new owners and old owners, Figures 5.15 
shows that about 62 per cent transaction performed is between new and old owner 
who has relationship such as parent to children, brother to sister. 
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Figure 5.15 The relationship between old and new owners (1996-2006) 
(Sources : Valuation and Property Services Department, 2006) 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
As shown above, there are linkages between economic framework and the activities 
of agents in the land market in Kuala Lumpur. The economic framework as 
institutions laid down the foundation for the demand and supply to interact in the 
market place. As shown, these affect the ways they decide either to supply the land 
for development or limit the transfer by holding the land and hence no development 
may take place. Similarly, there are legal frames that restrict and/or facilitate the 
negotiation, transfer and dealing in the land and property market. 
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6.0 ANALYSIS ON THE LAND SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS IN THE MAS 
AREAS OF KAMPONG BARU, KUALA LUMPUR 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In fact, the rate of land development in the MAS areas is not really smooth as 
expected comparing to the rest of the CBD areas in Kuala Lumpur. As mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 3, there are factors attributed to the formation of land supply 
constraints in the case study areas. Moreover, the increasing pattern of trends in land 
market in Kampong Baru is comparatively lower than the rest of the CBD areas in 
Kuala Lumpur. Therefore, Kampong Baru is an indigenous area full of speciality. 
This is attractive for further investigation.  
 
Unfortunately, there were several efforts undertaken by the government to 
undertake redevelopment of Kampong Baru during 1980s and 1990s. Government 
proposal to acquire the MAS areas in 1992 was a failure due to landownership and 
valuation constraints. This had initiated a new development plan in 1993. Once 
again, the plan was abandoned due to the land supply constraints. Consequently, the 
government had realised about the need to come up with a new Development Plan in 
2006 to take place until 2020 considering the land supply constraints.  
 
Although the land development initiatives had been undertaken by individual and 
corporate landowners as well as a society of Kampong Baru people known as 
Pembangunan Mas Melayu Berhad (PMMB). Table 6.2 shows the progress of land 
development activities from 1995 to 2005. The table shows that during the period of 
ten years from 1995 to 2005, the most obvious type of land development was 
commercial with 73 per cent compared to residential 22 percent only. There are 
Naza Tower and Rah Properties which were being developed into multi-storey 
buildings in 1997 and 2004 respectively. 
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Kampong Bharu (KB) MAS Type of 
Development No % No MAS/KB (%) 
Commercial 44 73 11 25 
Residential 13 22 5 38 
Others 3 5 -  
Total 60 100 16 27 
                                                  Source: JPI DBKL 
 
There are proposed developments approved but left undeveloped by land 
developers. For example, development initiated by Ruby Realty in 2004 with the 
problem of feasibility due to density or number of storey of the building proposed 
for development. Since there are delayed and abandoned projects in the areas, it can 
be said that the land development activities in Kampong Baru is at a slow pace since 
1990s due to the land supply constraints.  
 
 6.2     Property Market Trend in MAS areas  
  
The trend in land and property transaction in Kampong Baru is said to be consistent 
and stable.  Figure 6.2 shows about 100 transactions from 1995 to 2006. Transaction 
occurred everywhere within the MAS areas alongside the main road or even at the 
inferior location of Kampong Paya and Kampong Masjid. During 1996 to 1999, 
there was a slower rate of transaction due to economic recession. Conversely, the 
trend in property transaction increased during 2000 to 2006 once the economy got 
better. 
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Figure 6.2: Property Transaction in MAS areas 1996 - 2006 
Source: Adapted from JPPH2007 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Distribution of transactions 1996-2006 
               Source: Adapted from JPPH 2007 
 
There is about 61 percent of the transaction done from individual landowners to 
individual landowners. About 30 per cent transactions were completed by corporate 
landowners and individual landowners and only 9 per cent from corporate to other 
corporate firms. Transfer from corporate to another corporate landowners involving 
approved land indicated that they are looking for speculation without having real 
intention to undertake redevelopment themselves. 
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6.2 Planning Constraints and Analysis 
 
In Chapter 2, the literature reviewed the importance of planning in preparing 
a good land use for development purposes. This ensures a sustainable urban land 
development for the next generation.  
According to neoclassical perspective, rules of planning for development 
may constraints the landowners from making up decision to sell the land or to 
participate in the land development. Planning requirements, for example, land use 
ratio may distort and restrict the landowners from making decision to develop the 
land. In other word, planning rules may influence the level of price in the market. 
When the price of land is affected by lower price of low cost housing as designated 
in the land use plan, land developers may reluctant to buy the land due to lower 
profit margin expected from the project. Conversely, when a piece of commercial 
land has been designated in the development plan, its price may tend to be higher for 
commercial price. Consequently, high price in the market may attract more property 
developers. Unfortunately, the restriction in interests of the indigenous land may 
distort the potential buyers to buy the land for development purposes. The reasons 
may be for the landowners to wait a longer while for a higher price or lower profit 
margin expected by land developers. In both cases, the availability of the land is 
constrained by the nature of planning rules applied therein. 
 
6.2.1 Planning Constraints in the MAS areas 
 
Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan (PSKL) 2020 emphasis on the improvement of 
living quality with regards to cultural values and encouraging active participations of 
its citizens. As such, PSKL 2020 ensures that infrastructure and amenities, culture 
and social development will be met for the benefit of the population, staff, visitors 
and investors. Therefore, the planning was aligned towards achieving the equivalent 
of physical, economic, social and environments. This core target would lay down a 
strong framework for the potential redevelopment of the MAS areas in Kampong 
Baru. 
 
In PSKL2020, the MAS area has been identified as one of the main 
Comprehensive Development Areas (KPK) to stimulate and promote commercial 
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and industrial development in Malaysia. As indicated, this area is planned and to be 
promoted as a mixed development to incorporate residential, commercial as well as 
light industrials.  
Nevertheless, there are constraints and redevelopment initiatives may have to 
face challenges. It needs attention from everybody involved in redevelopment of the 
areas. This is due to the fact that there are land supply constraints in the areas that 
have to be solved prior to the actual launching of the redevelopment projects. Since 
long time, any redevelopment initiatives had be undertaken but the success was too 
far away from what should be harvested. A thorough study may be undertaken in 
details to analyse the possibility to preserve but enhance the traditional way of life in 
the MAS areas rather than a total redevelopment.  
 
6.2.2 Planning Constraints with regards to the Drafted Local Plan of  
Kampong Baru (DPTKB) 
 
Policies and plans for implementation had been arranged and drafted in a 
plan known as DPTKB. Those policies act as guidelines for implementation. One of 
the ingredients of the plan is to uphold the interests of the Malay landowners and the 
most suitable way to undertake the redevelopment of the MAS areas in Kampong 
Baru. Originally, the guidelines have been drawn from those initiated but aborted 
redevelopment programs since 1991 when the MAS areas was planned for land 
acquisition involving lots of lands along Jalan Raja Abdullah. This area has been 
designed as a comprehensive redevelopment site in 1991 but failed. The main reason 
was landowners refused to sell their lands or disagreed to get involved in the 
schemes. Since then, the government has had several initiatives that had indicated 
the real initiatives to undertake redevelopment in the MAS areas. 
 
In 1993, the development had been further strengthened with allocation of 
different land uses zones for Kampong Baru areas. The area along Jalan Raja Muda 
Abdul Aziz , Jalan Raja Abdullah and Jalan Raja Alang up till Weekend Market had 
been designated as commercial and limited special commercial areas. The inferior 
lots were allocated for residential zones. Interestingly, the MAS area in Kampong 
Baru is then strengthened once again in 2006 with emphasis on the requirements of 
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PSKL2020. This shows that the government is really serious in efforts to undertake 
redevelopment in Kampong Baru. 
 
As a consequence of the detailed allotment of the MAS areas according to 
structure and local development plans, the lands in the MAS areas has been showing 
an increase trends due to the allotment of land uses. For sure, commercial lots is 
fetching a higher prices in the market compared to residential lots. Planning has 
made the affected landowners are more confident with the demand and potential 
land uses in the market. Whilst the land developers are more secure in looking 
towards the potential redevelopment plans and initiative for the purpose of 
identifying the feasibility provided by the government. For example, once the 
redevelopment initiative failed to take effect in 1991 due to disagreements with the 
land compensation to be given to the affected landowners, they have realised the real 
value of their indigenous lands in the market. The main ingredient of their land value 
is due to the development planning of the land as proposed by the government. 
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7.0 LANDOWNERS’ ATTITUDE AFFECTING THE SUPPLY OF  
LANDS  
 
 
7.1       Introduction 
 
Landowners have important role in determining the availability of land in the 
development processes.  Only landowners who are willing to bring the land into the 
development process either directly through planning proposal or indirectly by 
releasing their rights to other people who can optimize the potential of the lands 
through land transfer and hence the land will be readily available in the development 
process.  Therefore, besides existing institutions, landowners’ attitude also affects 
their decision in determining the future of the land (Cadman and Topping, 1995; 
Ismail, 1999). 
 
7.2    Respondents’ Characteristics 
 
In this empirical work, three groups of respondent i.e landowners, 
professionals and land development agents were successfully interviewed.  Detailed 
distribution of respondents and characteristics of respondents are shown in Table 7.1 
and Table 7.2. 
  
Table 7.1: The classification of samples based on current condition of the lots and 
sample occupation 
Classification Total 
samples 
Description 
Landowners of 
undeveloped lots 
43 - 42 lots owned by individual 
- 1 lot owned by corporate 
Landowners of 
developed lots 
8 - 5 lots owned by individual 
- 3 lots owned by corporate 
   ( 2 of them as developers) 
Landowners who 
have traded their lots 
3 - 1 voluntary transfer 
- 2 compulsory purchase 
Planner 3 - 1 of them works in the special unit of  
Kampong Baru Development 
Valuer 1  
MAS Boards 3  
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The total respondents for landowner of undeveloped lots occupy the highest 
number, since undeveloped lot is the main issue in the land development processes.  
Among four corporate owners, two of them are developer.   
 
Respondents’ background for landowners of undeveloped lots and the 
characteristics of the lots are shown in the Table 7.2. 
 
 
  Table 7.2:  Landowners background of undeveloped lots and characteristics of lots 
Characteristics Detailed characteristic Percentage 
A. Landowners  Background 
Ages 1. <20    years 
2. 21-30 years 
3. 31-40 years 
4. 40-50 years 
5. > 50   years 
   0.0 
   0.0 
   4.8 
  28.5 
  66.7 
Education 1. Uneducated 
2. Elementary 
3. Secondary 
4. Higher education 
    4.8 
  26.1 
  59.6 
    9.5 
Household income 1. < RM 1000 
2. RM 1001-RM 1500 
3. RM 1501-RM 2000 
4. RM 2001-RM 2500 
5. > RM 2501 
   33.4 
   35.7 
   16.7 
     7.1 
     7.1 
B. Lots’ Characteristic 
How lot was occupied 1. Gift or inheritance 
2. State granted 
3. Purchase 
4. Compulsory purchase 
5. Lease 
   88.1 
     4.8 
     7.1 
     0.0 
     0.0 
Landownership 1. Single owner 
2. Multiple owner 
   19.0 
   81.0 
Land use 1. Residential 
2. Industrial 
3. Commercial 
4. Vacant lands 
   95.2 
     0.0 
     4.8 
     0.0 
The purpose of 
occupying the lots 
1. Leasing 
2. Own use 
3. Generate income 
4. Investment capital 
5. Development potential 
6. Inheritance 
     0.0 
   88.1 
     9.5 
     0.0 
     0.0 
     2.4 
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 From Table 7.2, some information can be extracted in terms of respondents’ 
background and characteristics of the lots.  The common respondents’ background is 
dominated by old people (more than 67 per cent), medium education (87 percent) 
and low household income families (85.8 percent income less than RM 2000 per 
month). Whilst, for the lots’ characteristics, most of lots were occupied from their 
ancestor (inheritance lands), owned by more than one owner (81 per cent), used as 
residence (95.2 per cent) as well as the purpose of occupying the lot was for own use 
(88.1 per cent).  
 
7.3       Land Owners’ Attitudes from Land Rights Point of View 
 
Basically there are three rights attached on the land namely the right to use, 
to possess and to dispose of (Guerin, 2003; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).  These 
rights can be attributed to an individual or can be shared among different individuals 
(Picot et al., 1997).  Which rights exist and who owns them has major societal and 
economic implications such as incentives on rights owner for long-term 
management of lands (Guerin, 2003). 
 
Based on the empirical survey, there are many ways landowners handled the 
land particularly related to the intentions they have and actions the have done.  Table 
7.3 tries to relate the landownership, landowners’ characteristics, the objectives to 
own the land and also the landowners’ attitude in handling the land. 
 
Table 7.3: Charateristices and the main purpose in owning the lots 
 
Variables Lots number 
Multiple 1,2,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,18,19,21,22,23,24,25, 
26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33, 36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43, 44, 47 
Single  3,4,8,16,17,20,34,35,45,46 
Landown
ership 
Corporate 48,49,50,51 
Landown
er’ 
characteri
stics 
Old people 1,2,3,4,5,9,10,12,14,15,16, 18,1920,21,22,24,26,27, 
28,29,30,34,37,38,39,41, 42 
Inheritance 2,3,5,6,8,9,11,12,13,14, 15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22, 
23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30, 31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38, 
39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46, 47,48,49 
State granted 7,10 
Lots’ 
Characteri
stics 
Purchase 1,4,29,49,50,51 
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Table 7.3: Landownership, landowners’ characteristics, landowners’ attitude and 
the main purpose in owning the lots (Continued) 
 
Variables Lots number 
Own use 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25, 
27,28,29,32,33,34,35,36,37,38, 
39,40,41, 
Bequeathed asset 8 
Generate income 26,30,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50 
Development potential 51 
Main purpose in 
owning lots 
  
Landowner’ 
attitude 
Intend to sell 1,3,14,21,24,39,42,46, 
Intend to develop for own use 1,2,14,15,16,17,19,20,24,26,28, 
34,37,39,40,42 
Intend to develop for rented 
house/apartment 
6,913,22,23,27,30,31,32,33,35, 
38,41,51 
Agree to compulsory purchase 1,3,4,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,1516, 
17,19,21,22,36,23,2426,27,29,30,3
2,33,35,36,37,3842,44,45,46,47, 
48,50 
 
Prefer to stay in KB after 
redevelopment 
2,3,4,5,6,9,11,12,13,14,16,17,18, 
19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28, 
29,30,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,40, 
43,44,45, 
   
 
Table 7.3 shows that 37 samples or 79 per cent of the individual landowners 
have more than one owner.  Only 21 per cent of the lots are owned by a single 
owner.  It indicates that multiple ownerships is a common condition in the Kampong 
Baru area.  Besides it is caused by the interval time between the establishment of 
MAS settlement and the registration of rights, 1900 to 1964, strict implementation of 
Muslim rules on inheritance, called Faraid, by distributing land to all respected 
owners and by putting all names on the grant is considered as the owners’ attitude 
causing multiple ownerships (Baharin, 2003).  
 
According to the way 47 individual landowners occupied the lands, 42 
samples were occupied from inheritance process, 2 samples from state granted, 3 
samples from purchasing.  Corporate landowners purchased or inherited the lands.  
Landowners of lots number 48 stated that his family founded a private company 
 103 
 
called Arina Development Sdn Bhd and put the inheritance land as the asset for their 
company.  Dato’ Rahim, the owner of RAH Properties Sdn Bhd and lot 49 
mentioned that besides inheritance land, he also bought the adjacent lands from the 
original landowners so that a 23-storeys building can be technically and 
economically constructed.  
 
In term of the objectives to occupy the lands, 90 per cent land owners used 
their land for their own usage such as residences.  Only 9 per cent have tried to 
optimize the potential of the land by generating income through running small 
business such as a store or leasing part of the lots to other people such as what lot 31 
did.  This is different with the owners of developed lands who have successfully 
optimized the land by improving the use of the land.  While in terms of the age of 
the landowners, 66.7 per cent are occupied by old landowners. 
 
Based on Table 7.3, particularly the intention of the landowners to sell and to 
develop the land, three groups of landowners can be drawn namely to maintain the 
whole rights, to maintain part of rights and to release all of the rights.  The first 
group is identified by the intention of the landowners not to sell the land and develop 
the land for their own use.  The second group is characterized by the intention of the 
landowners not to sell the lands, to develop the lands but intend also to lease the land 
or the landed property for other parties.  The last group of intension is identified by 
the will of the landowners to sell the land.  According to Buitelaar (2003b) 
transferring part of the rights changes the content of the bundle of rights, whilst 
transferring the whole of rights doesn’t change the content of the rights but the 
ownership of the rights. 
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 Table 7.4 summarizes the result of landowners’ attitude in terms of the way 
they manage their rights and the reasons behind their actions. 
 
Table 7.4: Reasons for supporting landowners’ attitudes towards land rights 
No Attitudes Lots Reasons 
1 Release all of 
the rights  
1,3,14,21,24,31,35, 
40, 41,42 
Avoid conflicts, financial 
problem, stay out side KB 
2 Keep part of the 
rights 
4,6,9,13,22,23,27,30,
32,33,36,39, 3,44,45, 
47,48,49,50,51 
Stay in KB, get return from the 
lands, Preserve Malay Land, 
good location 
3 Keep all of the 
rights 
2,5,7,8,10,11,12,15,1
6,17,18,19,20,25,26,2
8,29,34,37,38, 
Inheritance land, Preserve 
Malay land, good location, 
easy to do business, want to 
stay in KB  
 
Landowners’ conflict is a reason mentioned by landowners of lot 31 who 
intend to sell the land.  Often multiple ownership triggers conflicts among them 
particularly related to the implementation of use-right.  They are aware that the 
longer they keep this condition, the worse the conflict will be.  Different reason was 
stated by landowners of lot 32 who intended to sell the land.  Since every owner has 
the full rights upon the land, no decision about the future of the land can be 
achieved. Although some landowners, lot number 14, 31, 35, 40, 41 and 46, 
basically intend to keep their land rights by developing the lands, financial problems 
have encouraged them to release the rights. 
 
Various reasons were mentioned by landowners who want to maintain their 
full rights such as inheritance land, preserve Malay land, good location, easy to do 
business and want to stay in KB.  Inheritance land is the mayor reason stated by 
landowners.  For them land given by their parent are considered as a mandate that 
should be maintained as best as possible.  In fact, landowners of lots 5, 8, 18, 20, 28, 
35 consistently stated that whatever the condition is, including compulsory purchase 
approach, they will always try to keep all their rights. 
 
Subsequent reason that drives landowners to keep the land rights is to 
preserve Malay land in the urban area.  This is because Kampong Baru is the only 
Malay Reservation Land located in the urban area, thus maintaining their land rights 
is one form of preserving Malay dignity.  The next factors are good location and 
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easiness to do business.  Kampong Baru which is located close to central business 
district area of Kuala Lumpur city provides amenities particularly the easy access to 
any public facilities such as bank, government office, education and hospital.  In-
depth discussion on this reason will be presented in Chapter 8. 
 
The intention to maintain the rights is also expressed by the intention to 
develop their land particularly for their own uses although some of them are still 
hindered by financial problems, for example landowners lots 2, 26, 37 and 38.  Even 
landowners lots 37 have tried to develop their land with the help of a private 
developer.  However, the developer deprived the promise by still keeping the grant 
without any development progress.  
 
The third group of landowner is those who still want to own the rights, but 
they also have no objection to release part of their rights for a temporary period, for 
example through leasing.  The landowners still keep the right to delineate, release 
the lots, but give the right to use and to occupy to other people for a certain period of 
time.  By leasing for a certain period of time, besides getting additional income the 
original landowners will be able to secure the inheritance land from being 
permanently transferred.  Therefore, if there is a chance to develop the land, besides 
for their own uses they also want to develop the land for, such as, rented house and 
apartment.  
 
According to the survey addressed to the landowners, only 4 land owners 
who have tried to sell their lots.  Multiple ownerships is one of the land attribute that 
provides dual effects.  For the first group who intend to sell the land, multiple 
ownerships is a condition which should be immediately solved as what Rosta 
(Respondent no: 31) mentioned.  The reason is that the longer this condition 
attached on the land, the more problem will be encountered particularly to optimize 
the potential use of the land.  On the other side, multipleownership becomes factors 
that make the landowners hesitate to sell off the land because of the huge effort to 
obtain unanimous agreement among the landowners.  This is what the respondent 
no: 36 mentioned that they have had many times the whole family (8 land owners) 
discussed about the future of the land.  However until the interview was done they 
still have not decided about the future of the land.  
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When a question about what factors influence landowners decision to release 
the lands and 5 choices were given namely development, land price, money, land 
status and others, the answer is shown by Figure 7.1. 
 
65%8%
19%
5%
3%
Development Price Money Land Status Others
 
Figure 7.1 Factors influence landowners to release the lands 
 
Figure 7.1 shows that 65 percent respondents will release the land if there is 
development project set up either by government or private companies in Kampong 
Baru area.  The second and third reasons are ‘others’ and ‘land price’ which 
recorded 19 per cent and 8 per cent respectively.  Depending on other landowners’ 
decision and what the government wants are two argumentations belonging to 
‘others’ choice.  These arguments indicate that passive response is one alternative 
solution that landowners may prefer.  Whilst expecting high price is the only 
argument supporting ‘land price’ choice such as what landowner number 21 and 35 
stated. Since both landowners intend to release the land (see Table 7.4), high price 
become precondition to perform land transfer.  
 
Besides using market mechanism, landowners may be forced to release the 
land through compulsory purchase or land acquisition. This approach has been used 
as a policy instrument to correct market failures in urban development or to help to 
implement land use plans (Ding, 2007), or as preliminary works to amalgamate 
lands (Ismail, 1999). Land acquisition is a form of the hierarchy mechanism which is 
part of the autonomy owned by the landowners are given to the other party (in this 
case is the government) through a special process different to the normal land 
transfer process.  
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Once the respondents were asked about the possibility to use compulsory 
purchase as the alternative approach to overcome the land supply problem, around 
79 per cent of them agreed to the use of this approach as long as a certain condition 
has been fulfilled.  The condition is that the compensation should be based on the 
open market value of the land.  There are 48 per cent of the respondents firmly 
agreed that the amount of compensation becomes the main factor that hinders the 
success of the compulsory purchase.  In fact, in order to increase the land price, 
three landowners of lots 22, 24 and 42 had suggested the removal the landownership 
restrictions.  Lot number 3 mentioned that besides compensation government should 
also consider another alternative way to acquire land such as by substituting the land 
and house with comparable price at a certain place close to Kampong Baru area.   
 
For the corporate owners, only 2 owners (48 and 50) don’t agree with the 
compulsory purchase since they believe it is very hard for the government to handle 
fair compensation to allow Malays to develop Kampong Baru according to their 
intentions. The other 2 landowners (49 and 51) agreed, although they are still 
wondering whether the government is capable to buy all the land due to the fact that 
substantial capital must be invested in Kampong Baru areas.  
 
Twenty one percent of respondents still do not agree with the land 
acquisition since the land must be for inheritance that should be maintained and 
further bequeath to the next generation.  Landowners of lots number 2, 8, 18, 20, 25, 
28, 32, 35, 43, 45, 49, 51 are those who don’t agree the compulsory purchase as an 
alternative approach to solve the land supply problems.  This attitude is in line with 
the landowners’ attitude not to release their rights as listed in Table 7.3 except 
landowner lot 35 and 40.  It is due to their rational reasons that amount of 
compensation would be generally lower than the open market price.  This is the 
main reason why they prefer to release their right through market mechanism.  In 
addition, landowner number 40 mentioned that government should elaborate clearly 
about the planning proposal for the development so that every affected landowner is 
aware about his rights and his responsibility.  
 
In terms of compulsory purchase, interviewed respondents were commonly 
mentioned that it is no need to use this approach.  Several reasons that they gave 
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were that there are problems to transfer the rights (Mohd Fauzy Hasyim, 2006) due 
to the landownership constraints. Some of the government agency was given 
responsibility to develop Kampong Baru (Kamarulzaman Mat Saleh, 2006), let the 
Malays develop on their own with the help of the government (Samsuddin Abdul 
Kadir, 2006). However, government must review the land status prior to the 
development (Azmir Jaafar, 2006). 
 
From the previous discussions about the condition that caused landowners to 
release their rights and also about the compulsory purchase, indication on the 
behaviour of the landowners can be identified.  Generally landowners are willing to 
release their rights to the government as long as the government provides clear 
information about the objectives of the project with just compensation.  This is 
shown in the following Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5: The landowners’ attitudes to releasing the land 
Land owners 
attitude 
Through Market Through Compulsory 
Purchase 
Release their 
rights 
1, 3, 14, 21, 24, 31, 35, 40, 
41, 42 
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 
30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 
39, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 
50 
Keep (part or all) 
of their rights 
2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 
34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45, 
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 
2, 8, 18, 20, 25, 28, 32, 35,  
43, 45,49, 51 
   
Some landowners are strictly mentioned whether they agree or not, once government 
has established the compulsory purchase, the affected landowners should obey (Lot 
5 and 7). 
 
According to the question asked to the landowners who have released their 
land rights due to land acquisition and/or transactions, a number of reasons emerged.  
Two of them released the land due to compulsory purchase while the third one is 
because of personal reason.  All of them mentioned that agreement from all 
landowners is the main step that should be taken into account.  Wapingi (son of 
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landowner of lots 557 A) mentioned that their family actually didn’t intend to 
release the land because they wanted to keep their rights and enjoy the amenity they 
had. The government project had forced his parent to release the land regardless of 
the reasons. The intention to enjoy the amenities was also proved by purchasing the 
new land inside Kampong Baru after they received the compensation from the 
project.  
 
However, a different reason was given by Latifah (daughter of landowner of 
Lots 398) who sold the land due to government project to develop new road 
surrounding Kampong Baru area.  She mentioned that, although government didn’t 
acquire their land, her family still intended to release the land because all of the 
landowners had already stayed outside Kampong Baru.  Whilst, Syamsul (son of 
landowner of Lot 444) elaborated that the main reason why his parent sold the land 
was to avoid family conflict and the size of the land (around 444 m2 ) is too small to 
be divided among them.  In addition, the alternative to amalgamate the land with 
contiguous was considered difficult since the people who are at that time stayed 
everywhere else did not have close relationship with his parent.  Thus, releasing the 
land was the best alternative to optimize the potential use of the land (Syamsul, 
2006).   
 
The main concern for landowners who were affected by compulsory 
purchase projects was the value of fair compensation. Wapingi (2007) mentioned 
that due to compensation dispute in the hearing process, his family brought the case 
to the court.  Fortunately, the court approved to give additional compensation.  
Latifah’s (2007) family initially expected compensation value of about 
RM400/square foot. However, after four months of negotiation, they finally agreed 
to release the land for RM250/square foot.  In addition, the uncertainty on the 
valuation system used by the government also becomes a very crucial factor.  For 
example, Wapingi family received compensation for RM 240/square foot in 1996 
and Latifah’s family received compensation for RM250/square foot in 2002 for their 
land. The government was given compensation for widening the road of Jalan Sultan 
Sulaiman at RM250/square foot (Syamsuri, 2007).  These examples on 
compensation illustrate that although those land acquisitions happened at different 
times, the same amounts of compensation were given to the affected landowners. 
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 This discussion gives preliminary clues that although landowners wanted to 
keep the land rights, they still have positive response to any project established by 
the government. Anyway, the landowners are still looking forward for a just that 
provides monetary awards so that they may release their land for development.  
 
From the property rights view point of view particularly the land status, 
generally lands in Kampong Baru are already secure in terms of ownership, for 
example around 90 per cent of the lands have had title of document and the status of 
lands are freehold (Abdul Rahman, 2007).  This implies that security in 
landownership had increased the degree of transferability of land (Mooya and 
Cloete, 2005).  However, the process of land transfer in the market is slow compared 
to the bequeathing process (see Chapter Six).  The main reason in support of this 
phenomenon is that these are inheritance lands, preserve Malay land, good location 
(see Table 7.4) that must be secured.  This is online with what Mooya and Cloete 
(2005) who had found in their research about land market in urban fringe area where 
land holders prefer to pass over the land to their relatives than to sell it off in the 
market.  They found that this phenomenon is the result of the concept of land 
ownership as a security and welfare rather than as a tradable asset.  
 
In relation to land ownership rights, multiple land ownerships was 
recognized as hindering the supply of land for development  The bundle of rights is 
shared together with other land owners.  As a result any decision to manage the land 
should be approved by all landowners.  Since every owner has his own interest, it is 
not easy to get consensus.  This causes attenuation of landowners’ rights particularly 
to transfer the land due to certain limited buyers may be interested to buy the land.  
As a result, bargaining power of the landowners to find the best buyers at a higher 
price is also attenuated. 
 
 
 
7.4       Land Owners’ Attitudes Towards Land Development  
 
In relation to the development of MAS area, generally respondents agreed to 
the idea that MAS area should be developed.  Forty six respondents or around 90 per 
cent with various reasons fully support the redevelopment of MAS area, 
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unfortunately the rest answered “No”.  The following Table 7.6 shows landowners 
and their stated reasons.  
 
Interestingly, there are arguments by the landowners to preserve the Malay 
identity is are either agree or do not agree on the development of MAS area.  
Landowners of lots number 14, 16, 18, 22, 25, 27 and 28 mentioned that those who 
agree on the development of MAS area argue that development of MAS area is 
possible without having to ignore Malay identity.  They stated that only through 
development the identity of urban Malays can be preserved.  It is due to surrounding 
Kampong Baru area that has grown significantly so that the physical contrast 
emerged between Kampong Baru and its adjacent areas.  However, the landowners 
of lots 5, 8, 43 and 45 are argued that maintaining the current condition of the 
kampong is the alternative way to preserve their inheritancy.  
 
  Table 7.6: Landowners’ attitudes toward MAS development and supporting 
reasons 
 
Attitude toward 
MAS development 
Landowners of lots number Reasons 
Agree 1,2,3,4,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14, 
15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23, 
24,25,26,27,29,30,31,32,33, 
34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42, 
44,46,47,48,49,50,51 
Strategic location, 
preserving Malay identity 
and dignity, to improve 
Malay income, to adapt 
with the vicinity area 
Not agree 5,8,28,43,45 To preserve Malay 
identity 
   
 
In terms of the type of landowners, landowners of undeveloped land in 
general, totaled to 40 samples, have agreed with the development of MAS area, 
while 7 out of 9 landowners of developed land agreed the development of MAS 
area. Both landowners of undeveloped and developed lands provided similar reasons 
to support their arguments.  However, in relation to the need to maintain the 
restriction in interests, there are 35 out of 51 landowners were firmly stated that the 
landownership restriction in interest of MAS should be maintained as it is.  The 
reason is simply that Kampong Baru is the only Malay settlement in the urban area.  
As such, releasing the restriction in interests means opening the possibility of non-
Malays to own the MAS lands in Kampong Baru.  
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With regards to the landowners’ attitude to develop the land, Table 7.7 
shows various attitudes and reasons there on. 
 
Table 7.7: Land owners’ attitude to develop the land 
Landowners’ 
attitudes to 
development 
Lots number Factor influencing the 
attitudes 
Tried to develop 
but failed 
5, 9, 24,34, 35, 37, 40,51 Support: 
Landowners agreement, 
improve household income, 
improve the amenity 
Hinder: 
Financial problem, difficult to 
get agreement from 
landowners, cheated by private 
company, lengthy procedures 
Haven’t tried to 
develop 
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11,12,13,1
4,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,
23,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,3
2, 33,36,38,39,41,42 
Financial constrain, difficult to 
get agreement, old age, no 
grant at hand 
Want to develop 1,2,6,9,13,14,15,16,17,19, 
20,22,23,24,26,27,28,30,3
1,32,33,34,35,36,38,39,40,
41,51 
Improve household income, 
increase the pleasure, preserve 
Malays lands, optimize the 
potential of the land 
Don’t want to 
develop 
3,4,5,7,10,12,13,18,21,29,
37, 42 
Old age, inheritance land, 
financial constraint, difficult to 
get agreement 
Have developed 43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50 To get additional income, 
optimize the potential of the 
land, good location, improve 
amenity, to stimulate the 
surrounding area, to support 
the need for space for the core 
business 
   
Among 42 undeveloped lands taken as sample, there are only 7 landowners 
of lots 5, 9, 24, 34, 35, 37 and 40 have tried to develop the lands.  Three of them 
failed to develop the land because the private land developer they were going to co-
operate with had cheated them by mortgaging their grants without performing any 
development.  In fact, a certain amount of money was spent in order to recover the 
document of title.  In addition, some of them are still don’t know of their grants 
where about.  The other reasons why they failed to develop the land were the 
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difficulties to get firm agreement from the landowners and who have no financial 
support.  For example, landowner of lot 9 failed to develop the land since a proposal 
to get a loan from a bank was refused. The reason was that at that time around 
19990’s the government wanted to purchase the land through Kampong Baru 
redevelopment program. 
 
 However, there are some good reasons that encouraged them to develop the 
lands such as all landowners were agreed to develop the land, to get additional 
income and to renovate the existing houses.  Landowner of lot number 5 for example 
had renovated her house by securing a loan from a bank in 1967.  The house was 
obsolete which is no longer fit for habitation.  Landowner of lots 9 and 40 
mentioned that all the family members have agreed to develop the land, however 
financial problems have impeded the plan for development due to economic 
recession in 1980’s.   
 
Table 7.7 shows that there are landowners who are passively responded to 
the land development initiatives.  Unfortunately, twelve landowners don’t want to 
develop the land.  Some of them declared that the government should take over the 
development of Kampong Baru area as what landowner of lot number 6 stated:  
 
“I do nothing because I have no financial support to develop the land. 
The government should take over the development of Kampong Baru. 
Landowners have no money” (Landowner of lots number 6, author’ 
translation). 
 
The government is responsible to initiate and undertake the development of 
Kampong Baru area as mentioned by 29 per cent of the landowners taken as 
samples.  Many reasons may support this argument such as landowners have no 
money (lots 1 and 6) and the government always has dominant roles in the 
development of Kampong Baru (Sulaiman, 2000). It has also been supported by the 
argument that Malays should have special position as mandated by Article 153 of 
the Federal Constitution.  
 
Anyway, those who have developed their lands commonly mentioned that 
optimizing the potential of the land was the only main reason.  Good location is the 
reason why landowners of lots number 44 and 45 used the land for running a 
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restaurant.  The fact that the lots were being located along the main road and close to 
the business area.  Whilst, landowner of lots number 43, 46 and 47 who had 
developed a rented house described that some reasons that encouraged the 
development were to improve their household income and to respond to the trend in 
the market for rented. 
 
Conversely, there are different reasons as stated by Dato’ Rahim, the owner 
of Rah Properties Corp. Sdn Bhd and Ghazali Syamsudin, the executive director of 
Arina Development Sdn Bhd.  Dato’ Rahim explained that besides economic 
reasons, the development of Plaza Rah was intended to stimulate other landowners 
to develop the lands adjacent to the development site by providing better 
environment.  
 
“Let the Malays themselves develop the land. Encourage wealthy 
Malays to participate in the development and to provide stimulation 
to other landowners. The government doesn’t have enough money to 
develop the whole Kampong Baru area” (Dato’ Rahim, 2006). 
 
The same reason has been also given by Ghazali Syamsudin why he and his brothers 
wanted to develop 18 stories (revised to 28 stories) apartment and office building in 
the areas.  His family realized the potential value of their land which is located along 
Jalan Raja Muda Abdul Aziz and also the intention to maintain inheritancy. 
 
 Table 7.8 shows the characteristics of the lands, type of developments and 
factors that support the development in stimulating the development in the MAS 
areas. 
 
Table 7.8: The characteristics of developed lands and objectives of development 
 
Lots 
number 
Land characteristics, landowner 
characteristics 
Type of development, 
objective, factors affecting 
the development 
43 Inherited, single lots,  individual 
owner, bank loan 
Rented house, Malay 
developer slow to finish, enjoy 
income, amenity 
44 Inherited, single lots, individual 
owner, own funding 
Restaurant, Not enough 
funding, get income  
45 Inherited, single lots, individual 
owner, own funding 
Restaurant, optimize the 
potential of land 
46 Inherited land, single lots, Rented house  
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individual owner, government 
funding 
47 Inherited land, single lots, 
individual owner, bank loan 
Rented house, get income 
48 Inherited land, multi lots, 
corporate owner, bank loan 
Apartment + office, stimulate, 
get income, take time to get 
approval (6 month) 
49 Inherited+purchase, multi lots, 
corporate, bank loan+self funding, 
Condominium, get income, 
stimulate other landowner 
50 Purchase, multi lots, corporate 
owner, self funding 
Administration building, own 
use 
    
In relation to the scale of land development, commonly the individual 
owners have smaller land size than the corporate landowners.  This scale dictates the 
size of land needed as shown by the number of lots to support development.  
Individual owners commonly developed single lot, while corporate owners 
developed multi lots.  For example Plaza Rah is constructed on the amalgamation of 
five lots including lots 1711, 1712, 332B, 336 and 338 B; Menara Naza is 
constructed on lots no 1358 and 1360 and Arina Development is constructed on lots 
number 317 A and 317 B.  The amalgamation of these lots was done after the 
transfer of rights from initial landowners to the corporate owners. 
 
Landowners’ motivation of those who have successfully developed the lands 
is also varied.  Individual owners commonly were motivated by the personal reason 
such as to increase household income, whilst corporate owners have wider 
motivation such as to stimulate other landowners and to improve the environment.  
However, development carried out by Naza properties was mainly to fulfill the need 
for more spaces to run their core business in car industry (Onn, 2007). 
 
 
 
7.5       Landowners’ Attitude towards Land Supply Constraints 
 
The previous sub-chapter 7.3 and 7.4 have discussed about the landowners’ 
attitude and factors that influenced their attitudes either positively or negatively. 
When a question was asked to the landowners of undeveloped lands about “Why 
you did nothing (didn’t develop or didn’t sell the land)” and four choices were 
provided, the answer is shown in Figure 7.2 
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A
34%
B
5%C
27%
D
34%
 
  A: I never thought about it C: Have no funding sources 
  B: Have no knowledge D: Difficult to make decision 
 
Figure 7.2  The reasons why landowners did nothing 
       
 
 Figure 7.2 shows that 34 percent of samples didn’t think of selling the land 
or developing the land (lots number 3,5,7,8,10,11,12,17,18,19, 20,25,26,27,28,29, 
33, 37 and 41).  There are many reasons supporting this argument are such as being 
old people, already convenient with the current condition, inheritance land and they 
have been deprived by private companies.  Samples which answer “have no 
knowledge” are lots number 26,27 and 30. Whilst, lots number 
1,2,4,22,23,26,27,30,32,33, 35,37,38,40 and 42 mentioned that they did nothing 
since they have problems with financing.  There are 19 samples (lots number 
6,11,13,14,15,16,19,22,24,26,27, 30,31,32,33,36,37,38 and 42) stated that 
difficulties to make decision among landowners was the main reason why they 
either didn’t sell the land or didn’t develop the land. 
 
As illustrated in chapter three, there are two ways where land will be readily 
available in the market for the development process, either directly or indirectly 
through land transfer.  Therefore, this sub-section will focuses on the attitude that 
hinders the land from being available in the land market for the land development 
process.  Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.7 show that there are a number of factors that affect 
the landowners attitude namely reasonable price, landownership, financial problem 
as well as personal reason such as landowners experience, their perspectives on land 
development, physical condition of the land owner such as being of an old age. 
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7.5.1 Reasonable Land Prices 
 
Land prices dispute is recognized as the factor that hindered the 
redevelopment of Kampong Baru in 1991 (Sulaiman, 2000; Ismail, 1999).  As for 
the current situation, the high value of compensation is still the main issue in the 
redevelopment of Kampong Baru as mentioned by Kamarulzaman Mat Salleh 
(2006): 
 
“The main issues to develop the MAS area are landownership and 
high compensation asked by landowners. Therefore to improve MAS 
area these factors should be taken into account first” (Kamarulzaman 
Mat Saleh, 2006, author’ translation). 
 
The just compensation value is always becomes the main consideration when 
discussing about compulsory purchase.  The result of interview shows that among 
37 landowners who agreed to the compulsory purchase, 23 landowners are firmly 
putting the market-value based compensation as the consideration that has to be 
achieved first.  Just to give illustration about the value asked by affected landowners 
and the market price from the real transaction recorded by VPSFTKL, a number of 
landowners taken as samples were asked about the land price if the government 
wants to acquire their lands.  The sample lots are located along Lorong Raja Muda 
Musa 5, Jalan Daud, Jalan Raja Ali, Lorong Raja Muda Musa 6, Jalan Shed Mahadi.  
The asking prices by landowners are RM500, RM800, RM400, RM600 and 
RM650/square foot respectively. According to Onn (Executive staff of Naza 
properties Sdn Bhd), the current market price of land in Kampong Baru is in the 
range of RM200-RM300/square foot for the land located at prime area such as Jalan 
Abdullah and Jalan Raja Muda Abdul Aziz.   The market price will be less if the 
land is located at the inferior area.  According to the land transaction recorded at 
VPSFTKL in 2006, a lot of land located at Jalan Abdullah was transferred at 
RM294/square foot.  Whilst, land located at Jalan Daud and Jalan Raja Alang were 
sold at RM210/square foot and RM179/square foot respectively.  This example 
indicates significant differences between the asking prices of land by the landowners 
as compared to market value of the lands. 
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 Interestingly, the only main reason that can be used to explain the big 
difference in prices are due the fact that MAS lands are with restrictions in interests 
as compared to the land outside MAS areas without it.  This argument was put 
forward by landowner of lot 40: 
 
 “If land price at Jalan Sultan Ismail is around RM800/square foot, the 
land price in Kampong Baru therefore is RM500/square foot.  It is the 
reasonable price” (Landowner of lot number 40, author’ translation). 
 
 
This argument is an indication that landowners are actually aware about the 
negative effect of landownership restrictions in interests towards land prices.  This 
awareness is also supported by the result of interviews on the factors that influenced 
the land prices.  There are around 76 per cent samples that agree landownership 
restrictions in interests are significantly influence the land price.  Why they asked 
quite a high price ?. Dato’ Rahim (2006) tried to explain that they may be don’t have 
information about the real demand in the market.  He subsequently stated that due to 
the fact that only Malays can occupy the land, the demand is limited and is strongly 
relied upon the affordability of the Malays.  For him the current market price had 
already indicated the affordability of the Malays and the reasonableness of the land 
prices.  This is actually known as bounded rationality based on lack of information 
affecting landowners’ decision by institutionalists’ view point.  
 
 
 
7.5.2 Land Ownership and Supply Constraint 
 
As mentioned in sub-section 6.4.1, landownership is the next issue which is 
suspected to hinder the supply of land for development (Kamarulzaman Mat Saleh, 
2006).  According to Adams et al. (1997) two main classifications of landownership 
that caused constraint namely (1) related to ownership such as unclear ownership, 
divided ownership and fragmented ownership; and (2) related to selling-eagerness 
such as willing and unwilling to sell. Mohd Fauzy Hasyim(2006) mentioned that the 
main characteristics of ownership in Kampong Baru which can commonly be found 
are multiple ownership and unknown owners. 
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In relation to multiple landownership, Guerin (2003) mentioned that multiple 
ownership discourages uses of the land because every owner has his own interest. In 
addition, Healey (1991) stressed on different strategies, perspectives and actions of 
landowners. When a question about why they didn’t sell or develop the land, 19 
samples stated that difficulties to get consensus from all landowners is the main 
factor.  Land owners of lots 6, 11, 13, 14,15,16,19,22, 26,27,30,31,32,33,36,37 and 
38 failed to develop the land because of no consensus among landowners.  
Landowners of lot 33 have tried to determine the future use of the land.  Three 
options emerged during the meeting namely to sell the land and equally divided the 
money, to sell the land and buy new land outside Kampong Baru or to develop the 
land themselves.  No decision has been made until now.  In other case, there is no 
unanimous decision about land price among landowners which has hindered the 
landowners from selling the land (lots 24, 32 and 36).  This phenomenon has been 
proven by Ellickson (1993) that it is more difficult for multiple owners due the fact 
that their behaviour are diverse. 
 
Conversely, there is a good implication of multiple land ownership. For 
example in the case of lot 31, the landowners will sell off the land in order to avoid 
conflicts among the landowners. This means that multiple ownership may provide 
positive effects to the supply of land.  Another example is shown by landowner of 
lot 48 who are with his brother had taken amalgamation of two lots 317 A and 317 B 
which subsequently had a planning approval to erect a 18 stories office and 
apartment building.  In 2002 this proposal has been approved by KLCH, though 
until 2007 the construction is not yet started.  The next example is multiple 
ownership of lot 45 whereby the landowners are sharing the capital to develop a 
restaurant without any money from a bank.  This is in line with what Buitelaar 
(2002) stated that multiple ownership have superiorities in terms of being more 
efficient than single ownership in order to achieve economies of scale. 
 
 
7.5.3 Financial Problems 
 
Financial problem was the next factor that respondents often mentioned 
when they were asked about the factor that hindered the development of the land.  
According to the interview, 15 samples indicated that the reason why they didn’t 
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particularly develop the land was that they didn’t have enough money (lots 1, 2, 4, 
22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40 and 42).  In this case, it seems that 
landowners positioned themselves as the developer since financial problem 
generally are encountered by developers who handle the physical works (Cadman 
and Topping, 1995).  Regardless of the assumption they made about themselves, 
from the questionnaires about household income of the respondents, 69 per cent of 
the landowners have household income less than RM1500 per month.  It is less than 
the average income of Malays household in Peninsular Malaysia in 1995 which has 
recorded RM1631 per month (Jali et al., 2003).   In other words, affordability of 
landowners to self-development of their lands is in fact quite low compared to the 
other ethnic groups of people in Malaysia. 
 
Actually, financial problems can be solved by getting financial assistances 
from bank, pension funds and insurance companies (Cadman and Topping, 1995).  
However, when the respondents were asked about submitting proposal to obtain 
loans from banks, most of them (40 respondents) answered “never tried”.  A number 
of arguments they mentioned such as being old, will try, never thought of it, 
multiple owners as well as difficult to get loan from banks. 
 
However, landowners of developed land mentioned that around 66 per cent 
of the respondents secured the financial support from banks for development 
purposes.  This is why some landowners of undeveloped lands who intend to 
develop the land, are planning to borrow money from the bank (lots 34, 39, 40 and 
41) to undertake development.  Some landowners are no longer hesitate to use the 
bank as an alternative solution to get loans to develop the land.  It is little bit 
different with the survey done by Ismail (1999) ten years ago where some of 
landowners hesitated to borrow money from the bank because of religious reasons, 
that is about interest.  However, the Islamic banking system which was introduced in 
Malaysia in 1994 (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2003) and which no longer 
implements interest has greately reduce the hesitation.  Therefore, actually the 
financial problem can be solved as long as there is intention from landowner to 
make a change.   
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Another financial problem that still remains as the constraining factor is the 
low value determined to the land if landowners used the land in MAS areas for 
collateral purpose.  Despite that low value, due to restrictions in interests, the land 
has to be developed for high value building. Moreover, only certain banks are 
allowed to offer loan to the MAS land with restrictions in interests. Unfortunately, in 
this research no information can be extracted from landowners who have 
experienced in borrowing the money from the bank.  Only landowners of lot 51 who 
stated that it is difficult to borrow money from a bank by using land in the MAS 
areas for collateral purpose.  
 
 
 
7.5.4 Personal Attitudes 
 
The first personal attitude that influences landowners to sell or to develop the 
land is landowner’s perspective about the value of land development in the MAS 
areas.  Landowners of lots 7, 10 and 12 argued that development of Kampong Baru 
is the government’s responsibility. This argument is also supported by answers that 
saying they don’t want to sell the land, they don’t want to develop the lands, they 
even strengthened their arguments by saying “I never thought about it” when a 
question about why they did nothing was posted to them.  This attitude and the 
supporting argument has caused the landowners to be passive, who are reluctant to 
respond to any development initiatives.  According to Adams (1994) passive 
landownership is landowners’ behaviour that causes land supply constraint. 
 
The second personal attitude is the experience they gained during the 
development of their lands.   Landowners of lots number 34, 35 and 37 told that 
their parents have had bad experience regarding the land development within the 
MAS areas. A private company had promised them to develop the land and had used 
the grant for the purpose of preparing development plan.  However after a couple of 
years there was no development materialized but the private company didn’t return 
the grant to them.  Even until now landowner of lot 34 do not know of the grant 
where about.  This is the reason why landowner lot 34 was unable submit any 
development plan to local authority, because he did not have the grant.   
 
 122 
 
The third personal attitude is the physical condition of the landowners or the 
land.  As discussed in the previous sub-section, being old people is the reason that 
the landowner argued why he didn’t intend to sell or develop the land.  Landowner 
of lots 5, 11, 27 and 29 are among those landowners who mentioned that age is of 
the reasons why they don’t want to sell or to develop the land.  In fact they answered 
“never thought about it” when the reason why they did nothing was asked to them.  
In addition, landowner of lot 5 said that present condition of the MAS area is already 
satisfactory and he is pleased that all his children had the lands in Kuala Lumpur for 
their own family.  This discussion indicates that being an old age landowner is a 
factor that constrains the supply of land for development.  
 
 
 
7.6    Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the landowners’ attitudes toward land rights and 
land development process.  Based on the way they managed their land rights, three 
group of landowners’ attitudes can be identified namely intend to keep all of the 
rights, intend to keep part of the rights and intend to release the rights.  Each group 
of landowners has specific reasons as the main consideration. 
 
In term of landowners’ attitudes toward land development, there are five 
groups of landowners that can be classified.  First group is those who have tried to 
develop the land but failed.  The second group is landowners who never tried to 
develop the land.  The next group is those who intend to develop the land and finally 
those who don’t want to develop the land.  Each group has particular factors that 
either encourage or constrain the decision. 
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8.0 TRANSACTION COSTS WITHIN ‘INSTITUTIONS’ AFFECTING 
THE SUPPLY OF LANDS 
 
8.1   Introduction 
   
When actors control certain resources, there are two type of elements drive 
the manner in which actors make decisions, externally and internally.  The former 
are determined by institutional environment surrounding the actors.  Whilst, the 
latter is more related to the actors themselves which is influenced by cost and benefit 
consideration (Eggertsson, 1995).  Institutions according to North (1996) provide 
incentive and restriction which affect human decision.  Transaction costs which are 
associated with the internal element simultaneously with institutions affect human 
decision whatsoever. 
 
This chapter, therefore, discusses the way institutions affect transaction costs 
which subsequently influences landowners’ decision to participate in the supply of 
land for development. As such indirect approach was selected by assessing activities 
that embedded transaction costs.  Therefore, there are three circumstances proposed 
about the possible sources of transaction cost namely related to the institutions, 
related to the existing property and contract rights and related to the transfer of 
existing property rights (Furubotn and Richter in Benhamm and Benhamm, 2001) 
This is used as the guidance to the discussion.  In addition, there are three 
characteristics of transaction were proposed by Williamson in Petersen (1995) 
namely uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity were selected to identify the 
presence of transaction costs.  In relation to land rights, two types of land rights are 
attached on land including fixed and legal rights as well as variable economic rights 
(Lai, 2001).  In term of cost, the former usually incur the fixed cost, the latter is vary 
depending on the presence of land attributes.  
 
 
 
8.2   Institutions, Transaction Costs and Land Transfer 
 
Transfer of lands is one of the initial steps in the land development activities 
(Cadman and Topping, 1995). Transfer of lands means not to transfer the physical 
land but the rights upon the lands (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973).  During exchange 
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process, North (1996) says that measuring the valuable attributes of what is being 
exchanged, protecting rights, policing and enforcing agreements are among activities 
that may produce transaction costs.  Cost here is not only related to the money but 
also in the form of time, opportunity and effort (Buitelaar, 2004b).  According to 
North (1996) institutions reduce uncertainty and so reduce costs.  However 
according to Furubotn and Richter in Benhamm and Benhamm (2001), related to 
institution there are transaction costs that include the costs of resources utilized for 
the creation, maintenance, use, change of institutions. 
 
Basically there are two ways landowners may release the lands through 
voluntary exchange (market) and through involuntary exchange (compulsory 
purchase) (Eggertsson, 1995).  The next sub chapters, therefore, discuss in detail 
institutions and land attributes that produce transaction costs which subsequently 
influenced the landowners decision to release the lands either through market or 
through compulsory purchase. 
 
 
 
8.2.1 Transferring Land in the Market 
 
As mentioned in Sub-section 8.1, when actors performed land transaction a 
fixed cost should be spent as a consequence of transferring fixed and legal rights.  
Including fixed costs are legal fee and legal tax.  For respondents who have 
experience in buying the land (Rah Properties Sdn Bhd, Naza Properties Sdn Bhd 
and Pembangunan MAS Melayu Sdn Bhd), these type of cost have been considered 
before land transaction. In other words, market have internalized externality so that 
transaction cost is already attenuated (Guerin, 2003). Another cost which can be 
known before transaction is lawyer’s fee. Onn (2006) mentioned that in average he 
has to pay around 1 per cent for lawyer’s fee. 
 
 
  
8.2.1.1 Transaction Costs and  Intention to Transfer the Land 
 
The first legal attributes attached to Kampong Baru settlement was the Malay 
Agriculture Settlement (MAS) Act in 1897 that established this area as indigenous 
land for Malays as the indigenous ethnic group Peninsular.  This establishment has 
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provided a protection to Malays to occupy a settlement in Kuala Lumpur city.  In 
other words, the government has provided exclusive rights to the Malays.  These 
exclusive rights became a form of dignity and pride for Malays in the multi ethnic 
society.   
 
Discussing redevelopment of Kampong Baru, Syamsuri (2006) argued that 
development of lands in Kampong Baru is not only as a matter of economic factor 
but also as dignity factor for Malays.  This is in accordance with what Dato’ Rahim 
(2006) mentioned “Kampong Baru as a Malay settlement should be preserved since 
it is related to the Malays’ dignity“.  Syed Ali Alatas, the president of The Malaysian 
Malay Chamber of Commerce, mentioned “Land in Kampong Baru symbolizes the 
culture, dignity and soul of the urban Malay community inherited over hundreds of 
years” (Bernama, 2007).  This relationship has also affected the decision of 
landowners to release the lands. 
 
From landowner’s point of view, releasing their lands is considered as 
loosing their pride and dignity. Landowner of lot number 25 who doesn’t want to 
sell the land stated: 
 “.. how pity it is, since this is an inheritance land passed on from one 
generation to the next generation. Hard to be understood if I have to 
sell the land” (Landowner of lot number 25, 2006; author’ translation) 
 
This expression indicates a guilty feeling if she has to release the land.  
Syamsuri (2006) mentioned that to a certain extent landowners who have sold the 
land and commonly stayed out of Kampong Baru felt guilty to their neighbors 
because of their inability to secure the rights.   
 
Another argument related to the value of inheritance land is argued by land 
owner of lot number 45 who doesn’t want to sell the land and also who rejects 
compulsory purchase: 
 
“No matter how big the compensation given, it can’t substitute the 
value bequeathed for Malays in Kampong Baru. Money received 
from compensation will run out immediately” (Landowner of lot 
number 45, 2006, author’ translation). 
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This argument indicates that the main reason why they don’t want to release 
the land is not as a matter of economic consideration. This is because they don’t 
want to lose their dignity.  
 
The next attribute of the establishment of Kampong Baru, which is located in 
central business district of Kuala Lumpur, is the facilities received by the residents 
of Kampong Baru.  The development of facilities near Kampong Baru wasn’t 
followed by the developments of Kampong Baru area.  It is due to prior to 1980 the 
focus of local government wasn’t to develop the lands in Kampong Baru, but to 
secure the land from land transfer (Syamsudin Abdul Kadir, 2006).  This better 
condition has provided amenity, privilege to landowners and people who stayed in 
Kampong Baru and subsequently affects the decision to release the rights.  In other 
words, releasing the rights means loosing the opportunity to get the amenities and 
privileges. 
 
Among the respondents, landowners of lots number 7, 32, 33 strictly argued 
that the current condition is already convenient, so that they don’t intend to release 
the lands. More detailed explanation was given by Syamsul (2006) who said that he 
and his family will still stay in Kampong Baru: 
 
“… people don’t want to move from Kampong Baru because there is 
a train station here, we have Pasar Minggu, short distance to 
monorail, buses and taxis pass to the main road, a short distance to 
the bank, office close around here, it is quite convenient” (Syamsul, 
2006) 
 
Social attribute is also the next reason given by Syamsul (2006) why he 
doesn’t move out from Kampong Baru  
 
“Lets say a lot with the price is RM 100 per square foot and we have 
8000 square feet, so we have RM 800000. Of course for RM 800000 
you can buy a good land out there somewhere, for the same value. It 
may be 25-30 km a way there. Or you can buy a good bungalow. But 
I will not. Because I live here, all my friends are here, all the things 
are now here. There is no reason why I should move out from 
Kampong Baru”. 
 
This argument indicates that social attributes that they currently enjoy is also 
a factor that hinder the intention to transfer the land.  They hesitate to release their 
land, because they don’t want to lose the social privileges. 
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 In relation to the preference of the current resident of Kampong Baru if 
redevelopment is successfully undertaken, eighty per cent of the landowners still 
intend to stay in Kampong Baru. The reason is that this area is located in the central 
business district of Kuala Lumpur so that access to public facilities is easy. In 
addition, landowners of lots 21,22,24,26,34,39 and 40 still prefer to stay in 
Kampong Baru because of strategic location particularly to do business.    
 
This argument strengthens the reason that economic consideration is not the 
only matter that hinders landowners to transfer the lands.  Landowners don’t intend 
to release the land because for them the opportunity cost that they have to pay is 
quite valuable such as opportunities to have dignity and opportunity to have 
amenities.  
 
The third land attribute is land rights factor particularly multiple ownership. 
In 1964 the government of Selangor State made a decision to provide rights to the 
Malays resident by registering their lots and giving them grants as evidence of a 
legal ownership (Sulaiman, 2000). Since then residents in Kampong Baru gradually 
registered their land so that now around 90 per cent of lots in Kampong Baru already 
have grants (Abdul Rahman, 2007).  However, the number of landowners name 
attached on the grant are generally more than one which is called multiple 
ownership.  According to the author survey, among 47 individual landowners, 37 
lots or 79 per cent are owned by multiple ownership. In fact at a certain lot the 
number of owner reaches more than 100 names (Norlizah Abas, 2006).  
 
In general, the planning and development rules require collective agreement 
of every multiple landowner prior to land transfer (Section 217 Part Fourteen the 
National Land Code 1965), subdivision, partition and amalgamation (Sections 146 
to 150 Chapter Three, Part Nine of the National Land Code 1965). Therefore effort 
should be taken particularly to get collective agreement from the owners before land 
development and land transaction. 
 
Interviews with landowners of undeveloped lots on why so far no real 
actions have been undertaken, nineteen landowners mentioned that the difficulties to 
make a collective agreement from landowners is the main reason why they did 
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nothing.  Landowner of lot 36 elaborated that they have tried to develop their land.  
On many occasions all 8 landowners had meeting to discuss the future of the land.  
From these meetings, various proposals emerged such as to develop an apartment, to 
sell the land then distribute to every landowner and to sell the land and buy new lots 
outside Kampong Baru. Until now, a collective agreement hasn’t yet been decided.  
This problems is in accordance with what Ellickson (1993) argued that consensus 
between just a few individual is easier than between a whole group, it is due to every 
owner with different behaviour has to be involved. 
 
Difficulties with multiple ownership have also caused Syamsul’s family to 
sell off their land.  It is due to family kinship owned by other owners, who allowed 
other families to stay at their share, provided additional effort to manage the land as 
a unity.  Such condition has been stated by Ellickson (1993) that land owned by an 
individual is relatively low-transaction-cost in term of internalizing externalities. 
This is because it is the easier to monitor the boundaries, easier to self-control than a 
group-owned or multi-person. 
 
When a question about factors that affect the value of land, 52 per cent of 
landowners answered that multiple ownership very significantly influence the value 
of the land, 26 percent considered that it was significant and the rest mentioned that 
it wasn’t significant. This data show that multiple ownerships is among factors that 
affects the value of the land. From this discussion, therefore, multiple ownerships is 
a factor that produces transaction cost particularly the time needed to get collective 
agreement and the opportunity to get better land value.   
 
Therefore Table 8.1 summarizes the institutions, activities that produce 
transaction costs as well as type of costs.  
 
Table 8.1: Institutions, activities, type of costs that affect landowners to release the 
land. 
Institutions Activities that produce 
transaction cost 
Type of cost  
 (lot number) 
Restrictions in 
interests 
- Decision to release land - lose opportunity to have 
dignity and amenities 
(7,12,18,25) 
Multiple 
ownership 
- To bring into market and 
development 
- effort and time to get 
agreement among owners 
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(11,36) 
- To make transaction - lose opportunity to get 
buyer and better value.    
(78 per cent of 
landowners) 
    
 
 
 
8.2.1.2 Transaction Costs and the Process of Land Transfer 
 
In the case of landowners already having the intention to release the land, 
there are still factors that will affect the process to transfer the land.  The first step is 
to find the best buyer.  To accomplish this activity, landownership restriction is well 
recognized as the significant factor that provides limited land market (Ismail, 1999). 
Restrictions in interests have positive and negative effects for the landowners in 
relation with land supply for development. It has provided dilemmatic situation. 
Restriction of ownership has attenuated the opportunities for landowners who intend 
to sell the land to get the best potential buyers since the only possible buyers are 
Malays. 
 
It means that the demand price really relies on the affordability of Malays. 
According to the data of household income (Government of Malaysia, 2001), 
Malays’ household income is lower than the household income of ethnic Chinese 
and Indian’s (See discussion in Sub-section 5.2.1).  In other words, the affordability 
of Malays to provide better demand price is still low compared to non-Malays.  In 
this case, maintaining the restriction of landownership, the landowners will pay cost 
in the form of loosing opportunity to get better land price.  From the transaction 
costs point of view, the landownership restriction has brought about to asset 
specificity characteristic.  In this case sellers only have particular buyers.  It is 
commonly called dedicated assets (Petersen, 1995). 
 
To see the potential buyer, the list of transaction from Valuation and 
Property Services Department is quite useful since the land market in Kampong 
Baru commonly are informal markets.  During the period 1996-2006, only certain 
buyers were actively participating in the market. It was recorded that among 43 
transactions, only 26 buyers were actively participating in the land transactions. 
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Three corporate owners bought more than one lot during 1996-2006 such as Naza 
Properties Sdn Bhd, Rah Properties Sdn Bhd who bought 6 and 5 lots respectively, 
and two individual owners who bought more than one lot (See discussion in Sub-
section 6.3.2).  The second case is the difficulty to get buyer as the case of 
landowner of lot 31.  Land owner of lot 31 intended to sell the land through a land 
broker, however after a couple of months the land was still unsold.  The third case is 
the seller should be active in order to get the possible buyer.  It was often that 
landowners had to approach an active buyer such as Rah Properties Sdn Bhd and 
Naza Properties Sdn Bhd either to buy or to jointly develop their lands (Onn, 2006; 
Hamisah, 2005).  These examples mentioned above show that landownership 
restriction bring about the condition that the seller have to spend additional cost in 
term of efforts to get the best buyers due to limited land market in Kampong Baru 
area.   
 
After the seller has successfully found the buyer who intended to buy the 
land, the next step is to negotiate and to transact the land.  To start the gathering of 
negotiation information about the attributes of the land and other party involved is 
very important. The lack of information causes additional transaction cost that 
should be considered in order to get the best negotiation status (North, 1996).  
 
As mentioned, only few buyers actively participated in land market so that 
sellers or landowners in Kampong Baru at least have knowledge about the buyers.  
Reversely, buyers who intend to buy the land commonly already recognized about 
the ownership problems since Kampong Baru case has become a famous issue in the 
urban-land development.  This is the reason why Dato’ Rahim, Enc Onn and 
Syamsul mentioned that there wasn’t any problems during land transaction in 
Kampong Baru.  It is due to the multiple ownerships as external factor commonly 
has been considered (internalized) by the buyer in the transaction by asking the 
seller to overcome the cost of multiple landownership prior to the negotiation (Onn, 
2006).  In addition, from transaction costs point of view, higher frequency of buying 
land in Kampong Baru owned by active buyers has improved the knowledge and 
reduced the transaction costs. 
 
In addition, the availability of road network inside this area causes 
information about particularly the physical attributes is no longer difficult to be 
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accessed. Syamsul son of landowner of lots located at Jalan Raja Muda Musa 444 
mentioned that it needed around 6 moths to finish land transaction.  It is due to the 
buyer is also the resident of Kampong Baru who has known well the physical 
attributes of the land.  
 
 Based on the discussion above, it seems that several sources of activities that 
may produce transaction costs such as time to collect information about land 
attributes and buyer, time to negotiate the price, resource needed to perform 
transaction and also resources needed to secure transaction didn’t appear in the land 
transaction in Kampong Baru.  It is due to limited buyers who actively participated 
in the market and the restriction of land in Kampong Baru is already well known by 
the buyers.   
 
In the case that landownership restriction is considered unsatisfactory to the 
current condition, the institutional change can be taken into account.  By changing 
the contents of landownership restriction, the opportunity of the Malays to occupy 
the rights on the land will be attenuated.  At a certain extent, the Malays have to lose 
their dignity because they have to release Kampong Baru to the non-Malay.  In the 
long run, the identity of Malays in the urban area is no longer available.  In addition, 
for the current government which has the power to change the restriction, changing 
this institution provides various effects which could be costly, it isn’t only as a 
matter of economic reason but also as a political reason due to its relation to the 
survival of the Malays in the urban areas (Nik A Majid, 1993; Massa, 2003).   
 
When a question about the future of MAS area was asked to the respondents, 
for the undeveloped lots, 26 landowners or around 60 per cent don’t agree on 
removing MAS status for Kampong Baru.  The main reason is that Kampong Baru 
as the Malays inhabitant in the urban area and as the inheritance lands should be 
maintained. Only landowners of lots number 22, 24 and 42 who agreed that the 
restriction of interest should be removed, so that it will omit the limited demand that 
finally increase the land value.  For the landowners of developed land, 100 percent 
don’t agree to the removal of the MAS status from Kampong Baru area. Their 
common reason is that Kampong Baru symbolizes the dignity of urban Malay. 
 
 132 
 
Table 8.2 summarizes the institutions, the activities that produce transaction 
and also the type of cost that may happen. 
 
Table 8.2: Institutions, activities and type of cost which affects land 
transaction 
 
Institutions Activities that produce 
transaction cost 
Type of cost 
(Lot number) 
- To obtain buyers - opportunity to get the best 
buyers (assets specificity). 
  (22,24,31,42) 
Restrictions in 
interests 
- To change institution - opportunity to have dignity  
  (60 per cent of landowners) 
- political cost (for 
government) 
   
 
 
 
8.2.2 Land Rights Transfer Through Compulsory Purchase 
 
Compulsory purchase is an approach to acquire lands by not using market 
mechanism.  This approach is selected whenever market mechanism can’t handle 
external factors such as landowners’ attitude so that transfer of rights is hard to be 
performed.  It is also used as initial steps to overcome small land size which isn’t 
economic for development by amalgamation process.  In term of type of right’s 
transfer, it is considered as hierarchy approach, where one party gives part of the 
autonomy to the other party. 
 
However, the implementation of compulsory purchase to overcome land 
supply problem commonly encounters some problems such as the lengthy and 
cumbersome procedure with no certain outcome; from political point of view it isn’t 
a legitimate intervention to the land market; finally it is very expensive business 
(Adams, 1994; Singh, 1994). Under Section 4 of the Act to prevent land speculation, 
all land transactions in the area are “frozen” for a maximum of 1 year.  It creates 
uncertainty for landowners such as whether their land is to be acquired. Amendment 
besides provides government the rights to alienate land and subsequently translates 
into physical project for the benefit of the population, it also gives the government 
very wide power to acquire land for developments not necessarily for a “public 
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purpose”. In a certain extent it may encourage  a land policy decision maker to be an 
opportunist by using a legal mechanism to acquire lands for personal benefits 
(Singh, 1994).  
 
During the acquisition process, the key factor which often hampers the whole 
processes is determination of the compensation.  Redevelopment project proposed 
by the government in 1991 to improve the quality of Kampong Baru failed to be 
implemented because of land value disputes (Ismail, 1999).  At that time landowners 
asked quite a high price that can’t be afforded by either the government or the 
private company which intended to participate in the development process.  The 
government offered a compensation of around RM175-RM200 per square foot to the 
affected owners. However, according to the survey undertaken by National 
University of Malaysia, fifty seven per cent of the landowners expected the 
compensation higher than RM 200.  Only 29 per cent expected compensation less 
than RM200 (Ismail, 1999). 
 
Another example is the amount of compensation given to the landowner 
recorded from the author’s empirical study.  In 1996 the amount of compensation for 
private company purpose was RM240 per square foot.  In 2002 lot 398 located at  
Jalan Khotib Khoyan was compensated RM250 per square foot for public purpose. 
Six years elapse the compensation was only increased RM10 or increased 4.1 
percent or 0.7 percent each year.  While in the market during the same interval 
years, lot in Jalan Abdullah Kampong Baru was increased around 52 percent or 8.4 
percent each year (Valuation and Property Services Department Federal Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur, 2006).  
 
Just to give an illustration about land market price, in 1996 a lot located at 
Jalan Sungai Besi 557 A was acquired by government for Light Rail Transit at RM 
240 per square foot.  At the same year a lot at Jalan Abdullah was sold at RM175 per 
square foot and a residential lot at Jalan Yap Kwan Seng, non Malays reserved, was 
sold at RM353 per square foot. Next, in 2002 lot at Jalan Khatib Khoyan was 
acquired by government for public purpose at RM250 per square foot, whereas in 
2003 lot at Jalan Abdullah 23 was transferred at RM200 per square foot.  In 
addition, RM 250 was the price of land per square foot which is located at Jalan 
Kemuning (VPSDFTKL, 1996-2005). These examples illustrate that the 
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compensation that the government paid is actually already higher than the market 
price of the same land status, but lower than the market price of land without 
ownership restriction. 
 
The examples given above illustrate that no standard valuation system have 
been used to determine compensation. An uncertain situation is faced by either the 
landowners or the government.  Usilappan (2006) mentions that unfortunately the 
term market value is not defined under the Act. Therefore, disputes often emerged 
between government and landowner when determining the compensation. To solve 
the dispute, the parties bring this case to the court and judge with the help of two 
assessors will make a decision.  
 
A case happened in Kampong Baru during land acquisition held by 
government for Light Rail Transit (LRT) in 1996. Wapingi family as the owner of 
lot 557 A located at Jalan Sungai Besi wasn’t satisfied with the compensation. Their 
land was only compensated by RM200 per square foot, while the land with the 
typical characteristic was valued RM250. Therefore they brought the case to the 
court.  Finally the judge decided that additional RM40 per square foot should be 
given to the Wapingi family. It means that uncertainties which derived from 
unstandarized valuation system have provided additional cost in term of time to 
negotiate the final compensation (Wapingi case).  The summary of the discussion 
above is presented in Table 8.3. 
 
 
 
Table 8.3: Institutions, activities and type of cost which affects land acquisition 
Institutions Activities that produce 
transaction cost 
Type of cost 
Lot number 
Compensation in 
practice 
- To achieve acceptable 
compensation 
- time and effort to get 
acceptable compensation 
(uncertainty) 
(557 A) 
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8.3   Institutions, Transaction Costs and the Development Planning 
 
The landowners’ perception about development is shown by the argument 
that development responsibility is owned by the government.  Landowners of lots 1, 
3, 4, 6, 7, 19, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, 23, 25 are those who agreed with this argument. 
Though, only landowners of lots 3, 7, 10, 11, 12 who supported this argument by 
deciding not to do anything and, in fact, intend not to develop the land.  This 
perception can be understood by tracing back the history of the establishment of 
MAS area and how this land has been developed. The role of government since the 
establishment of this area and the development process is quite dominant (Sulaiman, 
2000), therefore they believe that the future of Kampong Baru is also in the 
government’s hand.  This perception will hinder the landowners’ intention to 
develop their lands.  This phenomenon is called bounded rationality, in which the 
decision they made based on the information and knowledge they have.  
 
The second factor that may hinder the intention to develop the land is 
multiple ownership.  As mentioned at Sub-section 7.2, landowner of lot number 36 
did nothing because no consensus can be made among landowners although 
meetings were held many times.  In addition, a similar case happened to lots number 
24 and 30, although they still intend to develop the land, they are still doubtful about 
the possibility to develop their lands.  In fact, landowner of lot number 30 intended 
to release the land. Both landowners have bad experience because they have tried to 
develop the land but dispute among landowners caused the development process to 
fail.  
 
Uncertainty is a condition that produces transaction cost and subsequently 
affects the landowner decision (North, 1996). The first case that may belong to this 
characteristic which can be identified is uncertain situation about the availability of 
grant because of unexpected experience in the past.  Landowner of lot 35 mentioned 
that he wanted to develop the land but he can do nothing since the grant is not in his 
possession.  He realized that he and his family have the ability to develop a rental 
house since his sons are already employed well.  In this case uncertainty situation 
has brought a deadlock condition so that the development is difficult to be 
materialized.  
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In preparing the planning proposal, the physical attributes of the land become 
the main factors such as the infrastructure and the land size. As previously 
mentioned, the lot size in Kampong Baru is 90 per cent less than 808.3 square 
meters (Ismail, 1999).  To achieve economic land size for development, 
amalgamation of more than one contiguous small lots have to be taken.  To 
amalgamate two or more lots isn’t an easy work due to landownership difficulties, 
including different landowners’ attitude such as refusal to participate or to preserve 
their inheritance.  
 
Syamsul (2006) mentioned that his family in 1990 wanted to develop the 
land and asked his neighbor to have joint venture in the development.  A 
consultation to an architect was done in order to have preliminary design of the 
development.  Most of owners of adjacent land agreed, but one owner rejected to 
participate in the development.  As a result the intention to develop the land failed 
because of the difficulties to get consensus from all landowners.  He further more 
stated that: 
 
“It isn’t enough to just make a plan. You have to do extra work to 
materialize the plan” (Syamsul, 2006). 
 
A corporate owner, who have bought a number of lots in Kampong Baru but 
distributed at several sites mentioned about the additional cost that he has to pay: 
 
“Holding cost. Due to nature of land-small and narrow, you have to 
buy a few lots around before the land can be properly developed. 
Must wait for surrounding owners to sell” (Corporate landowner of 
lot 51, 2006). 
 
This statement indicates that because of the size of land, to bring the land 
into the development process becomes more difficult.  In addition time and effort are 
needed in order to get agreement from owners of adjacent land to release the land.  
The problem will be more difficult if the adjacent land is also attached by multiple 
ownership case such as what Syamsul family has encountered. Since it has nothing 
to do with the land and at least land tax should be paid every year, an additional cost 
called holding cost will emerge. 
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Besides the physical attribute discussed above, landownership restriction also 
produced asset specificity characteristic, in more specific term it is called dedicated 
assets.  The product of land development can only be occupied by particular buyers, 
Malays. Therefore, the affordability of those certain buyer absolutely influences the 
investment that the owners will put in the development process such as what 
landowner of lot 51mentioned: 
 
“If too high a value (of the land), development cost is high. Selling 
price (will be) higher.  So middle income Malays can’t afford.  
Defeat the original intention –to allow Malay retain their ownership 
of Kampong Baru” (Corporate landowner of lot 51, 2006; in the 
bracket is added by author) 
 
This argument is also supported by Dato’ Rahim, the owner of Plaza Rah, 
who explained that limited market of developed property and the high price of the 
land in Kampong Baru dictated the owner/developer to develop building such that 
the Malays can achieve, for example high rise building.  In addition, he also 
proposes  a solution to the government to relax the restriction by giving temporary 
right to non-Malays, so that dedicated assets will be a little bit loose. 
 
In order to get approval from local the government, landowners or 
developers have to consider various regulations as mentioned in Chapter 5. When a 
question about planning regulation was asked to landowners of developed lands, all 
of them mentioned that there were no difficulties during the processes.  However, 
corporate owner of lot 51 said that for small lot 20 inch set back is not feasible.  
 
From the previous discussion about institution and transaction cost, the 
following table summarizes the variables that cause transaction cost and the type of 
cost. 
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Table 8.4: Institutions, activities, type of cost in the planning of development 
 
Institutions/ 
Land 
attributes 
Activities that may 
produce transaction cost 
Type of cost 
(Lot number or case) 
   
Ownership  - to prepare planning 
proposal 
- time and effort to get consensus 
  (24,27,28,30,31,32, Syamsul 
case) 
- uncertainty (grant not in hand) 
   (34,35,37) 
- time and effort to get economic 
land size 
  (51, Syamsul case) 
Physical 
attribute 
- to prepare planning 
proposal 
- time and effort to amalgamate  
lands 
  (51, Syamsul case) 
Planning 
regulation   
- to prepare planning 
proposal 
- opportunities to maximize the 
use of the whole surface of land. 
  (51) 
   
 
 
 
 
8.4 Landowners’ Attitude and Transaction Costs Approach in the Land 
Supply in MAS areas- a Resume 
 
Chapter Seven has discussed the landowners’ attitude towards the supply of 
land for development.  In sub-sections 8.2 and 8.2 a further discussion about the 
landowners’ attitude from the view of transaction costs analysis has also been 
elaborated. This sub-section is a resume of the landowners’ attitude which 
influences landowners’ decision in managing their lands and also the activities, the 
institutions and the land attributes that embedding or causing transaction costs.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Seven, there are landowner’s attitudes that have 
been identified as the elements that drove the ways landowners manage their land 
and the ways they respond to the future development of MAs area. Among others 
landowners’ attitudes are intend to sell, not intend to sell, intend to develop as well 
as not intend to develop. Table 8.5 shows the combination of these attitudes and the 
current condition of the lands namely undeveloped land and developed land (or in 
the development process). 
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Table 8.5: Landowners’ attitude and the current condition of the land 
No Attitudes Final/current 
condition 
Lots number 
1 Not intend to sell 
Not intend to develop 
 
undeveloped  4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 18, 25, 29 
2 Intend to sell 
(Has not been sold) 
Not intend to develop 
undeveloped 3, 21, 24 
3 Intend to sell 
(Has not been sold) 
Intend to develop 
 
undeveloped 1, 14, 31,35,39, 40, 
41, 42 
4 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has not proposed proposal) 
undeveloped 2, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 
19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 
32, 33,  35, 36, 37, 
38, 41, 51, 6, 34,39 
5 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has obtained approval 
and/or have developed) 
developed 43, 44, 45, 46,47, 
48, 49, 50 
6 Intend to sell 
(Has been sold) 
Sold 52 
 
 
As shown in Table 8.5, combination of 4 attitudes and the current condition 
of the lands provided 6 possible decisions that landowners have selected.  In the 
table, there are 8 landowners who have 2 basic intentions, which actually little bit 
contradictive, namely intention to sell and intention to develop. Once the landowner 
intends to release the lands, they don’t want to put any investment on it. Figure 8.1 
illustrates these 6 decisions in the flow chart form. To illustrates the connection 
between intention to develop and sold, a dash line is used, particularly to indicate an 
ambiguous decision. 
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Figure 8.1  Spectrums of the landowners decision to manage the lands 
 
In relation to the transaction costs, as discussed in sub-section 8.2 and 8.3, 
there are various type of transaction costs that emerge during the processes to supply 
the lands for development purpose such as opportunity costs (to enjoy dignity, to 
enjoy amenity, to obtain good buyer, to achieve better land value, to maximize the 
use of the land), time (to have consensus among landowners, to achieve acceptable 
amount of compensation, to amalgamate lands, to achieve economic land size), 
effort (to have consensus among landowners, to achieve acceptable amount of 
compensation, to amalgamate lands, to achieve economic land size). For the 
government, the most related cost is political cost particularly when the government 
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changes the current status of MAS area. Based on Table 8.5, Table 8.6 shows the 
relation of the landowners’ decision, the landowners’ attitudes, the type of 
transaction cost and the sources of costs that affect landowners’ decision 
 
Table 8.6: The relation of decision, landowners’ attitude, sources of costs, type of 
cost and land owners 
Deci
sion  
Landowners’ 
attitude 
Sources of costs Type of cost Land owners 
1 Not intend to sell 
Not intend to develop 
 
-restriction in interest 
-multiple ownership 
-bounded rationality 
-opportunity cost 
-effort 
-time 
 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 18, 25, 29 
2 Intend to sell 
(Has not been sold) 
Not intend to develop 
-multiple ownership 
-physical characteristic 
-bounded rationality 
-effort 
-time 
3, 21, 24 
3 Intend to sell 
(Has not been sold) 
Intend to develop 
 
-restriction in interest 
-multiple ownership 
 
-opportunity cost 
-effort 
-time 
1, 14, 31,35,39, 
40, 41, 42 
4 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has not proposed 
proposal) 
- restriction in interests 
- multiple ownership 
-physical 
characteristics 
- uncertainty 
- asset specificity 
- bounded rationality 
-planning regulation 
-opportunity cost 
-effort 
-time 
2, 6,9, 13, 15, 16, 
17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34,35, 
36, 37, 38, 41, 51,  
39 
5 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has obtained approval 
and/or have developed) 
-restriction in interests 
 
-opportunity cost 
 
43, 44, 45, 46,47, 
48, 49, 50 
6 Intend to sell 
(Has been sold) 
  52 
     
 
 
From Table 8.5 and 8.6, it can be recognized that in the supply of lands for 
development, there are 4 unit of transactions namely achieving a unity intention to 
sell, achieving a unity intention to develop, transferring the rights and obtaining 
approval for development.  By adding the actors involved, the activities in the 
transaction as well as the manner landowners may supply land for development, the 
transaction costs approach in the supply of land is shown in Table 8.7: 
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Table 8.7: Transaction costs in the supply of land for redevelopment of  MAS areas 
 
Stage Seller Buyer Activity Transaction 
A. Supply land through land transfer 
(1)Intention 
maturation 
Individual 
owner 
Owners as 
a unity 
To have consensus 
of interest 
Initiation 
(2) Land 
transfer 
Previous 
landowner 
New 
landowner 
To make a contract; 
negotiation 
Transfer 
ownership 
B. Supply land through planning proposal  
(1)Intention 
maturation 
Individual 
owner 
Owners as 
a unity 
To have consensus 
of interest 
Initiation 
(2) Planning 
approval 
Landowner
/ developer 
Local 
authority 
To make planning 
proposal and to get 
approval from local 
authority 
Procurement 
 
 Intention maturation means to assure that the intention to sell or to develop is 
the result of comprehensive consideration to the existing internal and external 
factors.  In other words, the intention to sell and to develop the lands is influenced 
by the existing institutions such as restrictions in interests and land development 
regulation and also the cost benefit consideration for example countable values and 
uncountable values.  Initiation as the transaction in the intention maturation stage 
(see Table 8.7) consists of any (initial) steps to ignite and to mature the intention to 
either sell or develop the land.  For example, landowners don’t intend to release the 
land because they don’t want to lose the opportunity to enjoy amenity and dignity 
currently they obtain (landowners lots 7,12,18 and 25). Landowners don’t want to 
sell their land since they don’t want to spend the cost in the form of time and effort 
to achieve consensus among them (landowner lots 11, 36). In the intention maturity 
stage, individual landowner who has personal interest is the seller, whilst corporate 
landowner is considered as a buyer.  
 
 In the supply of land through land transfer, previous owner is the seller and 
the new owner is the buyer.  Activities involved in this stage are including to get 
information on the land price and buyers, to negotiate as well as to make a contract.  
Ownership is the object to be transferred.  From the empirical study, landowner of 
lot 31 failed to transfer the land because restrictions in interests have produced asset 
specificity so that only limited buyer can be found. 
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Procurement is the transaction in the supply of land through planning 
proposal. Procurement means the seller expect something, for example approval, 
from buyer by obeying any requirements established by the buyer.  In this case, the 
seller is the developer or landowner, the buyer is the local authority.  Any cost spent 
to fulfill requirements and to get approval is considered transaction costs. For 
example corporate landowner lot 51 until now have not proposed the planning 
proposal since the size of the land don’t fulfill the economic size for development. 
Syamsul’ family failed to apply planning approval since the requirement to get 
approval from all the landowners can not be realized. 
 
 
 
8.5   Conclusion 
 
To measure transaction costs various approaches were used such as indirect 
approach; three possible sources of transaction cost proposed by Furubotn and 
Richter in Benham and Benham (2001); three characteristics of transaction proposed 
by Williamson in Petersen (1995) as well as two types of rights attached on land 
identified by Lai (2001). 
  
From land attributes point of view, there are a number of attribute that have 
caused transaction costs.  In the transfer of rights, the establishment of Kampong 
Baru as indigenous land and also restrictions in interests have provided dignity and 
amenities for Malays, specifically landowners, and hindered landowners to release 
the land.  It is due to transferring the rights, at the same time loosing the opportunity 
to enjoy dignity and amenities.  In addition, ownership restriction has caused assets 
specificity since only certain buyers can buy the lands, so that sellers lost 
opportunities to get the best buyer and the best price. A multiple ownership also 
produced transaction cost particularly time and efforts to get landowners’ consensus.  
Uncertainty about valuation system was also identified as the source of transaction 
cost particularly in the process of obtaining acceptable compensation. 
 
In the land development process, ownership restriction was identified as the 
source of assets specificity particularly any developed property located in Kampong 
Baru area.  This characteristic influenced landowners or developers decision to put 
investment in the development of MAS lands. While during preparing planning 
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proposal, physical attributes of the lands particularly lots’ size dictated to the various 
costs such as time and effort to amalgamate the lands and to achieve economic size 
of the land.  
 
By using Cadman and Topping (1995) approach where two activities are 
considered as the manners land supply may enter the development process, there 
have been identified six decisions the way landowners manage the lands. In 
addition, there are 4 unit of transactions namely achieving a unity intention to sell, 
achieving a unity intention to develop, transferring the rights and obtaining approval 
for development have been identified. Based on these 4 unit transactions 
subsequently a transaction costs approach in the supply of land in the MAS areas has 
been developed.   
 
Institutions, land attributes, transaction costs and land development create a 
circular linkage.  The existing institutions and the existing attributes of the lands will 
affect the amount of transaction costs. By measuring the transaction costs, actors 
make decision such as to sell or to develop the lands. At a certain extent, actors may 
change the institutions if these institutions are no longer capable either to 
accommodate their interests or to solve their problems efficiently.  Positive 
decisions will stimulate development, so that development can be materialized. The 
output of the development then changes the current attributes of the land.   
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9.0 THE FUTURE DIRECTION IN THE REDEVELOPMENT OF 
KAMPONG BARU, KUALA LUMPUR 
 
 
 
9.1    Introduction 
 
 
This chapter discusses the future direction in the redevelopment of Kampong 
Baru based on the identified problems related to the institutions and also proposed 
suggestion by interviewees.  The solution is divided into some parts namely related 
to the suggestions from respondents, predevelopment considerations, strategies to 
achieve the objectives and proposed redevelopment plan. 
 
 
 
9.2   The Respondents Suggestions to Redevelop Kampong Baru 
 
In terms of redevelopment program for Kampong Baru, Kuala Lumpur, 
basically 90 percent of respondents agreed.  Table 9.1 lists the suggestions proposed 
by respondents in the redevelopment project which are classified based on the 
predevelopment considerations, organization, actors involved as well as target 
output of the redevelopment. 
 
Table 9.1: List of suggestions from respondents  
Topic Suggestions Landowners 
number/Agent’ 
name 
Predevelopment considerations  
Preserve Malays characteristic 2,9,15,16,17,18,19,22,
23,24,25,27,28,30,35, 
37,38,39,42, 
43,44,45,49, 52,53,54 
a. The objectives 
For the community benefit 21,24,30,36 
To relax restriction 49 
Review the land status Azmir 
b. Institutions 
Amend act Kamarulzaman 
 Comprehensive planning 21,24,30,36 
Organization  
 Established a powerful body 52 
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 Review the role of MAS board Azmir, Fauzy, Dato’ 
Rahim 
Actors  
Resident involved 43,49 
Government involved 43,51,49,48,45 
Private companies involved 51 
a. Type of actors 
  
Government initiate developments 1,3,4,6,7,9,10,11, 
12,14,20,23,25 
Government selects good private 
companies to redevelop 
51 
Lets Malays redevelop MAS area 
gradually 
Dato’ Rahim 
Group land owners initiate 
redevelopment 
Fauzy 
Comprehensive involvement of the 
government and landowners 
Azmir, Syamsudin 
 
b. Strategies 
Educate people Azmir, 
Kamarulzaman 
 Encourage wealth Malays/private 
companies own by Malays 
Dato’ Rahim 
Target output  
 Mix land use (tourism, residence, 
office) 
7,9,39,35,36,33, 
12,38, 51,47,45, 
Syamsuri 
 Malays settlement in the city Syamsuri 
   
 
Based on the summaries mentioned above and also the suggestions from the 
respondents in the redevelopment project, the next sub-sections discuss steps should 
be taken namely predevelopment considerations, strategies to achieve the objectives 
and proposed redevelopment plan. 
 
 
 
9.3   Predevelopment Considerations 
 
Some aspects that should be considered before establishing the project is to 
determine the main objectives of the project.  In addition, some problems that will 
hinder the project particularly the land supply constraint must be anticipated. 
Therefore discussion will be addressed to the possible objectives derived from 
respondents’ suggestion.  Whilst, the discussion about factors that hindered the 
 147 
 
supply will be focused on the institutions and land attributes based on the research 
findings. 
 
 
 
9.3.1 The Objectives of Redevelopment 
 
Various objectives of redevelopment of Kampong Baru can be extracted 
from the interview such as for the benefit of all society particularly Malays in urban 
area (lots number 33,36,37,39), as an example of Malay community in the urban 
area (Syamsuri) as well as to preserve inheritance lands (lots number 
43,44,45,49,52,53,54).  Above all, the main objective is to improve the quality of 
life among the Malays through providing rights to access resources in the urban 
area. 
 
The objective contains some implications in the implementation stages 
namely still provide rights to occupy the lands for Malays (lots number 2,9,15-19, 
22 -25,27,28,30,35, 37-39, 42 to 45, 49; Syamsuri). Malay community, particularly 
landowners, should be actively involved in the development process (lots number 
18,39,42; Azmir; Syamsudin; Fauzi).  In term of physical output, mixed land use 
design is among suggestion proposed by agent and landowners to accommodate 
various interests (lots number 7,9,12,33,35,36,38,39,51,45,47; Syamsuri).  Besides 
as the residence for Malays, commercial facilities such as offices and rental house 
building is also developed in this area.  
 
 
 
9.3.2 Strategies to Resolve Institutional Constraints and Land Attributes 
 
There are two types of institutions that constrain the supply of land for the 
development of formal institutions and informal institutions. The following sub 
chapters discuss the need to review formal institutions, to deal informal institutions 
as well as to deal with land attributes. 
 
 
 
9.3.2.1 Formal Institutions 
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From the discussion in Chapter Seven and Eight, two formal institutions that 
affected actors’ decision to supply land for development were establishment of 
Kampong Baru as indigenous lands for Malays and valuation in practice.  The first 
formal institution produced Malays’ sentiment to the lands and also the ownership 
restriction.  The second institution caused the refusal of landowners to release the 
lands, or if this system was implemented a big cost has to be spent in terms of time 
and effort. 
 
The need to redevelop Kampong Baru is based on the intention to maintain 
and improve the urban Malays settlement in urban area.  The issue is related to 
ownership restriction in that the land can’t be occupied by non-Malays.  From 
property rights point of view, restriction attenuates landowners’ right to sell 
(delineate) the land to any buyers.  From land market point of view, this restriction 
limits the market.  Incomplete rights and limited market will reduce the value of the 
land.  Also, it will be less attractive for land developers and financiers for 
development purposes.  So that the purpose of the amendment is to attract more land 
developers and investors to undertake development of Kampong Baru area.  
 
To amend the existing institutions, careful consideration has to be taken into 
account particularly related to the objective of the development. Removal the 
restriction can contradict to the objective of amendment, to improve the quality life 
of the Malays.  Therefore, a feasible solution is to allow non-Malays to have part of 
the rights, for example the use right, for a certain period of time.  This approach has 
been successfully implemented for Malay Reservation Lands (1913) which provided 
possibilities for non-Malays to occupy the lands for a certain period of time up to 30 
years. 
 
To implement the solutions, amendment can be done to any individual title 
through surrendering to government, then realienating back to registered landowners 
and amending the restriction of interest to allow foreigners or non-Malays to occupy 
the site.  Next, section 195 to 204 of Part Twelve of the National Land Code 1965 
which have articles about surrender and realienation should be reviewed and 
amended. 
The second institution that should be reviewed is valuation principle.  This 
principle is regulated in Land Acquisition Act 1960. In 1997, an amendment has 
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been made to schedule 2 of Land Acquisition Act 1960 particularly related to 
compensation addressed to Malay Reserve Land.  Compensation is given without 
considering restrictions when the development is for public purpose.  However, if 
the development is only for Malays, compensation given should consider 
restrictions.  An other issue that should be reviewed is the practical definition about 
“market value”. Usilapan (2006) argued that until now there are various definitions 
about “market value”. Such loose definitions may produce uncertainty and open 
possibilities for landowners to refuse the government offer. Therefore, more 
practical definition about “market value” should be given so that no big difference of 
asking values emerged. 
 
 
 
9.3.2.2 Informal Institutions 
 
From empirical studies some informal institutions were identified as factors 
which affect costs and actors decisions.  Among others were landowners’ perception 
about land development, multiple landowners and financial difficulties. 
 
First, landowners’ perception about land development. Some landowners 
have perceptions that land development is the government’s responsibilities. As a 
result they tend to be passive landowners, in fact some of them didn’t think about 
selling land and developing land. Perception emerges because of combination of 
experiences and the existing knowledge in his brain. Therefore to overcome this 
problem, a new technology that can make up the existing technology, for example 
through positive information about land development, hopefully can re-orientate the 
perception of land development upon their lands. 
 
Second, multiple landowners. Multiple landowners cause difficulties and 
additional costs to get consensus among landowners particularly to determine the 
future of the land which finally constrained land supply.  Two issues related to the 
multiple landowners are the problem to trace the availability of landowners and to 
make consensus among landowners.  Formal approach to overcome the first issue is 
by reviewing the existing land registration policy particularly to simplify the process 
as regulated at Section 175 of Part Ten of National Land Code 1965 such as too 
many unregistered owners.  Also to reduce the complexity of the ownership, the 
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name of deceased owners must be deleted and new interested landowners should be 
written as soon as possible. The regulation that should be reviewed is Section 342 
and 343 of Part Twenty One of National Land Code 1965. 
 
In the case of obtaining consensus is the main issue, an alternative approach 
to simplify the procedure in making decisions can be selected for example to reduce 
the minimum percentage of landowners to make a legal decision. For example, as 
long as 80 percent of landowners agree, the development or transfer can be 
processed.  To do that, some regulation should be reviewed such as related to land 
transfer (Section 217 Part Fourteen the National Land Code 1965), subdivision, 
partition and amalgamation (Sections 146 to 150 Chapter Three, Part Nine of the 
National Land Code 1965). 
 
Third, financial difficulties.  There are various attitudes toward financial 
problems. Landowners of lots 33 and 44 mentioned that, what they know so far, 
there are too many procedures to apply for loans from banks. Whilst, landowner of 
lot 27 mentioned that he didn’t want to borrow money from the bank because he was 
already old.  Corporate landowner of lot 51 stated that it was difficult to get bank 
loan for Malay Reserve Land.  Therefore various alternative solutions can be 
proposed. The first solution is to educate landowners about the procedures to get 
loan from the bank and the knowledge about how to manage money.  The second 
solution is through formal approach by reviewing restriction so that the land value 
will increase.  The last solution is by selecting new body that can handle financial 
difficulties instead of bank such as a trust fund set up by the Pilgrimage Board 
(Tabung Haji). 
 
 
 
9.3.2.3 Land Attributes – Focus on Land Size 
 
As North (1996) and Lai (2001) mentioned, attributes of the land is one type 
of variable rights that becomes a source of transaction costs.  In Kampong Baru the 
prominent attribute that hindered the supply of land is the small size of the lots so 
that additional work to amalgamate the land is required.  The amalgamation process 
will be feasible if all landowners already have the same vision about the importance 
of land development to improve their prosperity and their inheritance.  In doing so, 
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an education process to landowners is needed either through direct system using the 
existing community organization such as MAS Board or indirect system for example 
through real actions.  An example of indirect system is pilot projects held by the 
government which consist of amalgamation process and planning development 
process.  Of course at the same time, other issues should be considered such as 
financial difficulties and technical skill difficulties. Therefore to accomplish the 
works, a powerful body to take care the work is needed as discussed in sub-section 
8.4.  To a certain extent, an enforcement approach to push the amalgamation process 
may be selected particularly if a deadlock situation is encountered, for example 
through compulsory purchase. 
 
  
 
9.4   Strategies to Achieve the Objectives 
 
In order to achieve the objective, the following strategies can be taken into 
account namely comprehensive implementation and empowering Malays. 
Comprehensive implementation means that the redevelopment program should be 
supported by all levels of government organization, private organizations, 
landowners and other agents. 
 
 
 
9.4.1 Organizations 
 
The federal government should put this development project as a national 
issue. In the hope, the program will be supported by parties which currently run the 
government.  To do that, the government should make this project as one form of 
issue for example in the Malaysia Plan.  It is not a simple work since the government 
has many priority programs that should be implemented.  In addition this is the only 
body which has the power to amend any acts and has the power to enforce in the 
implementation stages.  
 
To handle the project, the government may set up a new body in the federal 
level which has a special responsibility to develop indigenous land such as Urban 
Development Authority (UDA) (Land owner of lot 48; Syamsul, 2006).  This body 
is responsible to make comprehensive planning and also to set up a technical 
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department that covers various issues such as financial, legal and land development 
issues related to the indigenous land development. 
 
The second government organization is local authority.  The role of local 
authority is to secure and translate the agenda of indigenous land development 
established in the national level for the local purpose. In the case of Kampong Baru, 
Kuala Lumpur City Hall and Kuala Lumpur Land and Mines office are two 
government organizations that have important roles.  Local authority should provide 
informative and easy access planning system so that any developer and landowners 
can freely access information and easily understand the details of planning.  This 
open system hopefully can overcome the passive landowners.  Establishment of a 
special body that handles development proposals may reduce the complexity of 
obtaining approval from local authority. 
 
The third organization is private land development authority.  The role of 
private authority here is as a catalyst between landowners and the government.  The 
private authority uses opportunity that regulation provides, and match the need of 
the landowners.  An example that currently can be found in the area is Rah 
Properties Sdn Bhd.  Rah Properties have proven that a Malay company can develop 
the land, in fact Dato’ Rahim mentioned that his company acted as a stimulator for 
other Malays to develop Kampong Baru. He successfully developed 23 stories 
condominium located in Jalan Abdullah. Naza Properties Sdn Bhd is also the second 
Malay corporate that actively participate in land market in Kampong Baru.  Arina 
Development Sdn Bhd is also a new Malay corporate that has obtained planning 
approval from local authority to develop 18 stories building at Jalan Raja Muda 
Abdul Aziz.  Currently the corporate is still trying to find a developer to undertake 
development through a certain financial arrangement.   
 
Instead of buying the lands prior to development, private companies can 
undertake initiatives to undertake development and have certain arrangement with 
landowners such as joint-venture or equity partnership (Azmir Jaafar, 2006; 
Samsudin Abdul Kadir, 2006). In doing so, private companies should have a 
comprehensive land development scheme that considers landowners’ needs and 
aspirations such as to preserve traditional values and land rights. 
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Other agents that also have important roles in the land market and land 
development are financial organizations, such as banks and financial institutions, 
and landowners.  So far the banks and other financial organizations consider 
indigenous land development as non-secure and non-profitable project so that only 
60 percent of the project value can be given loan (Nik Mohd Zain, 2005).  Financial 
organization should change the notion about the non-secure project for indigenous 
land development particularly if the project is backed-up by the government.  
 
 
 
9.4.2 Empowerment Program for Malays 
 
Some respondents mentioned that lets the Malay themselves develop 
Kampong Baru (Dato’ Rahim, 2006; Syamsuri, 2006).  Therefore the affordability 
of Malays either as landowners or as Malay corporate in terms of financial and 
knowledge should be always improved (Kamarulzaman Mat Saleh, 2006).  As 
mentioned in the previous discussion, landowners have an important role that 
determines the supply of land for development.  Therefore to improve the roles of 
landowners, additional knowledge related to the land market and land development 
should be provided.  Hopefully in the long run, the knowledge they have can 
encourage the intention to optimize the potential of the lands. Education process can 
be undertaken through regular meetings in the society, participation in certain land 
development or through seminar.  MAS board, heads of Kampongs and 
professionals may take part in this programs.  In relation to the financial problems, 
the established body has to approach financial institutions to help Malays by 
relaxing the requirements. 
 
The same programs are also implemented to Malay corporates particularly 
related to the improvement of technical skills, management skills as well as financial 
aspects.  To do that, the established body should have the power to approach related 
departments to improve the technical skills or management skills for Malay 
corporates.  To empower financial aspect, the same approach to financial 
organization can encourage Malay corporates to initiate development in Kampong 
Baru.  For example, certain incentives are given to those who develop indigenous 
lands. 
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9.5   Zoning Map of Proposed Redevelopment Plan 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, attributes of the land together with the 
existing institutions will dictate the transaction costs and influence actors’ decision 
to participate in the land market and land development. It means that the changing of 
land attributes and institutions will drive the actors to respond to market and 
development in a different ways. Therefore, this sub-section focuses on the effort to 
change the attribute of the land through physical development. 
 
By referring to the existing development plan from Kuala Lumpur City Hall 
(2006), see Appendix E, and suggestion from respondents particularly related to the 
future performance of Kampong Baru area (as multiple land use or mixed land use), 
three zoning plan will represent the objectives and the landowners’ interest. The first 
zone is commercial zone. In this area the main use of land and building is to support 
business activities. The second zone is mixed zone. Mixed zone is identified by 
multi use of the land, not only for business activity but also for residence.  The third 
zone is residential purpose. In the third zone, the main use of the land and building is 
to support household activities. This zoning map is shown in the Figure 9.1. 
 
In relation to the land transfer, there are two governance systems to handle 
land transfer namely through market and through hierarchy for example compulsory 
purchase. In the case where the land market is already active, the best way to 
maintain and to stimulate the market is by providing incentives to either buyer or 
seller, for example tax relaxation. This system can be implemented in the 
commercial zone and mixed use zone. Compulsory purchase may be exercised on 
the residential zone. The reason is that according to the land transaction data, only 
few transactions in the market were reported in this zone. However, since 
compulsory purchase is full with the transaction costs, this approach should be 
implemented carefully. Therefore, encouraging the landowner to initiate land 
development is the most appropriate approach. 
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Figure 9.1  Zoning map of the proposed redevelopment plan 
 
A number of landowners, together with developer or investor may initiate 
development by establishing a certain joint venture arrangement to develop the land 
(Mohd Fauzy Hasyim, 2006). To accomplish this development, readjustment 
technique for urban area can be used. The concept of this technique is to assemble a 
number of contiguous lands so that an economic scale of the development can be 
achieved. For urban area, not the physical land will be shared among owners, but the 
right on the land.  It means that after assembling the lots, any individual owner still 
has the rights on the land but not full rights. In terms of the priority development, the 
zone which located at the prime area becomes the first priority.  The reason is that 
besides their accessibility, the development of the prime area can be directed to be a 
catalyst for the development of the other inferior areas. Tables 9.2 shows the 
strategy to develop MAS areas. 
 
Table 9.2: Development strategy 
Activity Residential 
zone 
Mixed zone Commercial 
zone 
Redevelopment Third priority Second priority First priority 
Stimulate land 
market 
Yes Yes Yes 
Land acquisition First priority Second priority Third priority 
MAS area (220 ekar) Kampong Baru Area (405.74 ekar) Kampong Boundary 
Business 
centre and 
office 
Mixed  use 
Residential
Mixed use 
Mixed  use Commercial
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Implementation of 
Readjustment 
Yes Yes Yes 
    
 
 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed strategies to undertake redevelopment of 
Kampong Baru particularly taking into consideration how to improve the land  
supply constraints.  In doing so, the establishment of the redevelopment objective 
becomes the most important part. The next step is to consider the existing 
institutions and land attributes that produce transaction costs and hinder the supply 
of lands.  To overcome institutional constraints, some formal institution should be 
reviewed and amended. Whilst, for physical attributes particularly land size, the 
same vision about land development should be given to landowners so that 
amalgamation of the lands will be more feasible.  To achieve the objective, an 
integrated program handled by a powerful body consisting of multi levels authorities 
is needed.  Since Malays become the main actors that occupy the full rights, the 
affordability of Malays determines the success of the program particularly if the 
government role is as a stimulator. To accomplish that, empowerment of individual 
Malays or corporate Malays is needed. 
 
A zoning map of proposed redevelopment plan is also identified and 
provided. According to priorities, this case study area is classified into three zoning 
areas namely commercial, mixed and residential zones. The commercial zone has 
the first priority in the redevelopment due to its accessibility and its potential 
development. To stimulate the market in the area where market is already active 
such as in the commercial and mixed zone, providing incentives will be the best 
alternative. For the area where market is not active such as residential zone, 
compulsory purchase or land acquisition may be selected but a careful 
implementation should be taken into account.  
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10.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
10.1  Introduction 
 
The objectives of this chapter are to resume the whole research that has been 
done including the developed framework, the empirical study as well as the 
discussion of the results.  Chapter Two, Chapter Three and Chapter Four discussed 
the theoretical framework and methodological approach to approve the developed 
framework.  Discussion on institutions and the way these affect actors’ attitudes 
towards land supply and land development are provided in Chapter Five.  It shows 
in Chapter Six the trend of land market and actors that actively participate in the 
supply of land in Kampong Baru.  Chapter Seven discusses the landowners’ attitude 
towards land supply for development process.  Chapter Eight investigates 
institutions and the way institutions produce transaction costs that subsequently 
affect actors to supply lands.  Next, Chapter Nine proposes the strategies to 
overcome land supply constraints for redevelopment of Kampong Baru, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
 
Therefore, this chapter is organized as follows; next sub-section discusses 
about the research findings, then fallowed by further research and closed by 
conclusion.  In the research finding sub-section, besides discussion about how far 
the research have found the relationship between institutions, transaction costs and 
land supply constraint, it also argues about how far research objectives have been 
achieved and the limitations of the research.  
 
 
 
10.2  The Findings of the Research 
 
This research has identified institutions, including property rights, and land 
attributes that affect actors’ decision to supply land in the development process.  
Two formal institutions have important roles in providing transaction costs namely 
ownership restriction and valuation in practice.  Ownership restriction produces 
asset specificity in the land transfer and also limited buyer since only Malays can 
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occupy the lands.  This asset specificity further more causes the value of land and 
property attached on the land become lower than those that don’t have restrictions. It 
means asset specificity will reduce the opportunity to get the maximum value of the 
land. Valuation in practice so far produces uncertainty since, according to empirical 
data, no standardized output was given to the lands that have typical characteristics. 
This uncertainty produces additional cost to negotiate and to end up at the acceptable 
value. 
 
The prominent land attributes that yield transaction cost are the small land 
size and fragmented rights or multiple landownership. The former hinders the land 
development since additional costs (could be money, time and effort) are needed to 
have economic land size by amalgamating two or more adjacent lots.  The latter 
produces transaction costs to get consensus among landowners about the future of 
the land.  Location of MAS area surrounded by developed lots and in the urban area 
indirectly provides transaction costs.  Currently MAS residents or landowners can 
benefit from the existing public facilities located a distance to MAS area. This 
amenity and the dignity because the indigenous land become attributes that are hard 
to be valued, which subsequently affect landowners to release the lands. 
 
From the previous discussion, the relationship between institutions 
(including property rights), land attribute, transaction costs and land development is 
shown in Figure 10.1: 
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Figure 10.1: The framework of institutions and transaction costs affecting actors’ 
decisions to supply lands 
 
Figure 10.1 shows that institutions and land attributes will dictate the 
characteristics of transactions such as uncertainty and assets specificity which then 
produced transaction costs which may be in various types of costs such money, time, 
effort and opportunities.  This transaction costs then influenced landowners’ 
decision based on the cost consideration to bring the land either in the market or in 
the land development process.  In the case that the transaction costs are quite big and 
the actors can’t effort it, to change existing institutions is an alternative way to 
overcome the obstacle of the development.  The actors’ decision, to actively or 
passively participate in the land market and land development as well as to modify 
the institutions, will influence the output of development, subsequently affect the 
existing institutions or the current land attributes.  
Institutions 
- Formal institutions 
- Informal institutions 
 
Land attributes 
- Physical attributes 
- Social attributes 
- Economic attributes 
Transaction Costs 
- Opportunities 
- Uncertainty 
- Assets specificities 
- money, time, effort 
Actors’ decision : 
- to participate in land market and land 
development 
- to change institutions 
Land supply /land market/  
land development, institutional 
changes 
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10.2.1 Achievements of the Objectives of the Research 
 
This research has four research objectives.  First, To review a theoretical 
framework based on transaction costs and property rights theory in identifying 
institutions and the way institutions affect actors’ decision in the supply of lands for 
redevelopment in Kampong Baru Kuala Lumpur. The objective was achieved in 
Chapter Two and Three.  In Chapter two, the common understanding about land 
market including actors and factors that affected land supply in the land 
development process was elaborated.  In addition, the problems of land supply and 
how commonly this problem was approached as well as the weakness of the current 
approach particularly for indigenous land were also discussed.  This discussion came 
up with a need of different approaches that focused not only on the output but also 
on the process and that considered institutions as indigenous factors. Institutional 
Economics Analysis incorporates social factors such as individual’s preference and 
places rules within the analysis. Therefore, this approach provides tools to explain 
the roles of institutions in affecting actors’ decision to participate in the land supply 
for development process.   
 
Chapter Three discusses in more detail about two strands of theories in New 
Institutional Economics Analysis namely property rights theory and transaction 
costs theory and also the possible implementation of both theory in the supply 
constraint of indigenous land.  The objective of property rights system in land is to 
achieve the more efficient use of the land by distributing the land to the individual 
who are capable to explore the potential of the land. Transaction costs analysis 
concerns about the cost that are associated with transfer, capture and protection of 
rights.  In relation to the distribution of resources, the higher the transaction costs, 
the lower possibilities the transaction to be performed.  
 
Second, To study the trend of land market in the MAS area and the way 
actors affect transaction costs in the supply of land for redevelopment.  The 
objective was achieved in Chapter six.  It was identified that internal land transfer, 
through bequeathing, dominated the transfer of lands in Kampong Baru. Land 
transfer through market mechanism tended to increase and reached the highest 
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number of transaction, 13 land transfers, in 2004.  In terms of actors participating in 
land transfers, private companies dominated the transactions which were recorded 
about 63 per cent of the transactions.  The relationship between seller and buyer 
causes the agreed final price is not the actual price since knowing each other will 
reduce uncertainty, reduce cost to get information and increase the trust.  
 
Third, To identify and classify the behaviour of landowners in terms of 
active and passive involvement in the supply of lands for development in the MAS 
area. The objective was achieved in Chapter Seven.  It was recognized that three 
groups of landowners were identified namely those who intended to release the 
rights, those who intended to keep part of the rights as well as those who intended to 
keep all of the rights.  In terms of land rights the owners have, commonly they have 
registered their ownership and have full rights namely rights to occupy, to use and to 
delineate the land.  Although theoretically such secure rights increased 
transferability of land (Mooya and Cloete, 2005), land transfer through market was 
low compared to the land transfer through bequeathing mechanism.  The main 
reasons to support this phenomenon are it is inheritance land, it preserves Malay 
lands, it has good location that have to be secured.  Various institutions were 
considered as factors that affected  attitudes such as restriction of interest that 
reduced the rights to obtain the best buyers and the best prices, the fragmented rights 
that cause some difficulties to unify owners’ interests and valuation in practice that 
was not standardized and not acceptable for owners. These attitudes have 
constrained the supply of lands for development.  Similar institutions were also 
identified as the factors that influenced the intention of landowners to propose 
planning proposal, though the variable rights of the land, physical attributes such as 
small lots size, was more prominent in influencing the owners’ decision.  Other 
attitudes were more related to individual characteristic of owners such as owners’ 
perception about land development, financial difficulties as well as bad experience 
they have got. 
 
Fourth, To examine the way in which transaction cost affects actors 
particularly landowners and developer in the supply of land for development in 
Kampong Baru Kuala Lumpur, subsequently affected actors’ decision to supply the 
land for development. The objective was achieved in chapter Eight.  It was identified 
 162 
 
that the institutions mentioned in chapter Five and Seven also caused transaction 
costs that influenced cost benefit consideration of actors to participate in the supply 
of lands for development. Ownership restriction has caused assets specificity for 
seller (owners or developer) that subsequently reduced opportunity costs to get the 
best buyer and the best price. Fragmented rights, due to multiple ownership, have 
driven owners to spend additional costs such as time and efforts to get consensus 
among owners.  Uncertainty of the transaction was an issue since there is no 
standardized compensation systems that were acceptable for landowners and buyers.  
In term of physical attributes of the land, small lots size ignited some additional 
costs such as money, time and effort to have an economic size of the land for 
development.  This transaction characteristic will affect the amount of transaction 
costs and finally influenced actors’ decision to participate in the supply of lands for 
development. Based on the discussion above, the objectives of this research have 
been achieved. 
 
Based on the research finding and discussions, some suggestions to 
determine the future of Kampong Baru particularly to redevelop this area are given. 
This suggestion is composed of organizations, steps to be taken including the need 
to review the existing institutions as well as the objectives of redevelopment.  
 
 
 
10.2.2 Limitations of the Research 
  
Sub-section 10.2.1 has discussed the finding of this research particularly the 
success to achieve the objectives.  However, some limitations of the method used 
also have been identified during the empirical study. 
 
First, to define a certain cost as transaction costs at a certain extent is quite 
hard. It is due to the homogenous condition that the respondents have or they have 
internalized transaction costs as production costs.  For example, the complex 
processes to get planning approval from local authority. Since most landowners of 
developed lands have to pass the same procedures and also they have successfully 
got approval, they mentioned that was no difficulty to fulfill all requirements.  In 
addition no comprehensive definition about transaction, different researcher may 
classify similar activity as a different type of cost. 
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Second, the implementation of institutional economics analysis usually 
encountered the same difficulties particularly to separate formal and informal 
institutions.  It was due to at a certain extent both types of institutions 
simultaneously affected actors’ decision, for example the hesitation to sell the land is 
because of preservation purposes (informal institution) or because of low land price 
(the effect of formal institution). 
 
 
 
10.3  Further Research 
 
Based on the research findings and also the limitations of the research, 
further investigations can be done to improve the methodological approach. The first 
recommendation is to use comparative method by selecting two or more case study 
area, including Kampong Baru, with various characteristics of rights embedded upon 
the lands.  By selecting more than one case study area, the roles of institutions and 
land attributes in providing transaction costs will be more easily differentiated.  The 
second recommendation is to incorporate other approach which covers micro and 
macro level analysis such as socio-political approach. 
 
 
 
10.4  Conclusion 
 
This research has identified institutions and the way existing institutions 
including property rights together with land attributes produce transaction costs 
which subsequently affects actors’ decision to supply the land for redevelopment in 
the case study area.  Basically, the establishment of MAS area as indigenous lands 
and ownership restriction attached on the lands are the important formal institutions 
that affect land supply constraint in the MAS area. Ownership restriction produces 
asset specificity which subsequently causes limited market since only Malays may 
occupy the lands.  As a result developers and investors are not interested in putting 
their investment in the MAS area. So the development in MAS area is relatively 
slower than the development in its vicinity area.  
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This condition, on one hand, limits the possibility to optimize the potential of 
the land in the MAS area and subsequently reduce the opportunity for the owner to 
get optimum return from the lands. Finally, it affects the prosperity of the 
landowners. On the other hand, residents or landowners in MAS area receive a 
betterment condition, since they can get benefit from the development of facilities at 
the surrounding areas.  Limited affordability and better condition affect landowners’ 
attitude in managing their lands. 
 
At the same time, the establishment of Kampong Baru as indigenous land 
has created close relations between landowners and their land. Land is considered as 
the source of dignity and asset that should be preserved. As a result, instead of 
releasing the land to other people, they bequeathed the land to their offspring. So, 
the physical size of the land will be getting smaller and smaller, or the rights on the 
land are distributed to more and more number of people. This multiple ownership or 
fragmented rights is one of the physical attributes that produce transaction costs and 
subsequently affect landowners’ decision to bring the land to the market and the 
development process.  
 
Therefore, the aim of the research, that is to study institutions that affect the 
land market and the way institutions in which contribute to the transaction costs 
which subsequently affect actors’ decision to participate in the supply of land for 
redevelopment of Kampong Baru area, has been achieved by the research. 
 
For the future of Kampong Baru area, a comprehensive redevelopment 
planning that considers the benefit of all societies should be established particularly 
the Malay settlement in the urban area. In doing so, a powerful body responsible for 
the redevelopment of MAS area should be founded.  This body consists of at least 
three departments that are responsible to handle financial aspect, land status and land 
planning aspect as well as legal aspect.  Prior to the redevelopment, some formal 
institutions have to be reviewed such as ownership restrictions and valuation in 
practice so that asset specificity and uncertainty can be reduced.  In relation to the 
actors’ attitude and the affordability of Malay empowerment programs for 
landowners and private Malays companies should be taken into account.  
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JABATAN PENTADBIRAN TANAH 
FAKULTI KEJURUTERAAN DAN SAINS GEOINFORMASI 
UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA 
JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM 
 
 
SOAL SELIDIK  (A) 
PEMILIK TANAH 
 
 
Pembangunan Semula Tanah MAS Kampong Baru 
Analisis Penawaran Tanah Untuk Maksud Pembangunan 
 
 
 
 
Kajian kes tanah MAS Kampung Baru di Kuala Lumpur akan dikaji agar 
dapat memberikan suatu analisis yang jelas tentang penyelesaian masalah 
pembangunan semula yang ada, iaitu : 
 
• Mengenal pasti perkembangan penawaran dan permintaan tanah bagi tujuan 
pembangunan di Kuala Lumpur.  
• Menilai pembangunan semula tanah di kawasan MAS Kampong Baru dan 
mengkaji potensinya bagi penawaran tanah untuk maksud pembangunan. 
• Mengkaji peranan pemilik tanah, sektor swasta dan pihak kerajaan dalam 
pelaksanaan program pembangunan semula tanah MAS Kampong Baru. 
 
Pihak pengkaji berharap semoga semua pihak yang dilibatkan dalam kajian 
ini dapat memberikan kerjasama yang sewajarnya.  Untuk makluman, hasil kajian 
ini akan dirumus dalam bentuk kajian yang berbentuk akademik dan segala data 
yang diperoleh adalah rahsia. 
 
 
 
Sekian, terima kasih. 
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Bahagian A: Latar belakang pemilik tanah 
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
  
Alamat : ________________________ 
 
     ________________________ 
 
No. dihubungi : ________________________ 
 
1. Pekerjaan 
 [   ]  kerajaan    [   ]  kerja sendiri 
 [   ]  syarikat swasta   [   ]  pesara 
 [   ]  peniaga 
 
2. Pendapatan 
 [   ]  kurang daripada RM1000  [   ]  RM1251-RM1500 
[   ]  RM1001-RM1251    [   ]  RM1501-RM1750 
      [   ]  lebih RM1750 
 
3. Bilangan anak / jumlah tanggungan [ ____ ] orang 
 
4. Tahap pendidikan 
 [   ]  tidak bersekolah   [   ]  pendidikan menengah 
 [   ]  pendidikan rendah   [   ]  pendidikan tinggi 
 
5. Umur 
 [   ]  bawah 25 tahun   [   ]  41-55 tahun 
 [   ]  25-40 tahun    [   ]  55 tahun ke atas 
 
 
 
Bahagian B: Ciri-ciri pemilikan tanah 
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
 
(Sila sediakan salinan foto geran tanah, jika ada) 
 
6. Bagaimana harta tanah diperoleh? 
 [   ]  pemberian keluarga/warisan/pusaka 
 [   ]  pemberimilikan oleh kerajaan negeri 
 [   ]  pembelian 
 [   ]  Lain-lain, nyatakan: 
___________________________________________________ 
 
7. Tempoh menduduki / memperoleh: [ ______ / ______ ] tahun 
 
8. Status pemilikan tanah 
 [   ]  persendirian    [   ]  syarikat sendirian berhad 
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[   ]  pemilik tanah bersama   [   ]  syarikat awam berhad 
[   ]  syarikat keluarga    [   ]  syarikat milik kerajaan negeri 
 
 
9. Jenis pemilikan tanah 
 [   ]  pegangan kekal/bebas 
 [   ]  pegangan pajakan, baki tempoh? ______ tahun 
 
10. Bebanan tanah 
 [   ]  tidak 
 [   ]  ada, nyatakan: 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Bahagian C: Sikap pemilik tanah yang mempengaruhi pasaran harta tanah 
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
 
 
11. Apakah tujuan anda memiliki harta tanah ini? 
 [   ]  kegunaan sendiri   [   ]  potensi pembangunan 
[   ]  pelbagaikan pendapatan   [   ]  warisan keluarga 
 [   ]  pelaburan 
 
12. Pernahkah anda cuba untuk menjual harta tanah ini? berikan alasan anda. 
 [   ]  ya, tetapi gagal   [   ]  belum 
 
 _________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
13. Adakah anda akan menjual harta tanah ini? Berikan alasan. 
 [   ]  ya     [   ]  tidak 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Berapakah harga yang diharap?   [RM ___________ ] / ekar / feet-2 / m-
2 
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Bahagian D: Sikap pemilik tanah dalam pembangunan harta tanah  
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
 
15. Adakah anda berpendapat harta tanah sedia ada perlu dibangunkan? mengapa? 
 [   ]  ya, nyatakan    [   ]  tidak, nyatakan 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
16. Pernahkah anda cuba membangunkan harta tanah ini? nyatakan komen anda.  
 [   ]  ya, berjaya / gagal   [   ]  belum 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Adakah anda bercadang membangunkan harta tanah anda? nyatakan alasan anda.  
 [   ]  ya     [   ]  tidak 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Jikalau ada, apakah jenis pembangunan yang sedang dipertimbangkan? 
mengapa? 
  
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
19. Analisis pembangunan kawasan MAS Kampong Baru sediada 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Amat sangat 
memuaskan 
Sangat 
memuaskan 
Memuask
an 
Kurang 
memuaskan 
Tidak 
memuaskan 
 
Bil Analisis pembangunan kawasan MAS  
Kampong Baru sediada 
Penilaian 
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) 
1 Pembangunan sediada kawasan anda (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
2 Keseimbangan pembangunan dengan kawasan sekitar (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
3 Infrastruktur (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
4 Sistem perparitan dan jalan raya (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
5 Perancangan pembangunan kawasan pada masa 
hadapan 
(  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
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Bahagian E: Halangan dan masalah pembangunan tanah MAS Kampong Baru 
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
 
20. Sejauh mana pertumbuhan pesat pembangunan sekitar Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur 
mempengaruhi keputusan anda memajukan tanah anda? mengapa?  
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
21. Analisis halangan dan masalah pembangunan kawasan MAS Kampong Baru 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Amat sangat setuju Sangat setuju Setuju Kurang setuju Tidak setuju
 
Bil Analisis halangan dan masalah pembangunan 
kawasan MAS Kampong Baru 
Penilaian 
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) 
1 Kerajaan tidak memberi insentif kepada pemilik (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
2 Ketiadaan dasar oleh kerajaan (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
3 Sukar untuk membuat urus niaga (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
4 Sukar melakukan pinjaman bank/institusi 
kewangan 
(  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
5 Pemilik kekurangan sumber kewangan (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
6 Pembangunan yang tidak sekata (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
7 Sikap pemilik yang malas untuk 
mengusahakannya 
(  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
8 Kurang kesedaran (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
9 Sekatan MAS (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
10 Ramai pemilik pada sesuatu tanah (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
11 Saiz tanah yang kecil (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
12 Pengambilan balik tanah (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
13 Lain-lain, nyatakan: (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
 
 
 
Bahagian F: Cara membangunkan semula Kampong Baru 
 
22. Apabila kawasan Kampong Baru akan dibangunkan semula, perlukah pemilik 
tanah dilibatkan di dalam perancangan? beri alasan. 
 [   ]  ya     [   ]  tidak 
 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
 182 
 
23. Bagaimanakah pelaksanaan pembangunan semula kawasan MAS Kampong Baru 
ini sebaiknya dijalankan? 
 [   ]  Kerajaan sahaja   [   ]  Kerajaan dan pemilik tanah 
 [   ]  Pemilik tanah sahaja   [   ]  Pemaju dan pemilik tanah  
 [   ]  Pemaju sahaja    [   ]  Kerajaan, pemaju & pemilik tanah 
 
24. Apakah bentuk pembangunan semula yang sebaiknya diwujudkan? 
 [   ]  rumah kediaman sahaja 
 [   ]  rumah kediaman dan bangunan pejabat 
 [   ]  rumah kediaman, bangunan pejabat dan pusat perniagaan 
 [   ]  rumah kediaman dan pusat perniagaan 
 [   ]  kawasan pelancongan sahaja 
 [   ]  Lain-lain, nyatakan 
       
__________________________________________________ 
 
 
25. Jikalau pembangunan semula akan dijalankan, dimanakah anda akan tinggal? 
Kenapa? 
 [   ]  tetap di Kampong Baru dengan mengambil unit rumah kediaman yang 
dibangunkan 
 [   ]  pindah ke lokasi lain 
   
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Adakah anda setuju jika kerajaan mengambil balik dan dibatalkan status MAS 
untuk dimajukan? Berikan alasan. 
 [   ]  ya     [   ]  tidak 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Komen akhir: 
 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
 
Sekian, terima kasih 
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JABATAN PENTADBIRAN TANAH 
FAKULTI KEJURUTERAAN DAN SAINS GEOINFORMASI 
UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA 
JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM 
 
 
SOAL SELIDIK (B) 
PROFESIONAL DBKL 
 
 
Pembangunan Semula Tanah MAS Kampong Baru 
Analisis Penawaran Tanah Untuk Maksud Pembangunan 
 
 
 
 
Kajian kes tanah MAS Kampung Baru di Kuala Lumpur akan dikaji agar 
dapat memberikan suatu analisis yang jelas tentang penyelesaian masalah 
pembangunan semula yang ada, iaitu : 
 
• Mengenal pasti perkembangan penawaran dan permintaan tanah bagi tujuan 
pembangunan di Kuala Lumpur.  
• Menilai pembangunan semula tanah di kawasan MAS Kampong Baru dan 
mengkaji potensinya bagi penawaran tanah untuk maksud pembangunan. 
• Mengkaji peranan pemilik tanah, sektor swasta dan pihak kerajaan dalam 
pelaksanaan program pembangunan semula tanah MAS Kampong Baru. 
 
Pihak pengkaji berharap semoga semua pihak yang dilibatkan dalam kajian 
ini dapat memberikan kerjasama yang sewajarnya.  Untuk makluman, hasil kajian 
ini akan dirumus dalam bentuk kajian yang berbentuk akademik dan segala data 
yang diperoleh adalah rahsia. 
 
 
 
Sekian, terima kasih. 
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Nama  : ________________________________ 
Profesion : 
 
 [   ]  Arkitek    [   ]  Penilai 
 [   ]  Perancang    [   ]  Lain-lain, nyatakan  
__________________ 
        
Alamat : ________________________________ 
 
    ________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Bahagian A:  
Pandangan anda mengenai perlunya pembangunan semula tanah kawasan 
MAS Kampong Baru 
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
 
 
1. Perlukah kawasan MAS Kampong Baru sedia ada dibangunkan semula? 
 [   ]  ya, mengapa? 
 [   ]  tidak, nyatakan alasan 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Apakah masalah untuk membangunkan Kampong Baru? 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Adakah pelan pembangunan Kuala Lumpur sudah mengarahkan kepada 
memajukan tanah MAS Kampong Baru?  
 [   ]  ya, nyatakan alasan anda. 
 [   ]  tidak, nyatakan alasan anda. 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
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4. Apakah bentuk pembangunan yang sebaiknya dirancang?, mengapa? 
  
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Menurut pandangan anda, apakah faktor-faktor yang perlu dititikberatkan untuk 
memajukan kawasan ini? (Tandakan 1 hingga 7 berdasarkan keutamaan) 
 [   ]  lokasi     [   ]  pembangunan masa hadapan 
 [   ]  kemudahan laluan   [   ]  sumber kewangan 
 [   ]  gunatanah sekitar   [   ]  lain-lain, nyatakan 
 [   ]  saiz/keluasan tanah             
       
 _________________________________ 
 
6. Siapakah yang perlu dilibatkan di dalam perancangan pembangunan semula 
kawasan tanah MAS Kampong Baru? (Boleh tandakan lebih dari satu) 
 [   ]  Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur [   ]  Perancang / arkitek 
 [   ]  MAS Board    [   ]  Penilai 
 [   ]  Pemaju    [   ]  Pelabur 
 [   ]  Pemilik tanah   [   ]  lain-lain, nyatakan 
 
       
 _________________________________ 
 
7. Siapakah pelaksana pembangunan semula kawasan tanah MAS Kampong Baru 
ini sebaiknya dijalankan? 
 [   ]  Kerajaan sahaja   [   ]  Pemaju sahaja 
 [   ]  Pemilik tanah sahaja   [   ]  Kerajaan dan pemilik tanah 
 [   ]  Pemaju dan pemilik tanah  [   ]  lain-lain, nyatakan 
 [   ]  Kerajaan, pemaju & pemilik tanah  
       
 _________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Bahagian B:  
Pandangan tentang pasaran harta tanah kawasan MAS Kampong Baru 
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
 
8. Apakah pemilik tanah perlu menjual harta tanah mereka demi pembangunan? 
Berikan alasan. 
 [   ]  ya    [   ]  tidak 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
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 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
9. Siapakah pembeli yang akan diberi keutamaan? Berikan alasan. 
  
 _________________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Nilai semasa tanah MAS Kampong Baru di lokasi laluan utama (RM/skp) 
(Jl. Raja Muda Abdul Aziz dan Jl. Raja Abdullah) 
 [   ]  kurang RM200  [   ]  RM301-RM400 
 [   ]  RM200-RM250  [   ]  RM401-RM500 
 [   ]  RM251-RM300  [   ]  lebih RM500     nyatakan RM 
________________ 
 
11. Nilai semasa tanah MAS Kampong Baru di lokasi laluan sekunder (RM/skp) 
 [   ]  kurang RM150  [   ]  RM251-RM300 
 [   ]  RM150-RM200  [   ]  RM301-RM350 
 [   ]  RM201-RM250  [   ]  lebih RM350     nyatakan RM 
________________ 
 
12. Nilai semasa tanah MAS Kampong Baru di lokasi belakang (RM/skp) 
 [   ]  kurang RM100  [   ]  RM151-RM200 
 [   ]  RM100-RM125  [   ]  RM201-RM250 
 [   ]  RM126-RM150  [   ]  lebih RM250    nyatakan RM 
________________ 
 
13. Adakah anda setuju jika kerajaan mengambil balik tanah?  Berikan alasan. 
 [   ]  ya    [   ]  tidak 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Adakah anda setuju kerajaan batalkan status MAS?  Berikan alasan. 
 [   ]  ya    [   ]  tidak 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Bagaimanakah sebaiknya kerajaan menilai tanah mereka? berikan alasan. 
 [   ]  harga ditetapkan kerajaan [   ] harga sesuai harapan pemilik tanah 
 [   ]  mengikuti harga pasaran [   ] lain-lain, nyatakan 
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 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Bahagian C:  
Isu-isu dan masalah-masalah pembangunan semula tanah MAS Kampong 
Baru 
Isikan dan tandakan [√ ] pada pilihan anda 
 
 
16. Isu-isu dan masalah-masalah pembangunan harta tanah MAS Kampong Baru.  
Nyatakan pandangan anda. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Amat sangat 
setuju 
Sangat 
setuju 
Setuju Kurang 
setuju 
Tidak setuju 
 
Bil Isu-isu dan masalah-masalah Penilaian 
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) 
1 Kelemahan pentadbiran pejabat tanah (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
2 Penglibatan pihak berkuasa tempatan (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
3 Sekatan pada dokumen hak milik (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
4 Penilaian harta tanah yang rendah (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
5 Pembayaran pampasan harta tanah (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
6 Faktor fizikal harta tanah yang tidak ekonomik (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
7 Tanah dimiliki lebih daripada seorang pemilik (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
8 Ketersediaan sumber kewangan (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
9 Sekatan pada MAS (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
10 Pemilik tidak mahu membangunkan tanah (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
11 Pemilik ketiadaan kemahiran dan pengetahuan 
yang diperlukan dalam pembangunan 
(  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
12 Kekurangan kemudahan infrastruktur (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
13 Tumpuan hanya ke atas tanah berstatus selain 
MAS 
(  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
14 Kesukaran melaksanakan urusniaga harta tanah (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
 
 
 
 
17. Implikasi yang timbul apabila wujud pelbagai isu dan masalah pembangunan 
berkenaan 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Amat sangat 
setuju 
Sangat 
setuju 
Setuju Kurang 
setuju 
Tidak setju 
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Bil Implikasi isu-isu pembangunan Penilaian 
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) 
1 Pembangunan tidak dapat dilaksanakan (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
2 Wujud status tanah terbiar (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
3 Kemudahan infrastruktur tidak dapat disediakan (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
4 Kualiti hidup dan tahap sosio ekonomi penduduk 
ketinggalan 
(  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
5 Ketidaktentuan nilai harta tanah di pasaran (  )(  )(  )(  )(  ) 
 
18. Cadangan penyelesaian ke atas isu-isu dan permasalahan yang wujud 
  
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
19. Komen akhir 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sekian, terima kasih 
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Lampiran B.1. Rumah tradisional di kawasan MAS Kampong Bharu 
 
 
 
Rajah B.1a. Rumah lama dan tanah parkir 
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Rajah B.1b. Rumah lama dan tanah parkir 
 
 
 
Rajah B.1c. Rumah lama difungsikan untuk kedai 
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Lampiran B.2. Perancangan pembangunan tapak Pasar Minggu 
 
 
 
Rajah B.2a. Pelan pembangunan tapak Pasar Minggu 
 
 
 
 
Rajah B.2b. Pelan pembangunan tapak Pasar Minggu 
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Rajah B.2c. Pelan pembangunan tapak Pasar Minggu 
 
 
 
 
Rajah B.2d. Pelan pembangunan tapak Pasar Minggu 
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APPENDIX D 
 
  PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   An underutilized lot located at Kampong Paya 
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   An underutilized lot located at Jalan Raja Muda Musa 
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A developed lot (Plaza Rah) located at Jalan Raja Abdullah 
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   A developed lot located at Jalan Raja Muda Musa 
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APPENDIX  E - MAPS 
 
 
 
 
High potential of commercial area (Source: Kuala Lumpur City Hall (2006)) 
 
 
 
Main development project plan (Source: Kuala Lumpur City Hall (2006)) 
 
 
